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ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE: TECHNICAL REPORT

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Inquiries and comments regarding the program or this report should be addressed to:

Dr. Morton A. Bertin
Human Sciences Applications Research (Code 457)
Office of Naval Research
800 North Quincy Street
Arlington, VA 22217

or

Dr. Judith Ayres Daly
Program Manager
Cybernetics Technology Office
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
1400 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, VA 22209

ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE: TECHNICAL REPORT

SEPTEMBER 30, 1978

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crisis management problems encountered by the Soviets in the same sample of cases. Chapter 7 provides comparative analyses of Soviet crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems, while Chapter 8 discusses the incidents in the context of other developments in the postwar international system. Appendix A evaluates the reliability and validity of the set of crises examined while Appendix B presents comparisons of major U.S. crisis data sets to support the analysis presented in Chapter 8.

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This volume is one of three prepared for the Crisis Management Program of the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. The four volumes are:

- Technical Report
- Sample Output
- Documentation

They provide an analysis of the post-war Soviet crisis management experience and data on Soviet crisis involvement and concerns in the form of a user-oriented computer aiding system.

Robert B. Mahoney, Jr. served as principal investigator and manager for the project and was senior analyst for the materials presented in the Technical Report. Richard P. Clayberg supervised and conducted much of the data coding and made major contributions to the analyses presented in the Technical Report. His expertise in Soviet studies is reflected throughout the reports. Paul Davis assisted in the coding efforts. Janice Fain was responsible for the design, development, and implementation of the Soviet Crisis Executive Aids; a series of three, interrelated computer programs that are structured to allow users to have ready access to the data bases on Soviet crisis concerns and behaviors that were developed by the project.

The authors express their gratitude to the staff of CACI, Inc.-Federal for producing these reports. Special thanks go to Karen Wolfe, Kathy Harris, Lisa Dueno, and Mara Strock, who typed the volumes under extreme time constraints and Jim Schlotter, editor.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ANALYSIS OF THE SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

This study is part of an overall research program sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA/CTO). This crisis management program is directed towards developing technologies and methodologies to provide improved means for the early warning and management of crises. Among the contributions of CACI to this program have been the development of computer-based decision aids, the compilation of crisis data bases, and the use of quantitative methods to gain new insights into the crisis experience of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries.

MISSION

CACI's mission in analyzing the crisis management experience of the Soviet Union was:

- Compile a chronological list of crises from 1946 through 1975 as perceived by the Soviet Union.
- Gather who, what, where, when, why, and how information for each crisis -- again from the Soviet point of view.
- Select a subset of this crisis list and, using only open, predominately Soviet sources, collect detailed information as to Soviet actions (what), objectives (why), problems in crisis management (what went wrong), and general outcomes (how did it turn out, both for the USSR and for its allies).
- Integrate the data derived from the above collection and from statistical and other types of analysis with previously assembled materials on U.S. crisis experience into an interactive executive decision aid for use by crisis management planners.

METHODOLOGY

Essentially, if the hazards of cultural bias were to be avoided and a reasonably valid portrayal of Soviet perceptions and experience achieved, the research team had, like Alice, to "penetrate the looking glass," that is, to look at world events from the Kremlin's point of view. While doing so, every effort had to be made to produce data that was comparable with that already compiled for the United States. The key problem, of course, was that U.S. and Soviet ideological perceptions, understanding, and use of the term "crisis," and historical experience were widely divergent. Furthermore, the Soviets, for many reasons, tended often to be less than completely forthcoming about important aspects of their perceptions or experience. Thus it was decided to combine Soviet and Western techniques by using Soviet sources to identify and describe crises as the latter are understood by the West. Among the most useful of these sources were official pronouncements of policy at the more recent (19th through 25th) Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the public record of Soviet concerns and behavior at the United Nations, Soviet texts on crises and international relations, and the unique memoirs of Nikita Krushchev. The problem of pokazhuka (the Soviet compulsion to hide facts or feelings seen as displaying weakness) were offset through judicious crosschecking using Western sources.

CRISIS INVENTORY

This collection effort assembled a total list of 386 crises of concern to the USSR covering the period 1946 through 1975. As can be noted from the following example, these events were described from a non-Western point of view:

- 5 January - 21 August 1968: Anti-Socialist counter-revolutionary elements attempt to take Czechoslovakia away from other Socialist nations; fraternal assistance of Soviet Union, other Warsaw Pact (WTO) states counters threat.

TRENDS IN CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS

What broad patterns emerged from analysis of this list of 386 cases? There were significant fluctuations in frequency of occurrence over time ranging from a high in 1967 following a series of earlier peaks to a precipitous drop around 1971. With respect to other types of trends the following were observed:

- An increase in Soviet involvement with small powers after 1966,
- A consistently low level of strategic confrontation, accompanied by a slight drop in great power confrontations of any type after 1971,
- A steady level of threat to Communist parties and regimes, although there is a clear decline in perceived threats to their survival, and
- An increase in the Soviet ability to influence crises militarily, especially beyond its sphere of control (East Europe, and so forth).

Comparison With CACI Research on U.S. Involvement in Crisis Management

There was almost no expressed Soviet concern or involvement in crises occurring in North America; there was a lesser Soviet concern about events in Latin America; and South Asia and a greater interest in the Middle East. Both data bases showed an extremely low frequency of strategic confrontation, while the Soviet list indicated a greater desire on the part of Moscow to bring about a change in the status quo.

Predominant Correlates of Soviet Activity

Higher levels of Soviet crisis involvement were associated with events taking place at or near the Soviet borders, where there was an immediate likelihood of strategic confrontation, and/or where the USSR had a

moderate to substantial military capability that could be used in a crisis management role.

CRISIS ACTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS

Methodology

In consultation with the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR) the CACI research team selected from the list of 386 crises 101 cases for more intensive data collection and analysis. Grouped into three phases, this selection was graduated to give the greatest representation to more recent events, especially those occurring after 1970. Coding variables (the list of questions to be asked for each case) were designed to permit maximum comparability with the U.S. data base, with necessary additions to reflect peculiarly Soviet aspects of crisis management behavior (for instance, concern with other Communist parties).

Coding Problems

Due to the peculiarities of the Soviet system and national character, as well as to the use of open sources, it was found necessary to resort more often to answering coding questions by inference than was the case in coding general crisis characteristics. Further, the basic incompatibility between Soviet and U.S. crisis concerns and behavior rendered many variables drawn from research on the United States less than totally applicable. To reflect these variations in level of coder assurance and question pertinence, assessments were made of the reliability of the coding. As might be expected, the most reliable data on Soviet actions, for instance, were those describing necessarily public behavior such as diplomacy, especially at the United Nations. The least reliable coding for Soviet actions was details on Soviet security assistance (as opposed to general agreements to provide aid) and naturally secretive activities such as intelligence collection and

dissemination. The most reliably coded Soviet objectives involved matters of national prestige and efforts to block opponents. In general, "offensive" objectives proved harder to code than "defensive" goals.

OVERVIEW OF CRISIS ACTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS

Soviet Actions

- Soviet actions employed throughout the entire period: diplomacy, manipulation of conventional forces, and security assistance.
- Especially characteristic of Phase I (1946-1965): manipulation of own military forces (change alert status, repositioning, show of force, maneuvers and exercises), security assistance emphasizing continuity of existing military capabilities (maintenance and other logistical support).
- Especially characteristic of Phases I and II (1946-1970): multilateral political-military diplomatic activity, especially through the United Nations.
- Especially characteristic of Phase III (1971-1975): avoidance of military action, security assistance involving lower Soviet military-related costs and profile (provide economic assistance, provide other military training), and increased unilateral Soviet action.

Soviet Objectives

- Preservation of own and allied interests, blocking opponents, prestige, avoidance of direct involvement, favorable alteration of status quo.
- Especially characteristic of Cold War era: concern with preservation of Soviet buffer system.
- Phase II (1966-1970): protection of own and allied legal and political rights.
- Phase III (1971-1975): limiting of Western influence in the Third World, renewed support of insurgencies

(but not as orthodox Marxist-Leninist in nature as during the Cold War) and renewed concern with maintenance of the Soviet alliance system.

Soviet Problems

- Common to all phases: activities and interests of other actors, Soviet perceptions, attitudes, and ideological concerns.
- Steady decrease across the three phases: Soviet concern over key geopolitical regions (for example, East Europe), fear of Western encirclement, inadequacies in actions and timing, and constraints on Soviet military action.
- Steady increase across the three phases: chronic, overlapping crises; crises in areas hostile to the USSR; Soviet sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties; and various logistical problems.

A Search for Interconnections

Analyses of relationships among crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems in the non-random sample of 101 crises revealed:

- Provision of security assistance and altering of the alert status of conventional Soviet forces were more frequent during earlier years, when the crisis locale was in the Third World, and as Soviet military crisis management capabilities increased.
- Crises occurring in geopolitically sensitive regions tended to lead to Soviet alterations in the alert status of their conventional forces, to more unilateral diplomatic moves, and to less reliance on the United Nations (for example, in East Europe, Iran or along the Chinese frontier).
- In geopolitically sensitive areas where the chief Soviet motivation was to change the existing status quo, the USSR showed more interest in getting the target regime to adopt different policies and in containing Chinese countermoves; by way of contrast, however, the USSR did not, under such circumstances, tend to favor the restoration of peace (for example, Arab-Israeli conflict, Cyprus).

- Where the USSR faced threats to Communist parties and/or regimes and desired to alter or restore the status quo ante, the Soviet leadership tended to be sensitive to criticism from other Communist parties and to have problems caused by limited in-theater experience (for example, the Cuban missile crisis and Vietnam War).
- Soviet employment of security assistance tended to be tied to goals of restoring peace (for example, Vietnam War, Angola, Ethiopia), bringing about the fall of a regime (for example, South Vietnam, Rhodesia, Portuguese colonies in Africa), or denial of military access (that is, Western and Chinese).
- The USSR was generally able to take adequate actions to solve crises when its goal was to preserve a regime from internal threat, as long as it was not excessively worried about the possibility of Chinese interference (for example, Nigerian civil war) and did not need to worry about dissuading other actors from undertaking new policies.

Finally, analysis of the international environment in which postwar Soviet crisis concerns were formed revealed that Soviet concerns tended to vary in accordance with such factors as the rhythm of the policy cycle within the CPSU, Soviet behaviors towards the U.S. and PRC, the level of conflict throughout the world, and Soviet perception of U.S.-Soviet relations and the correlation of forces.

General Assessment

The above insights show a remarkable overall fidelity to the assessments made by many more qualitatively oriented students of Soviet foreign involvement in the period following World War II. The picture presented is one of steady growth in power, horizons, understanding, and experience. As the USSR overcame its Stalin-era fears of foreign encroachment and turned its attention outward, its leaders became more self-confident and the mix of policy tools they employed was adjusted to meet the new circumstances and opportunities. At the same time, however, Soviet lines of communications extended and its leaders found themselves increasingly

involved in those chronic crises not of their own making that are the cross of the genuine superpower.

CONCLUSION

CACI's analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience has had two major accomplishments. These achievements reflect an integration of traditional-style research on Soviet political-military behavior with state-of-the-art developments in information processing.

The project's first accomplishment has been the development and analysis of comprehensive data bases on postwar Soviet crisis concerns. To the extent practicable, these data have been produced to capture Soviet perspectives and incorporate many of the insights that have been developed in the field of Soviet studies.

Second, these data on postwar Soviet crisis concerns and actions have been made accessible to policymakers and analysts in two ways: the present report, which outlines the major trends and patterns in Soviet crisis concerns, and the companion Soviet Crisis Executive Aids, a series of three user-oriented interactive computer programs, which allow users to perform their own analyses.

In addition to providing information and analytical capabilities that are important in their own right as planning precedents for U.S. crisis managers, the project's analyses also provide a necessary base for further research. Coupled with CACI's previous research on postwar U.S. crises, they provide the analytical base required to address one of the major outstanding questions in the field of crisis management: the outcomes (consequences and concomitants) of superpower crisis management operations.

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

This report presents an analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience from 1946 to 1975. It is part of a project sponsored by the Cybernetics Technology Office of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA/CTO) as part of its Crisis Management Program. This chapter reviews the ARPA/CTO Crisis Management Program and CACI's research within this Program, summarizes CACI's Soviet crisis project, and outlines the remainder of the report.

THE ARPA CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Four of the major classes of products that have been produced within the ARPA Crisis Management Program are:

- Computer-based decision aids that can be employed in national and major command-level operations centers during crisis management activities to provide better crisis indications and warning.
- Data bases on the changing character of U.S. crisis management operations including crisis characteristics, the actions that the United States has employed in these incidents, the objectives it has pursued, and the crisis management problems encountered.
- New quantitative methods for crisis advance warning, monitoring, and management.
- Reports summarizing
 - U.S. crisis management activities from 1946 through 1976,
 - The typical problems encountered in crisis management,

- Current opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and
- Research gaps in planning for better national security crisis management.

Wide-ranging research has been directed toward each of these areas by ARPA since 1974. Initial work through 1976 was directed toward certain basic research themes prerequisite to effective technology development in the social sciences. Characteristic of this type of research were CACI's attempts to inventory past U.S. crises (CACI, 1975) and to identify the major patterns of problems encountered in past U.S. crises (CACI, 1976).

By 1976, however, a corner had been turned in the research needs for crisis management. Significant new information had been developed directly applicable to producing user-oriented, computer-based aids to:

- Assist defense operations centers in identifying what indicator and warning patterns signal the onset of a crisis and
- Develop option generation and evaluation aids to assist crisis managers after the crisis has begun.

CACI'S ROLE IN THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

CACI's efforts within the Crisis Management Program contribute to four classes of research products:

- Computer-based decision aids applicable to national and major command centers during crisis management activities.
- Data bases on the changing nature of crises, problems likely to be encountered, the types of objectives sought, actions taken, and the results achieved.
- New quantitative methods for analyzing U.S. and foreign crisis experiences.

- Substantive reports summarizing the problems of crisis management, opportunities for improving crisis management techniques and decision-making, and research gaps in the field of planning for better national security crisis management.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationships among these various classes of products in ARPA's Crisis Management Program. CACI's initial attempts to reconceptualize crises and to develop an inventory of U.S. crises began in FY75 (CACI, 1975). These efforts were continued and expanded during FY76 in CACI's major assessment of the background characteristics and problems encountered in a sample of U.S. crises between 1946 and 1975 (CACI, 1976).

Analysis during FY76 indicated four major directions for additional research. First, one tangent of the research (Shaw, et al., 1976) identified terrorist-induced crises as a growing area of concern. Subsequent analyses have identified research and development gaps in this area (CACI, 1977a). Second, a need was identified to reduce crisis management problems by determining the most effective set of actions for different crisis contexts and policy objectives. Accordingly, CACI's efforts during early FY77 focused on examining the relationships among U.S. crisis actions and policy objectives and developing a prototype computer-aiding system for crisis managers that incorporates these empirical relationships (CACI, 1977b). During FY78 this prototype system was developed into CACI's executive aid for crisis managers (CACI, 1978a). The executive aid provides national security planners with ready access to data concerning U.S. crisis characteristics, actions, objectives, and problems over the span 1946-1976. The design characteristics of this aiding system (described in CACI, 1978b) allow planners to have ready access to these data in the course of searching for precedents when planning for ongoing or anticipated crises. Finally, the need for data on the crisis management behaviors of potential adversaries was identified leading to the present project.

CACI'S SOVIET CRISIS PROJECT

CACI's analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience entails a number of tasks and subtasks.

- Develop an inventory of Soviet crisis management activities covering the 1946-1975 time frame.
- Identify and collect data on the characteristics of these events to show the nature of Soviet military crises.
- Select (in consultation with the COTR) a subset of these crises for inclusion in more detailed coding and analyses.
- Analyze this subset of the crises to identify
 - Crisis environments that may affect the occurrence of problems in crisis management,
 - Problems encountered by the Soviet Union in crisis management,
 - Soviet actions and objectives, and
 - Some of the general results of these crises.
- Add these data to the executive decision aid system previously developed by CACI (1978a) for analyzing U.S. crises.

The results of this project provide U.S. national security planners with the most comprehensive data bases (and associated analyses) dealing with Soviet crisis behavior and crisis concerns ever produced. Moreover, this information is presented in a form that facilitates access to the data (a highly user-oriented computer executive aid). This allows crisis managers and planners to conduct better reviews of past crises (both Soviet and U.S.) in the course of considering action options for ongoing or anticipated crises.

OUTLINE OF THE REPORT

This volume is divided into eight chapters and two appendices. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the methodology used to identify 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union in the postwar period. Chapter 3 presents a chronological list of these incidents, along with short narrative descriptions of each case. Chapter 4 focuses on the 386 crises to trace the evolution of Soviet crisis management behavior since World War II.

A sample of 101 cases was drawn and subjected to more intensive coding to identify Soviet crisis actions, objectives, and crisis management problems. The characteristics of this sample and analyses of the actions and objectives data are presented in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 analyzes the crisis management problems data. Chapter 7 provides comparative analyses of the relationships which these three intensive sample data bases have with one another and with the crisis characteristics coded for all 386 events. Finally, Chapter 8 returns to the entire set of 386 crises and examines them in the context of other developments in the international system and in Soviet affairs over the period 1946-1975. Appendix A evaluates the reliability and validity of the list of 386 crises. Appendix B compares the major U.S. crisis data files to support the U.S.-Soviet comparisons conducted in Chapter 8.

CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFYING THE SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents the research strategy employed by CACI to identify the Soviet postwar crisis management experience. The application of this strategy has produced a set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the period 1946-1975 and data on the characteristics of these incidents, Soviet actions and objectives, and the crisis management problems encountered by the Soviet Union. This set of cases is presented in Chapter 3.

Two criteria were used to develop this methodology. First, to the extent feasible, crises were identified from the perspective of Soviet observers. In order to adequately account for and forecast Soviet crisis management behavior, it was seen as essential to deal with the perceptions that prompt and correlate with Soviet actions. The second criterion was that, to the extent practicable, the Soviet crisis experience data base should be developed in a form compatible with previous data files dealing with U.S. crisis behavior developed by CACI for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) (CACI, 1978a). This would allow for indepth comparisons of the crisis management experiences of the two superpowers.

These two criteria presented a major analytical dilemma since Soviet and Western approaches to crises and crisis management differ substantially. Reconciliation of the two partially conflicting criteria formed the core of the research strategy. Anticipating the conclusions of the arguments to be presented, the resolution of the dilemma involves using Soviet sources to identify crisis events, where these events were defined in terms similar to those used in Western crisis studies.

The sections of this chapter deal with:

- Western approaches to crises and their limitations for the analysis of Soviet crisis behavior
- Soviet approaches and the problems they pose for analysis
- The means used to reconcile the two criteria, and
- The research strategy:
 - Operational definition and treatment of special cases and
 - Sources employed to identify crises of concern to the Soviet Union.

WESTERN APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF CRISES

Major Approaches

Each of the three major recent projects dealing with U.S. crisis operations during the postwar years, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), CACI, and Brookings efforts, has employed a different definition of "crisis." In the CNA International Incidents project (Mahoney, 1977b), U.S. crises were defined as

- Any actions taken by the National Command Authorities involving the U.S. Armed Forces,
- In conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United States,
- Other than in the course of general or limited war,
- And, with the exception of a few categories of operations (such as humanitarian relief efforts),
- That were reported at a given level in the U.S. political-military policy process.

In this approach, events were considered to be "critical" (crises) if they were highlighted in important service-level and national-level documents, for example, the Operational Summary of the National Military Command Center, the yearly histories produced by each Unified Command, and fleet command histories.

CACI's research (1976) on U.S. crisis operations defined "crises" as instances of extraordinary military management. The formal definition of a "crisis" was

A period of increased military management activity at the national level that is carried on in a sustained manner under conditions of rapid action and response resulting from unexpected events or incidents that have occurred internationally, internally in a foreign country, or in the domestic United States and that have inflicted or threatened to inflict violence or significant damage to U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities.

Each incident identified as a crisis meets at least one of the following criteria:

- Direct involvement of U.S. military forces in the incident.
- A military decision on the incident required or made.
- Subsequent military involvement of U.S. forces.
- An existing threat of violence or significant damage to U.S. interests, personnel, or facilities.
- The need for rapid military action and response.

Instances of humanitarian assistance or military action during a war (such as Korea or Vietnam) occurring after the commitment of U.S. forces were not included in the crisis listing. Once these criteria were established, an inventory of incidents since 1946 that met the definition was developed.

The Brookings project (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) focused on political uses of the U.S. Armed Forces.

A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.

The criteria used to identify events in these three recent projects share one major factor in common: all use organizational processes within the U.S. Government to identify crisis events. The projects differ, however, in terms of the type of organizational process examined. The CNA effort employed a source-based definition, using references to incidents in certain types of official U.S. documents as the mechanism for case identification. The CACI and Brookings efforts, on the other hand, employed event-type definitions involving extraordinary U.S. military management activity (CACI) or certain types of actions and intentions on the part of the U.S. National Command Authorities (Brookings).¹

In their focus on organizational processes, these three projects differ from two prevailing approaches to the identification and analysis of crises in the Western academic literature. In one of these approaches (Hermann, 1972) an intra-actor definition is used, with situations considered to be crises if they entail threats to one or more important goals of a state, allow only a short time for decision before the situation is significantly transformed, and occur as a surprise to decision-makers.² Hermann's definition focuses on the perceptual perspective of

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These two approaches were also implicitly source-based in terms of the materials that were available to the two research teams.

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Recently there has been a tendency for researchers using an intra-actor definition to omit surprise as one of the definitional characteristics

national decision-makers, a perspective that is very difficult for researchers to capture, even with access to classified materials. The other major academic approach (McClelland, 1972) focuses on interactor factors, with crises being defined in terms of unusual manifestations in the interflow of activity between nations.

Limitations of Western Approaches

These Western analyses of crises have produced a body of research that is both analytically rich and policy relevant. However, despite the merits of this research, some major problems occur when these Western approaches are applied to the analysis of Soviet crisis behavior. The reasons for these problems are:

- Fundamental differences between Soviet and Western approaches to the analysis of social phenomena in general and political-military factors in particular
- Differences in the positions from which the Soviet Union and the United States approach crisis management
- Differences in policy style between the Soviet Union and major Western powers
- The limited access that Westerners have to data concerning Soviet crisis behavior
- Various forms of direct and indirect bias that can affect Western analyses of Soviet behavior

Differences Between Soviet and Western Approaches to Crisis Analysis.

The first problem is that Soviet analyses of international politics, national security policy, and international crises (along with all other Soviet analyses of social phenomena) differ markedly from those commonly

since nations may deliberately attempt to provoke a crisis (see, for example, Michael Brecher's informal remarks at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis, March 1976).

found in the West.³ These differences are far more subtle, and significant, than simply the use of Marxist-Leninist terms and concepts in Soviet analysis. The most obvious and directly relevant difference is that Soviet authors do not distinguish between "political" and "military" factors in the way in which U.S. analysts customarily do. (This difference is considered in detail in the next section of the paper, which focuses on Soviet approaches to the analysis of crises.)

Soviet analyses tend to be less "event," episode, or incident oriented than is true in the West. Instead, Soviet analysts, using what they refer to as a "dialectical" approach, tend to focus on contextual/systemic factors (the relations that sets of events have with one another) and on longer-term trends and processes (for example, Gantmann, 1972). This emphasis on clusters of factors and longer-term perspectives often leads to the classification of events in terms of "stages," which are longer in duration and broader in scope than comparable "crisis events" in Western data files (for example, Yukhananov's (1972) analysis of the stages in the Southeast Asian conflicts since World War II).⁴

Differences Between Soviet and U.S. Positions.

The second difficulty arises from the positions from which the two superpowers approached crises during the postwar period. The United States emerged from the Second World War with substantial general purpose military forces suitable for farflung crisis operations, an undamaged economy

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Obviously, all Western analyses are not alike. Some Western Marxian analyses share many of the structural emphases found in the Soviet studies cited. The distinction being made is, however, valid for the body of Western crisis management literature being considered.

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A common criticism in the Soviet scholarly literature is that Western analyses employing quantitative techniques tend to focus on too narrow a range of concerns and thereby miss the systemic context which influences behaviors, (for example, Melikhov's recent (1977) review of U.S. quantitative international relations studies employing factor analysis).

capable of supporting further military construction, and a vast network of contacts with the preponderance of non-Communist nations and colonies. The Soviets, on the other hand, were devastated during the war. While militarily victorious, their economic base was substantially damaged, casualties were severe, and their forces were not structured for distant crisis operations. Moreover, Soviet policy miscalculations (Stalin's two-camp theory) and Western policies largely isolated the Soviet Union from contacts with other nations, particularly with what would become the Third World.⁵

This difference affected the Soviet crisis management experience in two ways. The first was that the Soviet Union had proportionately less in the way of resources to devote to the construction of "crisis managing" forces in the early postwar years (for example, general purpose naval forces). More significantly, their relative isolation presented them with a different set of crisis management policy problems than were faced by Western nations. While Western nations faced the problem of marshaling forces to support allied nations or factions, particularly in the Third World, the Soviet Union had to develop its contacts in order to gain allies among the newly independent states. These differences in position in all likelihood affected the types of crisis management practiced by the two superpowers.

Differences in Style.

A third reason why it is difficult to analyze Soviet crisis management behavior from Western analytical perspectives is that the Soviet Union has employed a different style of crisis management policy than has been used by major Western nations. These differences in style pertain to both the military policy instruments that the Soviet leadership has

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Stalin's two-camp theory discounted the independence of the former colonies, making them less attractive targets for Soviet contacts (Zimmerman, 1969).

elected to build and the ways in which these instruments have been employed.

Since World War II the Soviet Union has placed less emphasis in its military acquisition programs on developing projection forces (particularly naval projection forces) than has the United States.⁶ During the postwar period the Soviet Navy has had very limited amphibious and sea-borne air capabilities.⁷ While the absence of these forces during the early postwar period could be partially accounted for on the basis of the impact of the Second World War, the persistence of these gaps in Soviet crisis management capabilities is the result of implicit and explicit resource allocation decisions by the Soviet leadership.⁸

The Soviet Union has also been much less prone than Western states such as the United States to employ its armed forces actively in political roles (military aid excepted) in areas that do not border on the homeland or its immediate periphery (in the Soviet case the Soviet Union proper and Eastern Europe) (Hamburg, 1977). This policy style has even extended to relatively innocuous forms of political-military activity, such as naval port visits, which did not begin in the postwar era until 1953 and did not become relatively frequent until the mid-1960's, two decades after the end of the war (McGwire, 1975).

A number of nonexclusive factors might account for the different ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union have approached crises. One

⁶ This contrast is emphasized by the fact that the Navy has been the most frequently employed force in U.S. crisis management operations (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976).

⁷ The Soviet naval infantry force was only reformed (following its postwar dissolution) in the 1960's; its current strength is approximately one-tenth that of the U.S. Marine Corps.

⁸ There is some evidence that the Soviet leadership during the late Stalin era intended to construct a Western-style general purpose force navy with attendant projection/crisis management capabilities and that this set of policies was deliberately reversed following the death of Stalin (Herrick, 1968).

is that the Soviets may have a different view of the appropriate mix of policy instruments to employ. In his analysis of the role of military force in international relations, General Kulish notes concerning military presence that:

The problem of military presence, similar to any other large military-strategic problem, is first of all an economic and political problem and only thereafter does it become a military problem. If we view the problem of Soviet military presence in this light, then we immediately note that the USSR is following a policy that is basically different from the American plan. It has its own historical, economic, and geographic peculiarities which, distinct from those of the USA, will not allow it or require it to maintain a military presence in remote regions of the world (1972: 102).

A similar logic may be employed by the Soviets in crisis management situations, leading to a less active military diplomacy (again, with the exception of military aid) and a greater relative mix of nonmilitary policy instruments in Soviet political-military diplomacy.

A second factor that might account for aspects of Soviet crisis management policy has to do with the concern expressed by Soviet authors about the dangers of crisis escalation. This concern reflects the increased tendency of the largest global powers to become almost immediately involved in international incidents, the strong "uncontrolled element" which exists in modern international crises (for example, the actions of allied states which might not be completely controllable by superpowers), and the obvious danger that a crisis might lead to nuclear war (Zhurkin, 1975). Zhurkin also notes that participation in international crises may provoke domestic crises as happened in France in the early 1960's due to the Algerian crisis.

On the basis of an analysis of Soviet military writings, Jones (1975) argues that the Soviets are quite concerned with the potential negative domestic ramifications that might follow involvement in foreign wars.

In fact, a case has been made that one reason behind apparent Soviet reluctance to commit armed forces beyond its immediate sphere of control (that is, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe) is the fear of the impact that such exposure might have on the military personnel involved (as exemplified by the Decembrist revolt, and by Stalin's brutal treatment of Soviet personnel involved in the Spanish civil war (Ulam, 1968: 245) or who became prisoners of war during World War II (Medvedev, 1973: 467-469)).

These differences in crisis management policy style have direct implications for analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience. In analyzing U.S. crisis operations, events of major concern to the United States can be identified on the basis of overt military operations that are conducted in conjunction with these crises. Such approaches have been successfully employed in the Brookings, CNA, and CACI U.S. crisis projects. When analyzing the Soviet crisis management experience, on the other hand, this approach will not suffice since the Soviets do not always make an overt military response (by choice or out of necessity) to all crises of concern to them. The problem is not that the Soviets have fewer crisis concerns than major nations in the West. In their writings the Soviets are quite direct about expressing their interests even when they do not carry out a Western-style military crisis response in conjunction with the crisis. As a consequence, to capture the crisis events of concern to the Soviet Union in the postwar period, a new approach must be fashioned that is responsive to the different perceptions and style of crisis management employed by the Soviet Union.

Limits Upon Western Access to Soviet Data.

Westerners have limited access to data concerning Soviet crisis behavior. Soviet authors and spokespersons are notoriously reticent and secretive concerning all aspects of Soviet military behavior, including military operations during crises (Newhouse, 1973; Leitenberg, 1974). While the

Soviets do publish works dealing with their major foreign policy actions and with postwar international crises, the volume and quality of material available are substantially less than that available to U.S. researchers in the Western open-source crisis literature. Foreign students of the Soviet crisis management experience can never be "insiders" in the way that was true for analysts working on the major U.S. crisis projects. An effective research strategy must take this difficulty into account.

Finally, some obvious problems arise when Western sources, such as those employed in the major U.S. crisis projects, are used to identify or describe the Soviet crisis experience. Western media, government publications, and academic analyses never cover all events taking place in the world; only some of the news is "fit to print," given policy and public interests existing in a given country at a given point in time. As a result, there is a real danger that any analysis which relies primarily on Western source materials may not capture the true images of Soviet crisis behavior as seen by Soviet eyes.⁹ To cite one example (elaborated in Appendix A), Soviet commentaries on crisis events pay much less attention to border and transit events such as those associated with West Berlin prior to the 1970's than Western sources. Similarly, few Western sources express Soviet concerns regarding the repression inflicted on minor Marxist-Leninist and other leftist movements in the Third World as vividly as is found in Soviet media (for example, a special section of the Documents and Resolutions of the 25th Party Congress is devoted to the fate of such movements in Latin America and other Third World regions).

SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE ANALYSIS OF CRISES

Similarities and differences exist between Soviet and Western analyses of crisis management behavior. An effective research strategy for the

⁹ Moreover, to the extent that perspectives on Soviet crisis behaviors filtered through the medium of Western sources are desired, the most directly relevant sets of precedents for U.S. planners (U.S. crises involving the Soviet Union) are already partially available in existing U.S. crisis data bases (for example, CACI, 1978a).

identification of the Soviet crisis management experience must take both factors into account.

This section deals with three aspects of Soviet analyses. In the first two, differences from Western approaches are emphasized, while the third highlights similarities. The three aspects are

- The way in which Soviet authors link "political" and "military" subjects and, in so doing, avoid making common Western distinctions between the two factors.
- The various ways in which the Soviets define the term "crisis".
- The Soviet crisis management literature, a fairly recent development, which both emulates and interprets comparable Western studies.

The Soviet Approach to "Political" and "Military" Subjects

To the average American, steeped in a tradition of the separation of war from peace and military from civilian, the common temptation is to assume that such an arrangement can safely be projected onto other political cultures. In the case of the Soviet Union, the available evidence suggests a different picture.

In Lenin's eyes war was indeed as Clausewitz had defined it, "simply the continuation of politics by other (that is, violent) means" (Lenin, Collected Works, cited in Byely, et al., 1972). However, this was not sufficient. To be meaningful, the idea of war, had to be placed in the context of the class struggle, making it, like all other socio-historical phenomena, subject to the laws of Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, it was held that war "is first and foremost a continuation of domestic [rather than foreign] policy," since the latter expressed "the class structure of society most directly" (Byely, et al., 1972).

To the Soviets, the struggle against the opponents of historical inevitability and human progress must continue on all fronts (note Brezhnev's recent, angry rebuff to D'Estang's suggestion to stop the production of hostile propaganda). Detente is, in effect, full-scale "political" or "competitive war" limited only by a mutual recognition of the counterproductive nature of open, armed conflict, (which the West understands as war). The result is an at least partly deliberate fostering of an asymmetry of understanding as to the nature of war and peace (aided more or less unwittingly by Western misperceptions).

An ideological view of war and the military as a seamless, integral subset of total national policy is reflected in the nature of Soviet society and in the apportionment of roles and responsibilities within the Soviet party/government structure. As Odom (1976) implies, Russian society has had to adopt, through force of internal and external circumstances, many of the characteristics of military social structure -- rigid, explicit hierarchy; military and military-type titles; and a plethora of uniforms. The revolution of 1917 powerfully reinforced this broad tendency by superimposing on it a political philosophy demanding an even higher degree of hierarchical subordination as well as a total mobilization of all national resources -- spiritual, cultural, physical, and financial -- to unremitting combat against a surrounding host of domestic and foreign enemies. However, it was not just the active opponents of the new order that had to be dealt with. The indifferent masses and even many of the faithful had to be galvanized for sudden, radical change. The utopian elements in Marxism thus served to "add to the pressures for total control" (Rothman, 1970).

Both MccGwire (1977) and Mackintosh (1973) point out that the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has total responsibility for the articulation and implementation of overall national policy by "all of the organs of the Soviet state, including the military organ" (MccGwire, 1977: 53). In institutional terms this means that the Politburo determines

basic general policy. Policy is then carried out by a series of executive and watchdog hierarchies (for example, the Higher Defense Council, Ministry of Defense, KGB, CPSU, and various economic and administrative ministries). Due to "multi-hat" responsibilities of the ruling elite (often referred to as an interlocking directorate) and to deliberate overlapping of missions, the degree of functional separation of purview within the system is less clear than that found in a comparable Western polity. As Odom (1973) notes, the military is most accurately described as "an administrative arm of the party, not something separate from and competing with it."

This unification of "political" and "military" factors is carried forward in Soviet defense analyses. For example, in a major analysis of the balance of power, Tomashevsky (1974: 73) explicitly asserts that the balance cannot be evaluated solely on the basis of military factors. In his view, economic, political, ideological, and "moral" factors are equally integral in the balance of power or correlation of forces.¹⁰ Similarly, Proektor notes (1972: 43) that "international conflicts contain two aspects which are inseparably connected to one another -- a political and a military aspect."

This Soviet analytical practice has direct bearing on the analysis of the Soviet crisis management experience. In a sense that is not true in the West, it is fair to say that the Soviets have not had (in their eyes) any "military" crises since World War II. Instead, they have been involved in what they would term (again using Tomashevsky's (1974) terminology) "military-political" and "military-strategic" events. Military-political events are the elements involved in the Soviet crisis management experience.

¹⁰ Used in this sense, "moral" refers to domestic morale, internal support for the regime, and Soviet international prestige.

Soviet Definitions of Crisis

Soviet analyses also differ from Western studies in the ways in which "crisis" is defined. When dealing with political and political-military affairs, Soviet authors use the term "crisis" in three senses. The most basic of these is the "general crisis of capitalism." This term refers to the major change in the international political environment brought on by the 1917 Bolshevik coup d'etat. The success of the revolution "divided the world into two irreconcilably warring camps," one, the socialist (that is, Marxist-Leninist), inexorably rising, the other, the capitalist, seen as doomed to destruction (Aleksandrov, et al., 1940).¹¹

The second definition, identified as "governmental crisis," appears to be almost identical to Western usage with respect to cabinet crises in European parliamentary systems, wherein a parliamentary vote of no confidence or serious interministerial conflict effectively halts all governmental action above the routine level. Again, by definition, such crises are restricted to the "bourgeois system" (Aleksandrov, et al., 1940: 437).

A more sophisticated¹² Soviet attempt to come to terms with the idea of crisis is found in Zhurkin (1975), who defines international crisis or conflict as a "direct, immediate, political clash between states... and as exhibiting a tendency to grow (sometimes rather quickly) into a military conflict" (Zhurkin, 1975: 13). He notes that crises are "the result of a sharp, explosive intensification of contradictions in the international arena. Such conflicts are frequently preceded by local crisis

¹¹ Although Aleksandrov, et al.'s Political Dictionary is now nearly four decades old, it has yet to be replaced. While a document of the Stalin era, virtually the entire current Soviet leadership was raised, educated, and achieved major career advancement under Stalin, and many of the central concepts of that era, such as the general crisis of capitalism, continue to be employed in Soviet analyses (for example, Afanasyev, et al., 1974).

¹² "Sophistication" here refers to the elaboration of Zhurkin's arguments in terms of Marxist-Leninist concepts and categories in comparison to the other Soviet writers cited.

situations brought on by aggressive and reactionary forces, as was the case, for example, with the Saigon regime at the end of the 1950's through early 1960's or Israel in the summer of 1967" (Zhurkin, 1975: 14).

To be fully understood, Zhurkin's definition must be supplemented by his views as to the causes of such international crises. Predictably, Zhurkin holds that, whatever their type, "major international conflicts do not arise by accident; rather they come about as the result of conscious acts of aggression" (never, naturally, on the part of the Soviet Union, its allies, or clients). "The basic groups of contradictions which traditionally give rise to the overwhelming majority of contemporary international conflicts," according to Zhurkin, include:

- "The main contradiction of the present epoch, that between socialism and capitalism."
- "The contradictions between imperialism and a national liberation movement, which imperialism attempts to decide to its advantage through the help of colonial forces deployed against the liberation movements."
- Contradictions "among imperialist powers."
- Contradictions "between imperialism and developing nations."
- Contradictions "among independent developing nations of the 'Third World.'"

In his footnote to the above list, Zhurkin explains why "local politico-military conflicts can arise between" certain "chauvinistic and nationalistic" regimes and "socialist states" (that is, between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union); "however," he points out, "such a development of events is a historical exception" (that is, falls outside the otherwise all-encompassing concepts of Marxist-Leninist doctrine).

A final point of interest is his assertion that while, "on the whole, there are many reasons for the existence of basic international conflicts, . . . only as the result of interference (either direct or indirect) on the part of one or more major imperialist powers do local conflicts begin to threaten peace" either in the local conflict area or on a global scale (Zhurkin, 1975: 15).

In sum, then, it can be concluded that, from the Soviet point of view,

- Crises arise from contradictions (that is, basic conflicts) in the fabric of international politics,
- They can arise between opposed ideological systems or among capitalist powers and Third World nations,
- They are never accidental but always deliberately provoked, and
- The Soviet Union and its allies by definition never have crises and never start crises (to cite Aleksandrov, et al. (1940: 654), "The USSR is the only country in the world which knows no crises," and Brezhnev (1977), "It is a question, obviously, of the crisis afflicting the capitalist countries. Neither the Soviet Union nor the other socialist countries experience crises").

The Soviet Crisis Management Literature

The Soviet crisis management literature is a relatively recent phenomenon.¹³ This body of research differs from earlier Soviet studies of crises in that it consists of the first attempts at a systematic study of international conflicts (and crises) in the Soviet scholarly literature and in that it explicitly analyzes (and, to some extent, emulates)

¹³ The major works in this literature to date are Zhurkin and Primakov (1972), Zhurkin (1975), and Kulish (1972). The introduction to Zhurkin and Primakov (1972) states that it is the first systematic analysis of its type in the Soviet scholarly literature.

Western crisis management literature. Soviet analyses in this literature contain some striking similarities to Western analyses in their treatment of communication and signaling in crises and in their evaluation of attempts to formally model international conflicts.

One of the key concepts in the Western crisis literature has been the central role played by signaling (particularly signaling involving the "language of deeds" or movements of armed forces) in crisis interactions (for example, George and Smoke, 1974). This emphasis on intracrisis communications has direct counterparts in the Soviet crisis management literature. For example, Gantmann (1972) calls attention to such factors as the tendency for crises to bring the two superpowers into contact with one another even if they were not initially involved in the crisis, communication during crises through the actions of armed forces, and the use of negotiations (one form of institutionalized communication) to mitigate or limit ongoing crises and conflicts. In the same vein, Gromyko (1972a) presents a detailed Soviet analysis of superpower communications during the Cuban missile crisis.

This recognition of the importance of signaling and communications is significant because it suggests (without necessarily proving) that the Soviet Union may also recognize broader forms of crisis signaling and communications that are required to allow antagonists to make predictions about one another's behavior. Major powers have traditionally attempted to make such signals (an example is the U.S. Monroe Doctrine, which allows other major powers to anticipate a forceful U.S. reaction to any attempts by extrahemispheric powers to intervene in Latin America). It is possible that the Soviets may use their open literature to index their principal concerns (that subset of crises of particular interest to them) to both foreign and domestic audiences. This would seem to be particularly likely where the Soviets have made the special effort of translating such writing into one or more common international languages.

A related development of interest, which is found in both the Soviet crisis management literature and, more generally, throughout the Soviet social science literature, is a sympathetic attitude toward attempts to model political phenomena formally through techniques such as factor analysis and regression (for example, Melikhov, 1977; Fedorov, 1975; and Osipov and Andreyenkov, 1974). The Western efforts reviewed by these authors are criticized for their "bourgeois" theoretical bases and their failures to consider the systemic aspects of behaviors, particularly the complex interdependencies among political, military, and sociological variables. Nevertheless, a genuine interest in and sympathy toward these more formal techniques arises in the works and extends to the development of systematic machine-readable data bases. In his review of the use of forecasting methodologies in U.S. foreign policy, Kokoshin (1975) singles out the development of computerized "information banks" by U.S. analysts as an area deserving attention from Soviet scholars.

The significance of this analytical trend for this project is direct. It suggests that the present attempt to develop a systematic data base dealing with Soviet crisis management behavior that will be embedded in the form of a computerized decision aid is consistent with recent Soviet analytical emphases and hence that the style of analysis to be employed does not do violence to Soviet analytical perceptions.

RECONCILIATION OF THE TWO CRITERIA

Approach

The two criteria employed in developing the research strategy to identify the Soviet crisis management experience are:

- To identify crises as perceived by Soviet observers in order to obtain a Soviet perspective on the Soviet crisis management experience, and
- To develop the Soviet crisis experience data base in a form compatible with previous data files

dealing with U.S. crisis behavior developed by CACI for ARPA to facilitate comparative analyses of the crisis management experiences of the two superpowers.

These two criteria conflict to some extent because of the differences between Soviet and Western approaches to the analysis and management of crises outlined in the preceding sections.

The research strategy developed in response to these criteria is to use Soviet sources to identify Western-style crises. This strategy employs elements from both the Soviet and Western approaches outlined previously. Major elements taken from the Western perspective include the following:

- The treatment of crisis events as discrete episodes (in contrast to the Soviet tendency to focus on longer-term crises which, in some cases, span decades).
- A focus on negative events (viewing crises as turning points, Soviet authors would focus on both negative and positive events; examples of the latter would include major Soviet accords with Western nations which have settled outstanding Cold War issues such as the status of Berlin).
- The definition of crisis events in terms of their actual or potential negative impact on political-military values or interests (one of the three defining elements of crisis employed by Hermann (1972)).
- The employment of an organizational process (citation of an incident in a Soviet source) to identify cases, much as CNA's International Incidents project used official U.S. source materials to identify Navy and Marine Corps crisis operations (since Soviet sources are both approved and published by party and governmental bodies, publication constitutes a form of organizational process in a way that is not true for the Western open-source literature).

Major elements taken from the Soviet perspective include:

- A focus on political-military rather than simply military events,¹⁴
- The use of a case identification criterion (appearance in a Soviet source) that takes into account differences between Soviet and U.S. crisis management styles and positions by not focusing exclusively on the overt operations of military forces,
- The recognition accorded in the Soviet crisis management literature to the need for crisis communications by examining explicit (open-source) Soviet communications, and
- The avoidance of implicit and explicit Western biases by the use of Soviet sources.

Like all compromises, this research strategy is by no means perfect. While comparable in form, the Soviet and U.S. crisis data bases developed by CACI differ in focus, with the U.S. information dealing with more overt forms of extraordinary military management operations, while the Soviet definition deals with crisis concerns. However, given the nature of the problem, it is the best technical solution available.¹⁵

Reliability of Soviet Sources

Since Soviet materials are being used to identify crises of concern to the Soviet Union, it is necessary to address the inevitable questions that arise concerning their reliability. As noted previously, Soviet

¹⁴ In that the approach does include the Soviet Union as an actor involved in crises, however, it is inconsistent with Zhurkin's (1975) usage of term.

¹⁵ Moreover, in the analysis to follow, special attention will be focused on the subset of Soviet crisis concerns that involved relatively higher levels of Soviet involvement for example, in-theater military operational activity. This subset more closely resembles the set of U.S. operations collected in CACI's U.S. crisis project than does the entire set of Soviet crisis concerns cases.

writings have been marked by their reticence concerning Soviet military activity. Moreover, these materials can include propaganda and outright mendacity. Given these problems, can we place any reliance on Soviet sources?

The answer to the question is a qualified yes. Soviet sources are employed to identify events of concern to the Soviet Union. Given the recognition on the part of Soviet authors of the importance of intracrisis communications (which potentially can be generalized to broader forms of communication concerning crisis concerns) to signal to domestic and foreign audiences their self-perceived crisis interests, and the character of many of the Soviet works in question as explicit attempts to communicate with Western and domestic Soviet audiences (all of the Soviet writings used are open source materials),¹⁶ the research team believes the sources are adequate to the task of identifying those events (of all postwar crises) that were of particular concern to the Soviet Union.

This deliberately limited use of the Soviet sources ameliorates or eliminates many problems that would otherwise arise. The question of censorship is not a concern. Indeed, insofar as it ensures better consistency among Soviet writings it works to the benefit of the project. Similarly, any attempts by Soviet authors to misrepresent Soviet actions during a crisis are irrelevant, since Western sources were also used (both as cross-checks and as independent sources of information) in coding variables. Finally, there is no reason to be concerned with the extent to which the sources capture the "true" beliefs and positions of the top Soviet leadership. Barring certain forms of literature such as science fiction, the Soviets do not casually publish books and articles. The body of work that has been published has significance and import simply by virtue of having been published.

¹⁶ Moreover, to better capture explicit Soviet attempts to communicate their concerns to Western audiences, particular emphasis has been placed on materials that have been translated into Western languages by the Soviet Union.

DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES

Definitions

Based on the preceding analysis, crises of concern to the Soviet Union are defined as

- Events involving foreign nations (both internal and international),
- Involving conflict (violent or nonviolent), significant trends, and "structural" changes which might negatively affect Soviet political-military interests,
- Which are cited in certain classes of Soviet sources.

The first term in the definition identifies the geographic scope of the crisis concerns. Crises that are internal to the Soviet Union have been excluded because there appear to be no data sources (either Soviet or Western) which provide a reasonably systematic and consistent account of such incidents.

The second term lists the three generic types of events that are of interest. The first are violent and nonviolent conflict events. The concern here is with the character of the events themselves rather than Soviet conflict, per se. The second set includes dangerous trends and turning points that the Soviets call attention to in their writings (for example, West German remilitarization). The third category encompasses what the Soviets see as significant "structural" threats, for example, the formation of NATO and other "aggressive" and "anti-Soviet" alliances.

The final term refers to the sources used to identify the crises of concern to the Soviet Union. These materials are described at greater length below.

In employing this definition to identify Soviet crisis concerns, four significant exceptions and elaborations were made. The first has to do with the use of Western sources. Publishing inevitably involves delays between the completion of a manuscript and the publication of a book or article. This creates a problem for the project in the later years of the survey since some of the relevant Soviet source materials have not yet been printed.¹⁷ In response to this problem, Western sources were used as a supplemental source of data in the years 1973-1975. Cases identified in this fashion are clearly marked in the list of Soviet crisis concerns presented in Chapter 3. Western sources employed included The New York Times, Facts on File, Deadline Data, Keessing's, the Strategic Survey of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and existing data files dealing with U.S. crises produced by CACI (1978a), Brookings (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976), and the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1978a).

The second elaboration pertains to the treatment of Southeast Asian/Vietnamese war and Middle Eastern events. As might be expected there is a good deal of material on these subjects in the Soviet sources reviewed. While these sources tended to be consistent in their categorization of the major events (for example, the June 1967 war), there are inconsistencies between sources in the treatment and categorization of periods of lesser tension (for example, the prolonged "War of Attrition" between Egypt and Israel in the early 1970's). In response to this problem, particular emphasis was given to Yukhananov's (1972) analysis of conflict in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia since World War II and to two Soviet works on Middle Eastern affairs: Nikitina's The State of Israel, A Historical Economic and Political Study (1973) and (no author) The Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World (1975). Use of these

¹⁷ It should be emphasized that this is only a relative problem. Some of the sources (for example, the International Affairs chronology of significant foreign events, and the Party Congress materials) go through 1975. Coverage in the Soviet materials is fairly good through the October war of 1973.

volumes in this manner reduced the number of overlapping references to Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern incidents.

A third elaboration involves "continuous" crises. During the postwar period, the Soviets have perceived a number of more or less continuous crises, for example, U.S. plans over a number of years to form a Multilateral Nuclear Force that could have included West Germany (Steinbruner, 1974), which the Soviets saw as a particularly significant danger to their political-military interests. When faced with crises of this variety, an attempt was made to use the periods of peak concern identified in the Soviet sources to structure these events into more discrete crises.

The final elaboration concerns the need to interpret Soviet sources. The Soviet authors of the sources used to identify crisis concerns did not intend for their materials to be used to support a crisis management experience data base. As a consequence, the writings are often unclear as to the exact starting and termination of the events and other facets of the crises. One consequence is that the dates for the incidents are less specific than is the case for comparable crises in CACI's U.S. crisis operations data base (CACI, 1978a). In a few cases, references in the Soviet sources were so vague as to preclude identification of a specific crisis (for example, Astafyev and Dubinsky's citation (1974: 119) of Peking's attempts to stir up disagreements between the Bahutu and Batutsi tribes in Burundi and Rwanda, which is of little use given the continuing series of conflicts between these two tribes during the postwar period). In less extreme cases Western materials were used, in an adjunct role, to locate the focus and boundaries of incidents.

Sources

Six sets of Soviet sources have been used to identify the foreign crises of concern to Soviet decision-makers over the period 1946-1975:

1. Soviet statements in the United Nations.

2. The Soviet crisis management literature.
3. Soviet "State of the World" messages.
4. Soviet texts dealing with international events.
5. Khrushchev's memoirs.
6. Soviet chronologies.

The Soviet Union regards the United Nations (particularly the Security Council) as a major forum for presenting its views and as an important medium for crisis diplomacy (Zhurkin and Primakov, 1972). A detailed analysis of all UN Yearbooks published since 1946 captures this aspect of Soviet concern with foreign crises.

In recent years Soviet scholars at the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada and the Institute of World Political Economy have produced a small crisis management literature that is comparable in many respects to that found in the West. This literature has not been translated into English by the Soviet Union, but the major texts are freely available, in Russian, to Westerners. The survey of Soviet sources includes the three major works in this category.

The Soviet Union has a formal policy planning cycle that coincides with the CPSU Congresses. At each Congress since World War II there has been an assessment of the Soviet international position that has included a consideration of the international crises that occurred between Congresses. All postwar Congresses are included in the data base.

The Soviet Union publishes a large number of books, many of which deal with international affairs. In some, but by no means all, cases the Soviets translate these works into English and arrange for their sale in the West. These works are major Soviet inputs into an ongoing "dialog" between East and West in which the Soviets attempt to present their perceptions of world affairs to foreign audiences. The catalogs

of the two major outlets for Soviet books in the United States were obtained, and all titles that appeared to deal in any way with events of interest were ordered.

Khrushchev's memoirs are another form of Soviet communication to the West. On the one hand, they are clearly not official publications and were not translated for foreign distribution by the Soviet Union. On the other hand, given the sheer volume of material that was provided to Western publishing houses, the prominence of the author, and some of the "editorial" changes in the transcripts which occurred prior to their arrival in the West, there may have been informal acquiescence in their publication on the part of the Soviet leadership. As a result, they are included in the survey.

Finally, the survey includes chronologies of Soviet foreign policy actions and international events published in English by the Soviet Union. Other chronologies found in Soviet texts were also employed. The specific source materials used in this and the other categories are listed in Table 1.

TABLE 1
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Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-1973. New York: United Nations.

Soviet Crisis Management Literature

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PRIMAKOV, YE. M. (1972) "The Near East Conflict," in V.V. Zhurkin and YE. M. Primakov, International Conflicts. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka.

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Soviet "State of the World" Messages

Documents and Resolutions, Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Various Dates, 19th through 25th Congresses, 1952-1976). Moscow.

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ASTAFYEV, G.V. and A.M. DUBINSKY (1974) From Anti-Imperialism to Anti-Socialism, The Evolution of Peking's Foreign Policy. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

BASKAKOV, E. and Y. KORNILOV (1975) Soviet-American Relations: New Prospects. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

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- PYADYSHEV, B. (1977) The Military-Industrial Complex of the USA. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- RHEINGOLD, O. and F. RYZHENKO (1976) Contemporary Anti-Communism: Policy and Ideology. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
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- TARABRIN, E.A. (1974) The New Scramble for Africa. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- TOMASHEVSKY, D. (1974) Lenin's Ideas and Modern International Relations. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
- URALSKY, A. (1975) Soviet Peace Programme in Operation. Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.
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- VLADIMIROV, S. and L. TEPLOV (1977) NATO, A Bleak Picture. Moscow: Progress Publishers.

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In Defense of Fighters Against Reaction and Imperialism, On the Events In Indonesia (1967) Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

The Policy of the Soviet Union in the Arab World (1975) Moscow: Progress Publishers.

A Provocative Sally of Peking Authorities, Events On the Soviet-Chinese Border (1960) Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House.

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CHAPTER 3. CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION, 1946-1975

CRISIS LIST

Using the methods and sources presented in Chapter 2, 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union were identified over the period 1946-1975.

These incidents are listed in Table 1. To capture some of the "flavor" of these events as described in the original Soviet sources, the material included in this table has deliberately been written from a Soviet perspective.

TABLE 1

Major International Crises of Concern to the Soviet Union, 1946-1975
(As Seen Through Soviet Eyes)

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
001	451110-490622	Indonesian war of national liberation against Dutch.
002	460119-460501	India: Uprisings in Indian armed forces; part of Indian struggle for national liberation.
003	460119-541202	Soviet-Iranian disputes involving Soviet forces in Azerbaijan, Soviet-Iranian economic issues, Iranian repression of democratic forces within Iran, and border issues.
004	460121-470123	Greece: British forces attempt to suppress progressive forces.
005	460204-460216	Soviets press for removal of French forces from Syria and Lebanon; final forces leave by year's end.
006	460221-	West attempts to use economic incentives and sanctions to influence Soviet policy.
007	460305	Churchill's Fulton "Iron Curtain" speech -- a major signal in the West's movement toward "Cold War."
008	460316-491001	Chinese Communist Party and People's Liberation Army, with substantial Soviet assistance, successfully conduct revolutionary war of liberation.
009	4603-461009	Turkey: United States supports reactionary regime in its internal and external conflicts.
010	460604-	Trieste: The Soviet Union supports Yugoslavia in its territorial dispute with Italy.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
011	460701	The United States conducts its first peacetime atomic tests; this is a major event denoting the initiation of U.S. "atomic diplomacy."
012	460900-461000	South Korea: Popular uprisings against U.S. imperialism.
013	460900	Burma: General strike conducted as part of national liberation movement.
014	461202-470401	Germany: Despite Soviet protests, the United States and the United Kingdom sign an agreement leading to the economic merger of their zones of occupation in Germany; major violation of Potsdam agreements.
015	461219-500508	Initial phase of French colonial war in Indochina.
016	470110-470523	The Soviet Union supports Albania during its dispute with the United Kingdom and other nations concerning passage through the Corfu Straits.
017	4701-4702	Anti-republican conspiracy fails in its attempts to restore bourgeois-landlord rule in Hungary.
018	470207-480515	Conflict in Palestine involving British, Israeli, and Arab Palestinian forces.
019	470228	Taiwan: Unsuccessful popular uprising against KMT regime.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
020	470312-501115	Truman Doctrine proclaimed by the United States -- denotes a new phase in U.S. involvement in both Greek and Turkish affairs; an intensification of the "Cold War" and of U.S. involvement in the Greek civil war.
021	470331-	Madagascar: Popular uprising against French colonial rule.
022	4703-4710	Uprising against regime in Paraguay suppressed with U.S. assistance.
023	4704-471021	Chile: The United States launches political offensive against progressive forces; Chilean Government turns to the right, breaks with Chilean CP, arrests CP's leaders, breaks diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.
024	470505	French Communist Party loses its role in the French Government, in large part due to U.S. pressures.
025	470530	As a condition for U.S. aid, the Italian Communist Party is removed from the Italian Government; like the previous event, part of a general U.S. anti-Communist offensive in Western Europe.
026	470605	The United States adopts Marshall Plan; this plays a major role in U.S. attempts to gain economic domination in Western Europe and to use economic policy as a means of affecting Soviet policy.
027	470820-470910	The Soviet Union gives public support to Egyptian demands for the removal of British forces from Egypt and the Sudan.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
028	470917-491003	South Korea: The United States extends its influence in, and control of, events; the Republic of Korea begins to rearm, with U.S. aid.
029	470930	With the active support of U.S. and British intelligence agencies, reactionary forces in Rumania unsuccessfully plot to overthrow the government.
030	471020-481230	Conflict between India and Pakistan concerning Kashmir.
031	480126-480129	Rioting and cabinet crisis in Iraq prompted by a proposed treaty with the United Kingdom lead to a new government and rejection of the treaty.
032	480219-6209	Yemen: The Soviet Union opposes British operations and political intrigues that affect the interests of Yemen.
033	480223-480306	London Conference: Western powers begin, despite Soviet objections, to create the Federal Republic of Germany.
034	480225-480614	The resignation of 12 cabinet members occurs as part of a reactionary putsch attempt with ties to Western powers; the effort fails and a progressive regime takes over in Czechoslovakia on 14 June.
035	480301-481224	Costa Rica: Civil war and intervention by U.S. mercenaries.
036	480317	The United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux nations sign the Treaty of Brussels; this new alignment is not in the interests of the Soviet Union.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
037	480401-480623	Early stages of the Berlin crisis involving border controls and check-points between the Western- and Soviet-controlled sectors of Germany.
038	480409	Popular uprising against the regime in Colombia.
039	480515-490720	First major war between Israel and Palestinian and Arab forces.
040	480616-5708	Malayan war of independence against British colonial rule.
041	480623-490504	Berlin crisis: Responding to the extension of currency reforms to West Berlin by the Western Powers (an act which endangered the economy of the Soviet sector of Germany), controls were placed on access to West Berlin.
042	480628-	Sharp deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations; Tito adopts non-internationalist course.
043	480718-480721	Bolivia: Leftist and liberal elements triumph in uprising; right-wing Villarroel regime ousted.
044	480730-480818	Eastern European regimes reject British, French, and U.S. bids for access to the Danube River.
045	4807	Italy: Following the wounding of Italian CP leader/theoretician Togliatti by a neo-fascist (and the mass protest strike involving millions of workers that followed this incident), right-wing forces launch counteroffensive that ends with Italian accession to the Marshall Plan.
046	481016-54	Armed national liberation struggle in the Philippines.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
047	490320-490323	Israeli forces violate ceasefire agreements, seize territory in the Sinai, including the area that is later developed into the port of Eilat.
048	490404	NATO treaty is signed, marking a new stage in the "Cold War."
049	490430	Czechoslovakia: The United States and other Western nations support a bourgeois coup attempt that fails following an unsuccessful raid on an arsenal.
050	490907-491001	The Federal Republic of Germany is proclaimed; the Soviet Union disclaims all responsibility for the division of Germany thus effected by the Western powers.
051	491001-500214	Responding to a request from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union deploys air force units to protect Shanghai from KMT air attacks.
052	49-6209	Border conflicts between Yemen and British-occupied territory on the Arabian peninsula.
053	500108-	Ghana: General strike, boycott, demonstrations in support of national liberation struggle.
054	500320	Israeli forces occupy Bir Kattat in the demilitarized zone, withdraw following protests.
055	500411	U.S. bomber violates Soviet airspace along the Baltic coast; Soviet air defenses halt this illegal penetration.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
056	500425	The United States, France, and Great Britain sign the Tripartite Declaration; this leads to the unrestricted supply of arms to Israel and Arab States; part of a policy of supporting anti-Communist regimes in the region.
057	500508-540721	Indochina: Major increase in U.S. aid to France initiates a new phase in the war.
058	500614-500615	Peru: Revolt in Arequipa by progressive forces is quickly crushed.
059	500625-530727	Korean War: The Soviet Union provides logistical support to the People's Republic of China and Democratic People's Republic of Korea. At the request of the PRC, Soviet air units are moved to Manchuria to protect industrial centers.
060	500627	President Truman orders the U.S. 7th Fleet to prevent attacks on Taiwan; this marks a major shift in U.S. policy regarding the defense of the KMT regime.
061	501030-501101	U.S. troops suppress uprising in Puerto Rico.
062	510228-510301	Uprisings in Peru fail; leadership of outlawed Peruvian People's Party arrested.
063	5107	Gomulka, four associates removed from leadership in Poland, largely due to Stalin's actions.
064	511004-520213	Soviets protest French policies in Morocco.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
065	511016-511105	Egypt: Major clashes against British occupation occur in Ismailia and Port Said; over 500 Egyptians killed and wounded.
066	511021-511124	Western states propose creation of Middle Eastern Command -- an anti-Soviet military bloc; the Soviet Union denounces this as an aggressive action directed against it and its allies.
067	511109-511214	Yugoslavia uses the United Nations as a forum to raise the issue of the threats it perceives from the Soviet Union and other Eastern European states.
068	511122	The Soviet Union asks the U.N. General Assembly to consider the issue of U.S. interference in the domestic affairs of Eastern European nations; part of this issue involves the U.S. Mutual Security Act.
069	5112-580617	Tunisian national liberation struggle: General strike, demonstrations, violence as French fire on demonstrators.
070	520125	Barracks revolt of soldiers on Cyprus (unsuccessful).
071	520310	Cuba: Military coup conducted with U.S. backing; Batista regime established.
072	520409-520412	Nationalist revolution overthrows military junta in Bolivia.
073	520526-540830	Efforts by the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany to form the European Defense Community in violation of the Postdam Agreement.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		The Federal Republic of Germany agrees to join on 29 May 1954. Crisis passes with French Assembly's failure to ratify agreement on 30 August 1954.
074	520723	Anti-imperialist national revolution in Egypt; leads to withdrawal of British forces from Suez Canal Zone.
075	520726	Revolutionary uprising against Batista's regime in Cuba.
076	5207-5509	The United States uses diplomatic pressure, direct acts of aggression (carried out by Israeli extremists), and economic pressures in an attempt to draw Egypt into a pro-Western alliance.
077	5209-5212	Burmese troops conduct operations against KMT forces in Burma.
078	521120-600112	Colonial war of British imperialists against the national liberation struggle of the Kenyan people.
079	521122-521123	Iraq: Riots lead to fall of government, election reforms; British Legation and USIS office are major targets for rioters.
080	530208	Peru: Unsuccessful anti-regime strike in Arequipa; leaders of opposition arrested.
081	530325-531208	Burma: Soviet Union supports regime, opposes presence of KMT units in northern Burma.
082	530617	Berlin: West German revanchists, with U.S. support, attempt counter-revolutionary putsch in East Berlin

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		in the hope of starting a country-wide revolt within the German Democratic Republic; Soviet action crushes this effort.
083	530617-5309	Riots occur in seven Polish cities, initiating a period of domestic political problems in Poland.
084	530709-560302	Progressive nationalist forces in Morocco conduct national liberation struggle against French rule.
085	5310	British troops conduct aggression in Kuwait.
086	540127-540706	U.S. intervention suppresses anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolution in Guatemala.
087	540331	Soviet proposal to join NATO rejected by West, indicating that the Western powers have rejected both the spirit and the letter of the Potsdam Agreement and that NATO is an anti-Soviet alignment.
088	540520	U.S. imperialists overthrow the lawful government of South Korea.
089	540529-550820	Thailand unsuccessfully requests the United Nations to send a peace observation team in response to its reports of border incidents.
090	5405-5409	Chile: Domestic disorders, including a general strike, supported by progressive forces including Chilean CP.
091	540903-550405	Taiwan Strait Crisis: The Soviet Union protests U.S. aggression against the People's Republic of China and U.S. actions against merchant ships on the high seas; the

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		People's Republic of China protests the signing of the U.S.-ROC defense agreement; the People's Republic of China adopts more flexible policies toward the United States and Republic of China in late March-early April.
092	540908	SEATO formed, an anti-Soviet group.
093	540908-540910	Over Soviet objections, the United States succeeds in placing the issue of the Soviet shoot-down of a U.S. P-V-2 on the agenda of the U.N. Security Council.
094	5409	U.S. leaders give serious consideration to joint U.S.-UK-French action in Indochina but finally elect not to send combat forces.
095	541023	The United States, the United Kingdom, and France sign Paris Agreements on West German remilitarization, membership in NATO; in response, the Soviet Union annuls its 1944 treaty with France.
096	541101-620319	France launches a punitive colonial war in Algeria. The United States helps to finance French operations and puts pressure on Algeria by withholding food deliveries. Soviet aid plays a major role in the victory of the national liberation forces.
097	550104-550128	Egypt interferes with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.
098	550116	U.S. mercenaries conduct aggression against Costa Rica.
099	550116-550514	The Soviet Union fails to head off implementation of the Paris

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		Agreements, under which the Federal Republic of Germany would be remilitarized and allowed to join NATO. As a defensive measure, the Soviet Union and other regional states form the Warsaw Treaty Organization.
100	550120	One-day unsuccessful uprising in Guatemala involving a mutiny by leftists at the Aurora military base.
101	550224-551103	Formation and signing of Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), an anti-Soviet group.
102	550301-550330	Israeli ceasefire violations criticized.
103	550401-580805	Armed struggle of Cypriots against British colonialism.
104	550416	Pressures placed on Syria to have it join in a military alliance with Turkey and Iraq; Syrian concern with Turkish hegemony in region.
105	550504-550604	Colombia: Peasant uprisings.
106	5505-7109	Britain, acting in concert with the Sultan of Muscat, intervenes in Oman, opposes national liberation forces, has border incidents with Saudi Arabia.
107	5506-600101	French forces conduct a colonial struggle against progressive elements in Cameroon.
108	550701-550710	General strike in Chile.
109	550822-550905	Israeli forces violate ceasefire, occupy positions that will later serve as springboard for Sinai offensive in 1956.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
110	550916	Peron ousted in Argentina.
111	550925-700430	Struggle for Cambodian independence enters second phase, characterized by border clashes with neighbors.
112	550927	The Egyptian Government acts boldly to end the Western monopoly on arms supplies; purchase agreements signed with Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and Soviet Union.
113	551026-601220	Struggle for Vietnamese unity and independence enters new phase; Republic of Vietnam proclaimed on 26 October.
114	551213-560119	Israeli forces carry out attacks near Lake Tiberias.
115	5512-6304	New phase in Laotian struggle for unity and independence; internal civil war.
116	560109	U.S. Secretary of State Dulles promises to work for the "liberation" of peoples in Eastern Europe.
117	560213-560417	Jordanian Crisis: The Soviet Union expresses concern regarding the presence of Western military forces in the region and the possibility of Western intervention.
118	560628-560630	Poznan: Polish workers strike and demonstrate, demand withdrawal of Soviet troops; the Soviet Union concerned with potential break in Polish-Soviet relations.
119	560726-561028	Suez Canal nationalization crisis: Imperialist states put pressure on Egypt.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
120	560801	Honduras: Unsuccessful uprisings led by Captain Santos Osorto Paz against dictatorial regime and supported by liberal and Communist forces.
121	561018-561021	Poland: Gomulka is released from prison and assumes power; disorders continue but main danger to Soviet interests passes.
122	561027-561110	Hungarian revolution by counter-revolutionary forces.
123	561029-561108	"Triple Aggression": British, French, and Israeli forces attack Egypt.
124	5610-561125	Large-scale demonstrations and riots in Iraq, related to Suez crisis.
125	561102	Kuwait: Uprising against British rule.
126	561109-5704	After having been checked in the Suez crisis, Israel refuses to withdraw from the occupied territories; the United States encourages and supports this behavior; bowing to Soviet pressures and world opinion, Israel finally evacuates.
127	561117-591021	The Soviet Union supports the People's Republic of China in its annexation of Tibet.
128	561130-590101	Civil war and victory of national liberation movement in Cuba.
129	570105	The United States adopts the Eisenhower Doctrine, by which it claims the "right" to use its armed forces against any state in the Middle East

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		whose internal or foreign policies are not to U.S. liking.
130	5702	Anti-Soviet demonstrations and riots occur in Sian, China.
131	570302-580819	The United States instigates rebellions in Indonesia; when these efforts fail, the United States makes a major shift in policy and provides aid to the Sukarno regime.
132	570327-570127	The Soviet Union interprets FRG Bundestag resolutions as empowering the FRG Government to acquire missiles and nuclear weapons; the Soviets warn the Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire such weapons.
133	570419-570525	Jordanian crisis: Jordan represses patriotic forces; United States invokes Eisenhower Doctrine and deploys Sixth Fleet to Eastern Mediterranean.
134	570510	Rojas Pinilla dictatorship overthrown in Colombia.
135	5705	Anti-Soviet elements within the People's Republic of China plan provocations on the occasion of Voroshilov's visit to Kwangchow.
136	570816-	Soviets support Indonesian claims to West Irian.
137	570903-571230	Soviets support Syria in Syrian-Turkish crisis.
138	580101	Formation of European Economic Community damages trade relations between Socialist states and members of the Community, a significant event because trade relations play a

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		major role in the process of normalizing relations between states.
139	580123	Perez Jimenez dictatorship overthrown in Venezuela.
140	580220	Sudan accuses Egypt of massing troops in border regions; the Soviet Union avoids taking sides in this dispute.
141	5803	Peasant movement formed in Venezuela; peasants seize large estates; regime adopts ambivalent stance with respect to peasant movement.
142	5803	British suppress popular uprising in Nyasaland (Malawi).
143	580513-580520	U.S. forces prepare to intervene in Venezuela in response to civil disorders.
144	580513-581013	Right-wing members of the French military, upset over reverses in Suez and Algeria, join Algerian settlers in revolt.
145	580518-580624	Serious civil disorders in Lebanon.
146	580714-580821	Coup overthrowing monarchy in Iraq leads to crisis involving Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey; imperialist forces intervene in Lebanon and Jordan.
147	580823-581025	Offshore islands crisis between the United States and the People's Republic of China.
148	580905	Major shift in PRC policies -- Great Leap Forward, people's communes, increase in great power ambitions, Chinese nationalism. Policy failures lead to anti-Soviet hysteria.

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
149	580929-590826	French impose economic sanctions against Guinea; Soviets assist Guinea with credit agreements.
150	581114-590928	Berlin crisis: Western states reject Soviet proposals for normalization of status of Berlin; NATO states back FRG claims; West Berlin serves as a center of subversion.
151	58-59	PRC: Mao angrily refuses to allow the Soviet Union to build communications stations on Chinese territory, even in exchange for shared use of Murmansk.
152	590104-590106	Congo (Zaire): Popular uprising against dictatorial regime.
153	590530-5908	Nicaragua: Unsuccessful uprisings against dictatorial regime.
154	5906-6006	Chinese leadership provokes conflict with Indonesia over the question of overseas Chinese residing in the latter nation.
155	590828-591120	Sino-Indian border clashes.
156	591212-600429	Unsuccessful uprising, armed struggle against dictatorial regime in Paraguay.
157	591216-	Soviet Union initiates strong public opposition to South African rule in Namibia.
158	600112-601109	Burma: Anti-government, secessionist elements gain strength; serious armed uprising.
159	600118	Cameroon: French troops intervene on behalf of local regime.

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
160	600427	Rhee dictatorship overthrown in South Korea.
161	600401-611201	PRC leadership publishes <u>Long Live Leninism</u> , a major doctrinal break with Soviet Marxist-Leninist theory; initiation of open ideological struggle with Soviet Union/Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
162	600501-600615	Soviet air defenses down U.S. U-2. Incident was staged by elements in the United States opposed to U.S.-Soviet summit conference. In the aftermath of this incident, the Soviet Union adopted a new policy toward such overflights involving more active countermeasures; this leads the United States to end these operations.
163	600527	Menderes regime overthrown in Turkey.
164	60-	Chinese provoke border conflict near Buz Aigyar sometime during summer 1960.
165	600630-601215	Initial phases of the Congo crisis involving Western and U.N. intervention.
166	600706-610105	United States engages in economic warfare against Cuba, makes threats against Cuba.
167	600716	Soviet specialists withdraw from the People's Republic of China.
168	6007-	Albanian Government adopts deviationist line.
169	600905-610727	Second phase of Congo crisis: Reactionary military coup and civil war.

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
170	601011-601125	The Soviet Union warns the Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire nuclear weapons and of its concern with German remilitarization.
171	601113	Unsuccessful uprising in Guatemala.
172	601118	French paratroops intervene to aid pro-French regime in Gabon.
173	610315-	The Soviet Union opposes continued Portuguese colonial presence in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.
174	610411-640804	New phase in Vietnam's struggle for independence and unity. U.S. involvement in the conflict increases, the guerrilla struggle intensifies.
175	610416-610423	U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba.
176	610530	Crisis in Dominican Republic following death of Trujillo.
177	610619-610620	French aggression in Bizerte, Tunisia.
178	610701-611019	Iraq-Kuwait crisis.
179	610707-611119	Berlin crisis: West German press campaign threatens German Democratic Republic, subversion from the West intensifies; as a defensive measure, the German Democratic Republic (with support from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty Organization allies) constructs new border controls; after some standoffs between Western and GDR/Soviet forces, the crisis abates in December.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
180	610825-610909	Quadros resigns as President of Brazil; after overcoming some opposition from military circles, Goulart becomes President.
181	611114-611217	Crisis in the Dominican Republic involving the United States.
182	611218-611220	Indian liberation of Goa.
183	6112-62	PRC: From the end of 1961, the People's Republic of China conducts an open, anti-Soviet propaganda campaign; thousands of border violations in this period.
184	620216-621219	CIA-organized disorders provide United Kingdom with pretext to deny independence to Guyana.
185	620222-620323	Cuba complains in the United Nations that the United States is threatening an invasion.
186	620225-620825	Indonesia conducts military operations against Dutch colonialism to effect reunion of West Irian with Indonesia.
187	6202-6203	Cyprus: General Grivas secretly returns; pressure on Cypriot Government to remove leftists from regime increases; with Soviet support, Cypriot regime maintains independence.
188	6203-6311	Iraq: Internal civil war between Arabs and Kurds.
189	620422-6206	PRC: Sixty-seven thousand illegally cross Sinkiang border into Soviet Union; period of massive rioting against non-Han Chinese minorities in Kuldja, Sinkiang, China; People's

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
		Republic of China accuses Soviet Union of serious subversive activities.
190	620430-620501	Ne Win coup in Burma; Burma announces that it will adopt Socialist policies.
191	620510-6206	Uprisings in Venezuela, including incidents at garrisons in Carradians and Puerto Cabello.
192	620512-620701	U.S. forces land in Thailand.
193	620904-621108	Caribbean Crisis: The Soviet Union preserves the independence of Cuba.
194	620918-620923	Armed clashes between opposing military groupings in Argentina.
195	620920-621127	Sino-Indian border war.
196	620926-700523	Yemeni civil war.
197	6209	Chinese authorities allow the harassment of Soviet citizens in Harbin, Manchuria; the Soviet Union closes its consulates in Harbin and Shanghai.
198	621015-630501	Acting in response to a request from the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union permits 46,000 persons to leave Sinkiang for Soviet Central Asia.
199	621029	Cameroon: Local Leftist movement follows Chinese advice and adopts extremist tactics; movement is destroyed by regime as a result.
200	621227-630115	Congo (Zaire): Armed clashes between government forces and Tshombe's gendarmerie; arrest of Gizenga.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
201	630113	Military coup in Togo.
202	630130-671129	British forces battle national liberation movements in Aden/South Yemen.
203	630208-6311	Right-wing Baathists seize power in Iraq, initiate reign of terror against Iraqi Communists, war with Kurds.
204	630408	The Soviet Union objects to NATO plans to create a Multilateral Nuclear Force.
205	630410-721012	Senegal-Portuguese colonies border disputes.
206	630419-710130	New phase in Laotian struggle for national independence; the United States provokes and supports a right-wing coup to prevent normalization of the Laotian situation.
207	630420-630423	Jordanian Crisis: Cabinet falls over the issue of relations with Egypt, large-scale rioting; United States conducts naval operations in Eastern Mediterranean to support regime.
208	630423-720327	Revolt in Southern Sudan; People's Republic of China backs separatists.
209	6305-6306	Domestic conflict in Haiti and conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.
210	630614-630714	People's Republic of China makes open break on 14 June with publication of new Chinese political platform; Chinese diplomats in the Soviet Union attempt to distribute propaganda, leading to their expulsion

Table 1
Major International Crisis
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		and an exchange of protests between the two regimes.
211	630712	Ecuador: Arosemena ousted in coup.
212	630731-630901	Sino-Soviet talks break off; People's Republic of China openly opposes nonproliferation treaty, openly attacks Soviet Union.
213	630815	Congo (Brazzaville): Fulbert Youlou regime overthrown.
214	6308-	Somalia-Ethiopia border dispute. Soviets support Somalia (10 November arms agreement). Chinese attempt to stir up territorial quarrels.
215	6309	In response to Chinese provocations against its personnel in Sinkiang, the Soviet Union closes its consulates in that region. During 1963-1964, more than 100,000 Chinese were involved in approximately 4,000 border incidents.
216	631015-631101	Algeria-Morocco border war.
217	631118	Aref assumes power in a coup in Iraq, acts to normalize situation, particularly with respect to the Kurds.
218	631222	French forces intervene on behalf of the regime in Niger.
219	6312-6710	Somalian-Kenyan border disputes; Peking attempts to stir up territorial quarrels.
220	640101-640811	Cyprus crisis.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
221	640109-640112	Panama Canal riots.
222	640121-640217	Arab-Israeli dispute over Israeli plans to divert the waters of the Jordan River.
223	640123	British intervention in East Africa.
224	640219-640220	Gabon: French paratroops land and help President M'Ba to put down pro-U.S. putsch.
225	640225-640822	PRC-Soviet border talks resume and are then broken off; China refuses to continue dialogue. During the same period, China staged numerous border incidents on its Mongolian frontier, indicating that it no longer accepted the 1962 delineation; most Chinese technical workers withdrawn from Mongolia in this period.
226	6402	PRC: Mao publicly refers to the Soviet Union as an enemy of the People's Republic of China.
227	640304-640727	Venezuela charges that Cuba is supporting subversive movements.
228	640401-640402	Reactionary military coup in Brazil.
229	6404	Rumors spread in China that the Soviet Union is about to break diplomatic relations and declare war.
230	6404-640505	China attempts to have the Soviet Union excluded from the 2nd Afro-Asian Summit Conference.
231	640709-640715	Italy: The CIA supports a right-wing coup attempt aimed at suppressing anti-U.S. forces in Italy;

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		General DeLorenzo, Prince Borghese implicated.
232	640711	The Soviet Union warns the West German Government against attempts to acquire nuclear-armed missiles; warns the United States and other NATO nations that the Soviet Union would take strong actions if the Multilateral Nuclear Force is formed.
233	640801-640918	PRC: Mao publicly claims that China has well-justified claims to large portions of the Soviet Union's Far Eastern and Central Asian provinces.
234	640805-	With the Tonkin Gulf raids, a new phase in Vietnam's struggle for national unity and independence.
235	640903-650107	Malaysian-Indonesian border conflicts.
236	640920-650526	Unsuccessful popular uprisings against ruling military junta in Bolivia.
237	641012-641014	Niger: The People's Republic of China urges the Sawaba Party to resort to armed uprising; Sawaban efforts in this vein lead to the total suppression of the party.
238	641016	The People's Republic of China conducts its first nuclear explosion.
239	641105-641121	Sino-Soviet dispute: PRC delegation visits Moscow, makes unreasonable demands; on its return, China begins to make embittered attacks on the Soviet Union; Sino-Soviet

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		border tensions arise; China advises the Soviet Union to return the Kuriles to Japan.
240	641124-641125	United States airlifts Belgian forces to seize Stanleyville in the Congo (Zaire).
241	6411	French troops support regime in Central African Republic.
242	641214	The United Kingdom forces Jagan to leave office in Guyana.
243	650115-6601	Disorders in Burundi, including murder of prime minister. Later incident traced to Tshombe and U.S. Embassy. U.S. ambassador expelled in January 1966.
244	650119-650120	Warsaw Treaty meeting condemns proposed establishment of NATO Multilateral Force because it will give West Germany access to nuclear weapons.
245	6501	Chinese public statements indicate that the People's Republic of China has no intention of fighting anyone unless China itself is attacked; shows lack of support for Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
246	650207-	United States initiates bombing of Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Soviet delegation visits Hanoi, agrees to provide military aid. First major U.S. ground forces arrive in South Vietnam in March. Major Soviet aid agreements with Democratic Republic of Vietnam concluded in April.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
247	6502	Soviet Union appeals to People's Republic of China to provide additional assistance in transporting Soviet aid to Democratic Republic of Vietnam; People's Republic of China refuses.
248	650304	Chinese students in Moscow harass Soviet demonstration in front of U.S. Embassy in Moscow; Chinese attempt to smuggle propaganda literature into the Soviet Union.
249	650409-660111	Indo-Pakistani war: Soviet mediation at Tashkent.
250	650421-	Soviets oppose Rhodesian regime.
251	650428-	U.S. forces intervene in the Dominican Republic.
252	6504	China: People's Republic of China steps up border incidents, 12 major border violations involving 500 Chinese reported during 15 days in April; China advances new territorial claims against the Soviet Union.
253	650527-6507	New border incidents involving Israel, Jordan, and Syria.
254	650619	Algeria: Ben Bella ousted by military coup; Boumedienne assumes power.
255	6507-6511	Cyprus crisis.
256	650806	In a Vietnam war related incident, U.S. Air Force planes buzz and attack a Soviet vessel on the high seas.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
257	650930-	Indonesia: Elements of the Communist Party of Indonesia participate in extremist coup attempt; failure of coup leads to reign of terror.
258	6510-661113	Continuous armed incidents along Israeli Syrian border.
259	660223	Syria: With the help of the working masses, a coup overthrows the ruling dictatorship; progressive regime assumes power.
260	660224	Ghana: Coup supported by U.S. and British intelligence services overthrows Nkrumah regime.
261	660229-660505	The People's Republic of China rejects an invitation to attend the 23rd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This signals the final break between the two on party matters, the key link between Socialist countries.
262	660429-660829	German Democratic Republic envoys and families stationed in the People's Republic of China are subjected to attacks and harassment.
263	6604	Angolan liberation struggle: Maoists split revolutionary party; UNITA pulls away from MPLA.
264	660501-690101	PRC: Military coup occurs in China; referred to by Maoists as "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The coup leads to assaults on the Chinese Communist Party and other organizations within China. Anti-Soviet hysteria increases; Soviet Union declared to be "Enemy No. 1."

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
265	660624	The Soviet Union accuses Nicaragua of fostering armed attacks against Cuba.
266	660628	Coup ousts Illia in Argentina, general strike.
267	660723-691130	Italian-Austrian confrontation over Alto-Adige. Violent acts committed in Italy by ethnic dissidents. Italy accuses Austria of failing to take action to stop dissidents and blocks Austrian entrance into EEC.
268	660805	The Soviet Union complains about new U.S. provocations against Soviet merchant ships in Haiphong, DRV.
269	660820-6612	Soviet citizens in China subjected to abuse; mutual expulsion of students; Soviet Embassy abused; Chinese attempt to organize anti-Soviet riots in foreign nations.
270	660921-671115	Dispute between Congo (Zaire) and Portugal; Congo charges that Tshombe opposition forces are operating out of Portuguese Cabinda; Portugal charges that Congo has allowed the Portuguese Embassy in Congo to be abused.
271	6610	PRC: People's Liberation Army units arrive in Pamir border region and begin photo reconnaissance of Soviet territory, threatening exercises.
272	661208-661228	PRC: Chinese detain and harass Soviet vessel <u>Zagorsk</u> in Darien.
273	670109-6702	Battles along Israeli-Syrian border.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
274	670125	Chinese nationals riot in Red Square.
275	670126-670213	Siege of Soviet Embassy in Peking; the Soviet Union recalls the families of Soviet diplomats from China; departing Soviet citizens subjected to abuse; nationals of other WTO states and Mongolia also abused.
276	670128-670424	The Soviet Union informs West Germany that it expects the Federal Republic of Germany to suppress neo-Nazi movements within West Germany and that the Soviet Union disputes the "right" of the Federal Republic of Germany to claim to speak for all Germans; similar messages sent to major Western powers.
277	6702	Sino-Soviet border clashes, for example, over an island in the Ussuri River.
278	670301	Nation-wide strikes in Argentina.
279	670402-670913	Cambodia: Maoists instigate left-wing rebellion in an attempt to extend the Cultural Revolution; this effort fails and leads to the withdrawal of Cambodian Embassy personnel from Peking.
280	670407-670411	Israel attacks Syria near Lake Tiberias; Soviets protest.
281	670421	CIA instigates Colonel's coup in Greece as part of master NATO plan.
282	6704	Eritrean revolt in Ethiopia; Peking supports separatists.

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
283	670513	The Soviet Union protests concern- ing the unlawful and dangerous actions of U.S. naval vessels in the Sea of Japan.
284	670518-670604	Prelude to the 1967 war: Withdrawal of U.N. Emergency Force and Straits of Tiran passage disputes involving Egypt and Israel.
285	670530-700115	Civil war in Nigeria; United States and France aid Biafra; United King- dom supports Nigeria; Soviet Union supports lawful Nigerian regime.
286	670602-670605	Soviet protests concerning U.S. Air Force bombing of Soviet vessel <u>Turkestan</u> in Cam Pha, DRV.
287	670605-670718	June War: Israel versus Egypt, Syria, Iraq.
288	670626-6808	Burma: Chinese Embassy provokes demonstrations, riots; Burman- Chinese relations deteriorate; PRC aid to rebel movements within Burma leads to disaster for local Com- munist Party.
289	6706-670902	Aftermath of June war: Continua- tion of Israeli provocations; Soviet aid to Arab States; People's Republic of China attempts to pro- voke U.S.-Soviet naval clash; People's Republic of China accuses Soviet Union of fearing the United States.
290	670705-671105	Congo (Zaire): Insurgency and U.S.-organized evacuation opera- tions; new tensions arise between the United States and its major Western allies over their failure to participate in the evacuation effort.

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
291	670720	The Soviet Union objects to West German Bundestag extraordinary laws as violations of the Potsdam Agreement.
292	670730-671201	Cyprus: New junta in Athens and U.S.-backed <u>enosis</u> plans lead to new clashes between Greek and Turkish communities; the Soviet Union denounces these new attempts to make Cyprus into a NATO base; imperialists retreat.
293	670809-670810	PRC: Abuse of Mongolian diplomatic personnel; ambassador's car overturned, set on fire; hoodlums invade Mongolian Embassy.
294	670812-670820	PRC: Provocations committed against Soviet ship <u>Svirsk</u> in Darien.
295	670817-671167	Soviet criticism of United States on Korean issue; period of sharp increase in border incidents between the two Koreas.
296	670822	Soviet Union complains concerning the bombing of Soviet vessels in DRV harbors.
297	671021-671027	Following the sinking of the Israeli destroyer <u>Eilat</u> by Egyptian forces, Soviet Navy ships move into Alexandria.
298	671021-671208	The Soviet Union warns the Federal Republic of Germany and the major Western powers concerning the sharp increase in neo-Nazi activity within the Federal Republic of Germany.

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
299	671117	French troops intervene in Central African Republic.
300	671121-680501	Israeli forces attack Jordan; period of provocations along Israeli borders.
301	6711-	Even after its evacuation from Aden, British forces maintain a military presence on the Arabian peninsula and carry out violent actions.
302	671214	Unsuccessful anti-progressive coup attempt by General Zbiri in Algeria.
303	680104	U.S. Air Force planes bomb Soviet vessel in Haiphong (<u>SS Pereslavl-Zelesski</u>); Soviet Union complains and threatens to take protective measures.
304	680105-680821	Anti-Socialist counterrevolutionary elements attempt to take Czechoslovakia away from other Socialist nations; fraternal assistance of Soviet Union, other WTO states counters threat.
305	680105-681210	Cyprus: The Soviet Union accuses the West of planning to convert Cyprus into a NATO nuclear rocket base.
306	680123-681223	Pueblo Crisis: Democratic People's Republic of Korea and United States.
307	680210	In conjunction with the crash of a U.S. B-52 carrying H-bombs in Greenland, the Soviet Union warns the United States concerning dangerous, provocative flights of nuclear-armed bombers near Soviet borders.

Table 1
Major International Crises
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<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
308	680224-680529	Neo-Nazi activities within West Germany criticized by the Soviet Union.
309	680304	The Soviet Union accuses the United States and United Kingdom of attempting to form a military bloc under their auspices in the Persian Gulf.
310	680322-680617	France: Massive class conflict, first case of this gravity in years; general strike, upsurge of mass revolutionary movement.
311	680403-680404	Armed Chinese board Soviet vessel in PRC port and seize its captain; latter released after sharp Soviet protests; ship was carrying material to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
312	680406-	Portuguese forces attack villages in Zambia.
313	680509-680824	Berlin Crisis: Provocations by FRG regime; neo-Nazi's barred from Berlin by German Democratic Republic; in response to the passage of extraordinary legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany and attempts to extend it to West Berlin, the German Democratic Republic introduces new passport and visa regulations for West German visitors.
314	680629-690814	The People's Republic of China delays shipments of Soviet supplies to Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
315	680717	Coup in Iraq; Bakr replaces Aref.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
316	681003	Coup in Peru. New, anti-imperialist revolutionary regime takes power.
317	681012	Military coup in Panama.
318	681030	PRC: Chou En-Lai publicly states that anything, to include an attack on China, could be expected from the Soviet Union.
319	681119-681120	Coup in Mali; Keita socialist regime ousted, in part because of perceptions of "Chinese threat" - PRC actions in Mali.
320	690104-	British oppression in Northern Ireland opposed by Soviet Union.
321	690228-690802	The Soviet Union condemns new acts of aggression by Israel in the Middle East.
322	690302-690315	Sino-Soviet border incident: Armed Chinese incursion onto Damansky Island leads to exchange of fire; Soviet border guards drive the Chinese back across the border; 31 Soviets killed in action; Soviet Embassy in Peking under siege.
323	690319	British intervention in Anguilla.
324	690401-	PRC anti-Soviet course enters a new phase with the 9th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party; Cultural Revolution ends; Chinese propaganda emphasizes need to prepare for war; the Soviet Union is declared to be China's foremost enemy.
325	690409-690411	Major working class demonstrations and strikes in Italy signify an intensification of the general crisis of capitalism in the West.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
326	690418-720901	French troops intervene on behalf of regime in Chad.
327	690419	Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt-al-Arab.
328	690504	The Soviet Union protests concerning the incursion of Chinese soldiers into Soviet territory near Semipalatinsk.
329	690531	Dutch intervention in Curacao.
330	690608-691003	British-Spanish confrontation over Gibraltar. Spain cuts off Gibraltar's links with mainland. Spanish and UK fleets move to vicinity of Gibraltar.
331	690624-710423	U.S. imperialists provoke war between El Salvador and Honduras in order to step in and play mediator.
332	690708	The Soviet Union protests armed provocations by the Chinese on the Soviet section of Goldinski Island in the Amur River.
333	690813	The Soviet Union protests deliberate Chinese aggravation of the situation on the border near Semipalatinsk; several groups of PRC soldiers violate border near Zhalanashkol.
334	690830	Israelis blamed for fire in Al Aksa mosque.
335	690901	Bolivia: Military coup organized by U.S. intelligence.
336	690901	Coup in Libya overthrows monarchy.
337	690919-691127	The Soviet Union protests new Israeli military provocations.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
338	691008	For the first time, the PRC leadership officially states that their conflict with the Soviet Union is a state (and not simply party) issue.
339	691026-691031	The Soviet Union expresses its concern about the course of events in Lebanon. The Soviet Union claims that statements coming out of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon are equivalent to a U.S. claim to intervene in Lebanon.
340	691111	NATO makes policy shift, lowers nuclear threshold, claims that a "distinction" exists between the territory of the Soviet Union and that of Soviet allies.
341	691202-691222	The Soviet Union supports Guinea during its border disputes with Portugal.
342	700217	The Soviet Union denounces Israeli air raids near Cairo, pledges to continue aid to Arab States.
343	700218-71	The Soviet Union calls attention to new attempts by international reaction to aggravate the situation in Cyprus, attempts to overthrow Cypriot regime and to turn Cyprus into a NATO base.
344	700318	Coup in Cambodia brings Lon Nol to power; the People's Republic of China rejects joint socialist action in response to this event.
345	700325-700330	Chile: U.S. coup plot is thwarted.
346	700430-	Invasion of Cambodia by U.S., South Vietnamese troops; first large-scale

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		international political crisis of the 1970's; marks a new phase in the struggle of the Cambodian people for freedom from foreign domination.
347	700715-700808	The Soviet Union claims that Israel, with U.S. encouragement, is increasing its pressure on neighboring Arab States.
348	700909-701028	Chile: U.S. coup plot to prevent Popular Unity Front from coming to power is thwarted.
349	700913-701001	Downfall of Lin Piao in China leads to purge of People's Liberation Army, factional fight between two anti-Soviet groupings.
350	700920-701014	Civil war in Jordan and tension between Egypt and Israel. Soviet Union criticizes U.S. fleet movements. Soviet Union denies U.S. charges that it is violating "understandings" regarding Suez Canal ceasefire.
351	701004	The Soviet Union denies the validity of U.S. propaganda concerning alleged Soviet "threats" to the Western Hemisphere and alleged Soviet efforts to create a permanent nuclear submarine base in Cuba.
352	701022	U.S. aircraft violates Soviet airspace near Leninakan (near Turkish border).
353	701113-	Guatemala: State of siege declared, mass arrests, many deaths, repression of progressive movements.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
354	701121	Portuguese colonialists conduct commando raid on Conakry, Guinea, in an unsuccessful attempt to kill Guinean leaders and establish a pro-imperialist regime.
355	710130-7104	Invasion of Laos by U.S., South Vietnamese, and Thai forces.
356	710318	Editorials in PRC press abuse Soviet Union, hint that China will not cooperate with the Soviet Union on Southeast Asian issues.
357	710423-711217	Indo-Pakistani conflict, Bangladesh formed.
358	710819-710822	Bolivia: United States reacts to normalization of ties between Bolivia and the Soviet Union by establishing an economic boycott and aiding a military coup. New regime starts anti-Soviet campaign. Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina assist the United States.
359	711006-711012	The Soviet Union supports Zambia during its border disputes with South Africa.
360	720211	With U.S. encouragement, the Greek Government presents an ultimatum to Cyprus demanding that the latter submit to NATO dictation. Makarios, supported by the Soviet Union, successfully rejects Greek demands.
361	720402-720606	The People's Republic of China shows a lack of enthusiasm over the National Liberation Front offensive in Vietnam because of its envy concerning heavy Soviet arms deliveries to the Democratic

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		Republic of Vietnam and liberation forces that make the offensive possible.
362	720621	Israelis carry out piratic raids on South Lebanon.
363	720718	Expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt (oblique references in Soviet sources appear to refer to this event). ^a
364	7208	U.S. air raids (including bombing of Chinese ships) and mining campaign in Tonkin Gulf lead to greater Chinese cooperativeness in getting Soviet military aid through to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
365	720908-720916	Using the events in Munich as a pretext, Israeli aircraft attack Syria and Lebanon.
366	730127-750430	U.S. involvement in the Indochina war comes to an end. New phase in struggle of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos initiated as United States continues to provide aid to nonprogressive forces.
367	730627-731201	Uruguay: President Bordaberry dismisses Congress, ending constitutional government; initiates period of intense repression against progressive forces within Uruguay; all Marxist parties banned on 1 December.
368	730707	Afghanistan: Military coup overthrows monarchy.

^a This case is also extensively cited in Western sources, for example, Rubinstein (1977).

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
369	730911	Military coup overthrows Allende in Chile.
370	730925-	President Peron begins campaign of repression against progressive forces in Argentina.
371	731003-731114	October Middle East war.
372	740110	New U.S. strategic targeting doctrine announced. ^b
373	740119	The Soviet Union protests concerning the treatment of its diplomatic personnel in China; the Soviet Union and China expel selected members of one another's diplomatic missions. ^b
374	740210-740674	Iraq accuses Iran of aggression.
375	740226-	Ethiopia: Feudal emperor overthrown; important political and social changes take place in Ethiopia. Conflict within Ethiopian provinces; Eritrean separatist movements opposed by new regime.
376	740311-750322	With support from Iran, ^b Kurdish forces in Iraq revolt.
377	7403-751227	Soviet helicopter brought down in China; despite Soviet protests, Chinese hold crew; China releases crew in December. ^b
378	740424-751127	Revolution in Portugal ends one of the last fascist regimes; Soviet Union supports progressive forces, including local Communist Party.
379	740715-	Turkish troops invade Cyprus. Soviet Union defends Cyprus, demands

^b Cases taken from Western sources.

Table 1
Major International Crises
Continued

<u>Crisis Number</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
		withdrawal of foreign troops. NATO crudely intervenes in internal affairs of island.
380	750114	Soviet Union rejects trading agreement with United States; United States interferes with normalization of relations between the two states by attaching political conditions to the agreement. ^b
381	750213	Turkey closes U.S. bases. ^b
382	750408-751112	Yugoslavia boycotts 1975 Conference of European Communist Parties, during the period of the conference accuses the Soviet Union of violating previous agreements and of having ties to pro-Soviet dissident elements within Yugoslavia. ^b
383	750512-750514	U.S. <u>Mayaguez</u> operation. ^b
384	750519	U.S. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger warns North Korea against an invasion of South Korea, makes nuclear threats. ^b
385	750617	The Soviet Union warns Japan not to do anything that might damage Soviet-Japanese relations, with reference to a possible Japanese-Chinese treaty. ^b
386	750715-	Angolan civil war.

^b Cases taken from Western sources.

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CHAPTER 4. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET CRISIS MANAGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides selected analyses of crisis descriptor variables dealing with basic attributes of the 386 crises that were of concern to the Soviet Union during the post-war period and the Soviet actions that occurred in conjunction with these events. Later chapters present analyses of the crisis management problems encountered by the Soviets in a sample of 101 of these crises and examine Soviet actions and objectives during these incidents.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first traces patterns in the descriptor variables over time to show the evolving character of Soviet crisis concerns and crisis management activities. The second provides a comparison of all 386 crises with two other data bases: a subset of cases of relatively greater concern to the Soviets and a previously generated U.S. crisis characteristics data base (CACI, 1976). The final section examines interrelationships among the crisis characteristics, focusing upon the concomitants of the subset of cases in which the Soviets were most active.

TRENDS IN CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS

Frequency of Crisis Concerns

The relative frequency of incidents is only one limited aspect of crisis concerns. Soviet crisis events have varied along many dimensions. Since 1946, however, the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union has varied considerably over time (Figure 1), and some significant conclusions can be drawn from these patterns. Major modalities in Figure 1 include:




FIGURE 1. YEARLY FREQUENCY OF CRISES OF CONCERN TO THE SOVIET UNION

- A moderately high number of events in the immediate postwar years (1946-1948),
- A drop in the relative frequency of crises during the remainder of the Stalin era (1949-1953),
- A peak in 1955,
- Relatively high numbers of events in the periods following the 22nd (1962-1965) and 23rd (1966-1970) Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), including the peak year of the entire 30-year span (1967), and
- A drop in the frequency of incidents during the period between the 24th and 25th Party Congresses (1971-1975).

The formal Soviet policy process centers on the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Held at roughly 5-year intervals in recent years, these Congresses are major milestones for the review, formulation, and implementation of domestic and foreign policy. As a consequence, it would not be surprising to find that the frequency of Soviet crisis concerns varies according to the periods demarcated by these Congresses, as shown in Table 1.

From 1946 through 1961, the period of the 19th through 21st Congresses, the average number of crises of concern to the Soviet Union was relatively stable. There was a marked increase in the average number of events during the periods following the 22nd and 23rd Congresses (1962-1970). During this period the Soviets appear to have perceived relatively more challenges to their political-military interests (and possibly more opportunities as well -- the Soviet armed forces began to be employed in more active political-military roles during this period).¹

¹ For example, the first major crisis management operation of the Soviet Navy during the June war of 1967.

TABLE 1
Distribution of Events by Party Congress

<u>Duration (years)</u>	<u>Congress Period</u>	<u>Marker Date^a</u>	<u>Absolute Number</u>	<u>Average Number of Crises</u>
7.0	Prior to 19th	(451100-521005)	77	11.0
3.4	19th	(521005-560213)	40	11.8
2.9	20th	(560214-590126)	35	12.1
2.8	21st	(590127-611016)	28	10.0
4.4	22nd	(611017-660328)	81	18.4
4.3	23rd	(660329-710329)	95	22.1
4.8	24th	(710330-751213)	30	6.3
	(1946-1975)			(12.8)

^a Year, month, and date. The 1946 data include one case that began in 1945 and continued into 1946.

The sharp decline in crises following 1971 appears to be more than simply an artifact of the publication dates of source materials. The sources reviewed give good coverage until 1973-1974 (the October war and Cyprus crises). In 1971 there is a qualitative shift in the Soviet International Affairs chronology that covers the entire 30-year span, with a marked decrease after 1970 in the number of events reported that might negatively affect Soviet political-military interests. Moreover, in 1971-1972 there was a leveling off, followed by a downturn, in worldwide Soviet naval operations (Westwood, 1978).

It is also conceivable that the post-1971 shift might reflect greater confidence on the part of the Soviet leadership. Many of the types of events that caused concern in earlier years are no longer common problems (for example, colonialism issues and the status of Berlin). Perhaps more significantly, in the 1970's the United States began to accord greater recognition (through the SALT negotiations and other means) to the superpower status of the Soviet Union (for a Soviet perspective, see Zhurkin, 1975). This might have led to lessened relative concern on the part of Soviet leaders. At the same time, rough strategic equivalence may have made crises (at least in their major power confrontation form) appear intrinsically less attractive as policy venues.

Trends in Crisis Characteristics

On the basis of the time series patterns presented in Figure 1 and Table 1, the 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union can be divided into four phases against which the evolution of Soviet crisis concerns can be traced (Table 2). During the first phase, the average number of crises of concern during the periods demarcated by the Party Congresses was close to the 30 year average. The second and third phases capture the higher average annual levels of concern during the 22nd and 23rd CPSU Congress periods. The final phase depicts the lower level of concern evidenced since the 24th Congress.

TABLE 2
Phases in Soviet Crisis Concerns

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Party Congress Period</u>	<u>Number of Crises</u>	<u>Average Number of Crises/Year</u>
1	January 1946- October 196	From the end of World War II to the 21st Congress ^a	180	11.1
2	October 1961- March 1966	22nd Congress	81	18.4
3	March 1966- March 1971	23rd Congress	95	22.1
4	March 1971- December 1975	24th Congress	30	6.3

^a This set includes one case that began in 1945 and continued into 1946.

Table 3 shows the percentage of the 386 events occurring in each Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) region and by geopolitical locale (proximity to the Soviet homeland). Two notable points arising from Table 3 are the:

- Breadth of Soviet crisis concerns across the regions, even in the earliest period (while the Soviets may not have conducted Western-style crisis operations in regions such as Latin America, events in these areas were, nevertheless, of concern to them), and
- Decline during the latest period (1971-1975) in the relative frequency of events involving the Soviet homeland and Eastern Europe, probably in large part due to the settlement of the Berlin question.

Table 4 shows the types of parties involved in the crises by period. The categories used in this table are based on the typologies employed in

TABLE 3
Geographic Focus of Soviet Crisis Concerns by Period^a
(percentage)

	<u>1(1945-1961)</u>	<u>2(1961-1966)</u>	<u>3(1966-1971)</u>	<u>4(1971-1975)</u>	<u>5(1946-1975)</u>
<u>Region</u>					
North America	1.7	0.0	1.1	3.3	1.3
Central, South America	17.8	17.3	13.7	13.3	16.3
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.8	8.6	14.7	13.3	12.5
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	12.8	11.1	10.5	6.7	11.4
Middle East, Northern Africa	24.4	14.8	21.1	20.0	21.3
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	8.3	23.5	11.6	16.7	13.1
Pacific, Eastern Asia	21.1	24.7	26.3	26.7	23.6
Other, Multiple Regions, World	1.1	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.8
<u>Geopolitical Area</u>					
Soviet Homeland	2.8	13.6	7.4	3.3	6.2
Germany/Berlin (East or West)	7.8	2.5	6.3	0.0	5.7
Primary Buffer Zone (Warsaw Pact States)	6.7	0.0	1.1	3.3	3.6
People's Republic of China	7.2	12.3	15.8	10.0	10.6
Border States	2.2	0.0	4.2	13.3	3.1
Middle East	21.1	16.0	23.2	26.7	21.0
Other	52.2	55.6	42.1	43.3	48.4

^a Because of rounding, percentages do not total to exactly 100 percent.

TABLE 4

Crisis Participants by Period
(percentage)

Crisis Participants ^a	1 (1945-1961)	2 (1961-1966)	3 (1966-1971)	4 (1971-1975)	5 (1946-1975)
Two or More Large Powers, One of Which is USSR	40.0	38.3	38.9	33.3	38.9
Other	60.0	61.7	61.1	66.7	61.1
Between Two or More Nations Including at Least One Large Country Other than USSR:					
- At least One Party Vital to Soviet Interests	3.9	4.9	5.3	6.7	4.7
- No Party Vital to Soviet Interests	13.3	13.6	13.7	10.0	13.2
- Other	82.8	81.5	81.1	83.3	82.1
Crisis Between USSR and One or More Small Powers	12.8	9.9	20.0	16.7	15.0
- Other	87.2	90.1	80.0	73.3	85.0
Crisis Between Two or More Small Powers					
- At least One Party Vital to Soviet Interests	1.1	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.8
- No Parties Vital to Soviet Interests	4.4	8.6	6.3	10.0	6.2
- Other	94.4	90.1	93.7	90.0	93.0

^a Soviet "vital interests" are defined by the presence or absence of threats to the well-being or survival of Communist parties, movements, and regimes during the incidents.

CACI's previous research on the characteristics of U.S. crises (CACI, 1976). Two trends stand out:

- A post-1966 increase in the percentage of crises involving the Soviet Union and one or more small powers (the timing of this shift corresponds to the mid-1960s increase in the activism of the Soviet Navy in the Third World).
- A slight decline in the most recent period (1971-1975) in the number of great power confrontations.

Some of the general characteristics of the 386 crises are presented in Table 5. Reviewing the general character of Soviet crises (as presented in Table 5), it can be seen that there was a decline over time in the relative frequency of revolts, uprisings, and wars of national liberation. This fact, no doubt, reflects the successful course of decolonization during the 30-year period. In the 1971-1975 period, a rise in the relative frequency of concern with interventions and conflicts short of war coincides with a lessened focus on civil disorders. Other salient trends include

- A higher percentage of interstate incidents over time,
- A consistently low level of strategic confrontation over all periods, with a marked variation in potential confrontations over the spans,
- A steady overall level of threat to Communist parties (CPs), movements, and regimes (although a clear decline in perceived threats to their survival),
- Some increase in the relative frequency of violent events since the pre-1962 period, and
- A not unexpected increase in Soviet in-theater military crisis management capabilities during the incidents.

Table 6 deals with Soviet crisis objectives and outcomes. Focusing on the most recent (1971-1975) period, it can be seen that the predominant Soviet

TABLE 3
Crisis Characteristics by Period
(percentage)

	<u>1(1945-1961)</u>	<u>2(1961-1966)</u>	<u>3(1966-1971)</u>	<u>4(1971-1975)</u>	<u>5(1946-1975)</u>
<u>Crisis Characteristics</u>					
Dangerous Domestic Trends/Events	7.2	4.9	9.5	10.0	7.5
Riot, Other Civil Disorder	8.3	7.4	12.6	0.0	8.5
Uprising, Revolt, Insurgency	16.1	12.3	5.3	6.7	11.9
War of National Liberation	8.3	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.4
Coup d'Etat	8.9	16.0	14.7	10.0	11.9
Structural Change (Shift in Alignment, Formation of Alliance), Dangerous International Trend/Events	12.8	9.9	6.3	10.0	10.4
Border Incident/Territorial Dispute	7.2	16.0	16.8	10.0	11.7
Foreign Intervention, Conflict Short of War	28.3	24.7	28.4	40.0	28.5
War	2.8	6.2	5.3	13.3	4.9
Other	0.0	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.3
<u>Scope</u>					
Domestic ^a	38.9	35.8	22.1	20.0	32.6
International	61.1	64.2	77.9	80.0	67.4
<u>Strategic Confrontation</u>					
None	78.9	91.4	80.0	93.3	82.9
Potential	20.0	6.2	18.9	3.3	15.5
Actual	1.1	2.5	1.1	3.3	1.6
<u>Threat to CP, CP/Movement, or CP Regime</u>					
No Threat	56.7	59.3	51.6	56.7	56.0
Well-Being, Activities Threatened	27.2	28.4	41.1	36.7	31.6
Survival Threatened	16.1	12.3	7.4	6.7	12.4
<u>Level of Violence</u>					
NonViolent Events	41.1	38.3	26.3	33.3	36.3
Violent Events	58.9	61.7	73.7	66.7	63.7
<u>Soviet In-theater Military Crisis Management Capabilities</u>					
Uncolable	1.1	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.8
Substantial	22.2	19.8	27.4	33.3	23.8
Moderate	0.6	1.2	24.2	30.0	8.8
Minor/Negligible	76.1	79.0	48.4	33.3	66.6

^a Within a nation other than the Soviet Union.

TABLE 6
Objectives and Outcomes by Period
(percentage)

	<u>1(1945-1961)</u>	<u>2(1961-1966)</u>	<u>3(1966-1971)</u>	<u>4(1971-1975)</u>	<u>5(1946-1975)</u>
<u>Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Supported Actors</u>					
Uncodable, N/A	13.9	18.5	14.7	20.0	15.0
Preserve Status Quo Ante	27.2	34.6	40.0	40.0	32.9
Restore Status Quo Ante	12.2	23.5	24.2	16.7	17.9
Change Status Quo Ante	45.6	21.0	18.9	23.3	32.1
Indifference (Both Bad)	1.1	2.5	2.1	0.0	1.6
<u>Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Opposed Actors</u>					
Uncodable	2.8	8.6	6.5	13.3	4.1
Oppose Efforts to Preserve Status Quo Ante	41.1	18.5	22.1	16.7	29.8
Oppose Efforts to Restore Status Quo Ante	2.8	3.7	1.1	3.3	2.6
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	43.3	63.0	62.1	63.3	53.6
Indifference (Both Bad)	10.0	6.2	11.6	3.3	9.1
<u>Crisis Outcome for Soviet Union</u>					
Uncodable	0.6	0.0	2.1	0.0	0.8
Favorable	23.9	25.9	15.8	23.3	22.3
Mixed	27.2	34.6	48.4	50.0	35.8
Unfavorable	28.3	33.3	17.9	23.3	26.4
Indifferent	20.0	6.1	15.8	3.3	14.8
<u>Crisis Outcome for Soviet Allies</u>					
Uncodable	57.2	49.4	62.2	53.3	56.4
Favorable	13.3	13.6	2.1	13.3	10.6
Mixed	15.0	17.3	23.2	20.0	17.9
Unfavorable	14.4	19.8	12.6	13.3	15.0
Indifferent	0.0	0.0	1.1	0.0	0.3

objective has been to support in-theater actors in preserving the status quo ante and to resist the attempts of other in-theater actors to change it.² The study of crisis outcomes offers a number of interesting contrasts between the Soviets and their allies.³ The significantly higher percentage level of outcomes of all types for the Soviets when compared with Soviet allies results from the large number of instances of independent Soviet action. Over the period studied Soviet crisis outcomes have become more mixed. No clear trends in crisis outcomes have developed for the allies.

While the Soviets have, by their statements, expressed an "interest" in all 386 events examined in this project, it is reasonable to presume that their levels of interest varied across the cases.⁴ Crises of concern to the Soviet Union are differentiated in terms of levels of Soviet interest and activity in Table 7.

TABLE 7
Relatively Higher Interest
and Activity Cases
(percentage)

	<u>1 (1946-1961)</u>	<u>2 (1961-1966)</u>	<u>3 (1966-1971)</u>	<u>4 (1971-1975)</u>	<u>5 (1946-1975)</u>
Relatively Higher Interest Cases (N=221)	55.5	53.0	62.1	63.3	57.2
Relatively Higher Activity Cases (N=199)	54.4	43.2	52.6	56.6	51.5

² The status quo ante is defined as the situation the day before the crisis. Crises often involve both regional and extraregional actors. These measures deal solely with in-theater actors who are supported or opposed by the Soviet Union.

³ These outcome assessment measures are summary and somewhat coarse. They have to do with the overall favorableness of the results of the crisis and the postcrisis situation from a Soviet vantagepoint. The term "Soviet ally" is preferable to the commonly employed term "client," which can have undesirable implications concerning Soviet influence on the nations supported by the Soviet Union in crises.

⁴ Obvious exceptions are the 1973-1975 cases which were coded predominantly from Western sources because of the publication delay problems noted previously.

Of the two subsets of cases presented in Table 7, the first consists of what can be termed "higher relative interest" crises. Higher levels of Soviet interest are defined by Soviet actions during the incidents and/or the location of the events. These 221 higher interests cases possess one (or more) of three attributes:

- Soviet physical actions (movements of naval forces and so forth) in conjunction with the crisis events.
- Unusually intense Soviet verbal statements (threats, warnings, challenges, and other verbal behaviors that go beyond simply noting the existence of the incidents to express specific Soviet concerns and interests) with regard to the incidents.
- Incidents which took place in Eastern Europe or in other geo-politically sensitive areas contiguous to the Soviet homeland.

The first two factors define the subset of cases of greatest "interest" to the Soviets in terms of their behaviors.⁵ The third factor is included, in part, in response to the problems involved in coding Soviet behaviors from unclassified sources. For example, while it is reasonable to presume that the Soviets took a very great "interest" in all of their border incidents with the Chinese, available source materials almost certainly under-report the range of Soviet activities (Chan, 1978). The third category compensates for some of the intrinsic limitations of open source materials.

The second subset of analytical relevance consists of the relatively higher activity cases defined by the first two of the three criteria present above (N=199). While highly correlated with the previous subset ($r = .89$), the omission of the cases in which actions were likely, but

⁵ Of these two factors, the physical index is the more reliable. Though both Soviet and Western sources have been used to identify Soviet interests in terms of verbal behaviors, it is likely that some material of considerable interest (for example, the content of diplomatic communiques) is under-reported in the open source materials employed.

not recorded in available sources, will prove useful in the analyses carried out in the final section of this chapter.

The patterns presented in Table 7 are not surprising. Increases in the percentages of higher interest and activity events in the period since the mid-1960s, correspond to the increase in the activism of Soviet political-military diplomacy in the Third World at that time. For both factors, the most recent period (1971-1975) has the highest percentages of cases of greater concern.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSES

Some insights can be gained by comparing the set of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union with two other data bases:

- The subset of 221 relatively higher interest cases considered in the previous section.
- A U.S. crisis data base (CACI, 1976) consisting of 289 operations over the period 1946-1975.

These comparisons, which are presented for selected variables in Table 8, deal solely with crisis characteristics. Comparisons of U.S. and Soviet crisis actions, objectives, and crisis management problems are presented in later chapters.

Some of the most interesting points which emerge from the comparisons presented in Table 8 are:

- Geographic focus:
 - The almost complete absence of North American cases from the two Soviet data sets.
 - The relatively lower percentages of higher involvement Soviet cases in Central/South America and South Asia/Indian Ocean.
 - The higher proportion of Soviet cases which occur in the Middle East.

TABLE 8
Comparison of Soviet and U.S. Crisis Characteristics
(percentage)

	List of 386 Soviet Crises	221 Soviet High Interest Cases	U.S. Crisis ^b List (289 cases)
<u>Geographic Breakdown</u>			
North America	1.3	2.3	9.5
Central, South America	16.3	4.5	11.9
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.5	15.9	13.2
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	11.4	19.9	15.9
Middle East, Northern Africa	21.3	18.6	10.2
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	13.1	7.7	8.5
Pacific, Eastern Asia	23.6	25.8	26.8
Other, Multiple Regions, World	0.8	1.4	4.1
<u>Crisis Participants^a</u>			
Two or more large powers, one of which is the Soviet Union	38.9	67.9	35.6
Other	61.1	32.1	64.3
<u>Between Two or More Nations, Including at Least One Large Country Other Than the Soviet Union:</u>			
At least one party vital to Soviet interests ^a	4.7	13.6	4.5
No party vital to Soviet interests	13.2	44.3	3.1
Other	82.1	42.1	92.4
Crisis between the Soviet Union and one or more small powers	15.0	26.2	25.0
Other	85.0	73.8	75.0
<u>Crisis Between Two or More Small Powers:</u>			
At least one party vital to Soviet interests	0.8	0.5	6.2
No parties vital to Soviet interests	6.2	0.0	2.4
Other	93.0	99.5	91.4
<u>Threat to Protagonist Interests (for Soviet Union: threat to CP's, CP/movements, or CP regimes)</u>			
No threat	56.0	38.5	31.0
Some threat	31.6	45.7	36.4
Severe threat	12.4	15.8	12.5

^a Soviet interests are defined in these comparisons in terms of threats to Communist parties, movements, and regimes. If one of these three is challenged, Soviet interests are said to be involved.

^b In this table, "U.S." should be read in place of "Soviet" for the descriptions of variables where percentages are given in the final column.

Table 8
Comparison of Characteristics
Continued

	List of 286 Soviet Crises	221 Soviet High Interest Cases	U.S. Crisis List (289 cases)
<u>Strategic Confrontation</u>			
No (for Soviet Union: none or potential only)	98.4	97.2	97.9
Yes	1.5	2.7	2.1
<u>Duration of Crisis Activity</u>			
Less than 7 days	38.3	33.0	36.0
Between 8 and 30 days	10.6	10.4	20.0
Over 30 days	41.0	48.0	43.9
Uncodable	10.1	8.6	N/A
<u>Objectives</u>			
Noninvolvement (for Soviet Union: N/A, indifference, and other)	17.1	5.5	8.0
Preserve/restore status quo	50.8	66.1	74.4
Change status quo	32.1	28.5	17.6
<u>Crisis Outcome for United States or Soviet Union</u>			
Favorable	22.3	26.2	32.5
Unfavorable	26.4	31.7	41.2
Other (for Soviet Union: uncodable, mixed, indifference)	51.3	42.1	26.3

- Crisis Participants:

- The very large percentage of Soviet higher interest cases in the major power confrontation category.
 - The close match between the higher Soviet interest cases and the U.S. data in terms of the frequency of superpower-small power confrontations.
 - The paucity of cases, across all three data files in which "vital interests" (as variously defined) were involved in small power-small power clashes.
- The extremely low frequency of strategic confrontations across all three sets.
 - The similarities between the U.S. and Soviet files for the relative occurrence of crises of less than one week's duration, with the U.S. having proportionately more cases in the 8-30 days category and the (more structurally oriented) Soviets having more higher interest cases in the greater than one month category.
 - A tendency for more Soviet attempts to change the status quo during crises.
 - A pattern in which the U.S. had more favorable and unfavorable crisis outcomes, with the Soviets having proportionately more cases in the mixed category.

CORRELATES OF SOVIET CRISIS ACTIVITY

In 199 of the 386 crises, source materials revealed that the Soviets had engaged in unusually high levels of physical or verbal activity. This subset of cases can be used to search for the correlates of Soviet crisis involvement. It is a logically stronger subset to employ than the set of 221 higher interest cases, which included crises in which higher levels of activity were likely (given the geographic locales of the incidents) but not proven, given the sources available.

The potential correlates of higher levels of Soviet crisis activity are those crisis characteristics that take on a dimensional form (for example,

geopolitical proximity to the Soviet homeland, presence/absence of strategic confrontation). Coding Soviet activity as a dichotomous or "dummy" variable, Table 9 shows the relationships of this factor to selected Soviet crisis characteristics.

Focusing on the strongest correlations, Table 9 reveals three intuitively reasonable relationships, with higher levels of Soviet involvement being associated with geographic proximity to the USSR, the presence of strategic confrontations, and more substantial Soviet military crisis management capabilities. The collective fit among these three predictors and Soviet activity level is, however, somewhat disappointing. Multiple regression using the three as predictors produces an R of .41, an R^2 of .17 ($F = 26.1$), and a standard error of estimate of .45. With only 17 percent of the variation in Soviet activity accounted for by the equation, it is clear that these factors, while relevant, make up only a small part of a much larger picture, the exact dimensions of which cannot be developed from the data presented here using the analytic techniques thus far applied.

TABLE 9
Correlates of Higher Levels of
Soviet Verbal and Physical Crisis Activity

<u>Variable</u>	<u>r^a</u>
Threats to Communist Parties Present	.24
Level of Violence	.21
Geo-political Location (Proximity to USSR)	<u>.30</u>
Strategic Confrontation	<u>.33</u>
Duration of Crisis	.18
Soviet objectives with respect to actions supported by USSR that are in the crisis theater (preserve change status quo)	-.01
Soviet objectives with respect to actors opposed by USSR that are in the crisis theater (preserve/change status quo)	.18
Soviet in-theater military crisis man- agement capabilities	<u>.33</u>

^a All correlations computed using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS. With 386 cases, all correlations reported are statistically significant at the .05 level. Correlations .30, which amount for at least 9 percent of the variance of the Soviet activity variable, are underlined.

CHAPTER 5. CRISIS ACTIONS AND OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

Sample of Cases

Based on the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union during the postwar period, a sample of 101 cases was selected in consultation with ARPA/CTO and coded to identify Soviet actions and objectives during the incidents.¹ The sample was designed to reflect the Soviet policy process and to provide reliable statistical bases for comparisons across time.

The 386 crises were divided into three sets corresponding to the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

- 1946-1965 (19th through 22nd Congresses)
- 1966-1970 (23rd Congress)
- 1971-1975 (24th Congress).

Because the most recent cases are likely to provide the best precedents for U.S. crisis planners, the last two periods are oversampled. All 32 incidents in the 1971-1975 span are included, plus 35 cases from 1966-1970 and 34 crises from the 1946-1965 period.² In the second phase emphasis was given to cases involving the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Republic of China, and the Middle East. During the first period (1946-1965) stress was placed upon major East-West "Cold War" events, and a few disputes between the Soviet Union and

¹ These cases were also coded for the crisis management problems encountered by the Soviet Union and are analyzed in that context in Chapter 6.

² The percentages of cases sampled over the three subperiods are: 1971-1975 (100 percent); 1966-1970 (35 percent); 1946-1975 (13 percent).

other Marxist-Leninist states (Yugoslavia and China). The 101 cases are presented in Table 1.

In selecting variables for intensive coding, an attempt was made to maximize comparability between the Soviet data bases and U.S. crisis actions, objectives, and problems variables previously coded by CACI (1978a) by using the same variables. In some cases, particularly for crisis management problems, this was not possible. Some of the variables developed for U.S. crises were not collectable and/or inapplicable to Soviet crises. Moreover, additional variables were added to capture peculiarly Soviet aspects of Soviet crisis behavior and concerns (for example, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's relations with other Communist parties during the incidents).

Since only 101 cases are involved in the intensive data base, the descriptive characteristics of these crises necessarily differ somewhat from those of the entire set of 386 analyzed in Chapter 4. Table 2 presents selected comparisons of the two sets.

Some of the more prominent differences between the sample drawn for intensive coding and the entire set of 386 crises are:

- Geographic Focus: The intensive sample cases include:
 - A significantly lower percentage of Latin American events.
 - A lower percentage of cases involving the Soviet homeland.
 - Larger percentages of cases involving the Germanies, the Warsaw Pact states, China, and the Middle East.
- Types of Events: The intensive sample cases include:
 - Fewer relative instances of riots, civil disorders, uprisings, and wars of national liberation.

TABLE 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding^a

Identification No. ^b	Date	Events
003	460119-460501	Soviet-Iranian disputes
008	460316-491001	Chinese Communist Party succeeds in Revolutionary War of Liberation
014	461202-470401	Germany: United States, United Kingdom agree to economic merger
020	470312-501115	Truman Doctrine proclaimed
026	470605	United States adopts Marshall Plan
034	480225-480614	Progressive regime takes over in Czechoslovakia
039	480515-490720	First major Israeli-Arab war
041	480623-490504	Crisis in West Berlin
042	480628-	Sharp deterioration in Soviet-Yugoslav relations
048	490404	NATO treaty is signed
059	500625-530727	Korean war
066	511021-511124	West proposes creation of Middle East Command
082	530617	Attempted counterrevolutionary putsch in East Berlin
091		
112	540903-550405	Taiwan Strait crisis
122	550927	Egypt ends Western monopoly on arms supplies
123	561027-561110	Hungarian revolution
132	561029-561108	U.K., French, Israeli forces attack Egypt
	570327-570127	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany not to acquire nuclear weapons
137	570903-571230	Soviets support Syria in Syrian-Turkish crisis
146	580714-580821	Crisis in Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan and involving Turkey
147		
149	580823-581025	Offshore islands, U.S.-PRC
150	580929-590826	French impose economic sanctions against Guinea
161	581114-590928	Berlin crisis: normalization proposed (free city)
	600401-611201	PRC doctrinal break with Soviet Marxist-Leninism
162	600501-600615	Soviet air defenses down U-2

^a As is true throughout the project, crises are worded as they are seen through Soviet eyes, hence 610416-610423 is seen as "U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba."

^b Identification numbers are based on the entire set of 386 crises (Chapter 3).

Continued

Table 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding
Continued

Identification No.	Date	Events
165	600630-601215	Initial phase of Congo crisis
175	610416-610423	U.S. mercenaries invade Cuba
179	610707-611119	Berlin: Western subversion and the Berlin Wall
193	620904-621108	Caribbean crisis
195	620920-621127	Sino-Indian border war
210	630614-630714	PRC open break with Soviet Union
220	640101-640811	Cyprus crisis
234	640805-	Tonkin Gulf raids
249	650409-660111	India-Pakistan war
260	660224	U.S., U.K.-backed coup ousts Nkrumah in Ghana
264	660501-690101	Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
275	670126-670213	Siege of Soviet Embassy in Peking
276	670128-670207	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany about neo-Nazis
281	670421-	CIA-backed colonels' coup in Greece
283	670513	Soviet Union protests U.S. naval presence in Sea of Japan
284	670518-670604	Developments leading to Six-Day war
285	670530-700115	Nigerian civil war
286	670602-670605	Soviet Union protests U.S. bombing of Soviet ship in DRV port
287	670605-670718	Six-Day war
288	670626-6808	PRC activity leads to bad relations with Burma
290	670705-671105	U.S. evacuation operations in the Congo (Zaire)
292	670730-671201	New clashes on Cyprus
297	671021-671027	Sinking of <u>Eilat</u> ; Soviet naval forces move to Alexandria
298	671021-671208	Soviet Union warns Federal Republic of Germany about revanchism, neo-Nazi activity
304	680105-681003	Czechoslovakia: Counterrevolutionary coup attempt
305	680105-680821	Cyprus: Soviet Union accuses West
306	680123-681223	Pueblo crisis
308	680224-680529	Increased neo-Nazi activities in Federal Republic of Germany, West Berlin

continued

Table 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding
Continued

<u>Identification No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
309	680304	Soviet Union accuses United States, United Kingdom of attempting to form Persian Gulf bloc
311	680403-680404	Chinese board Soviet vessel, seize captain
313	680509-680824	Berlin: German Democratic Republic reacts to Federal Republic of Germany provocations
322	690228-690315	Damansky Island - Ussuri River crisis
327	690419	Iran-Iraq dispute over Shatt-al-Arab
336	690901	Coup in Libya overthrows monarchy
339	691026-691031	Soviet Union chastises U.S. Embassy on Lebanon statement
340	691111	NATO lowers nuclear threshold
342	700217	Soviet Union denounces Israeli air raids near Cairo
346	700430	United States, South Vietnam invade Cambodia
347	700715	Alleged Israeli pressure on Arab States
348	700909-701028	U.S. plot in Chile thwarted
350	700920-701014	Civil war in Jordan
351	701004	Soviet Union denies U.S. propaganda about Soviet aims in Latin America, Cuba
352	701022	U.S. aircraft violates Soviet border near Leninakan
354	701121	Portuguese raid on Conakry, Guinea
355	710130-7104	U.S., allied invasion of Laos
356	710318	PRC press abuses Soviet Union
357	710423-711217	Indo-Pakistani conflict; Bangladesh
358	710819-710822	U.S.-backed military coup in Bolivia
359	711006-711012	Soviet Union supports Zambia
360	720211	Greek Government presents ultimatum to Cyprus
361	720402-720606	People's Republic of China envious of Soviet arms aid to Democratic Republic of Vietnam
362	720621	Israeli raids in South Lebanon
363	720718	Soviet advisers expelled from Egypt
364	7208	U.S. air raids, mining of Tonkin Gulf
365	720908-720916	Israeli air attack on Syria and Lebanon
366	730127-750430	Final phase of U.S. involvement in Vietnam
367	730627-731201	Uruguayan president represses leftists
368	730707	Military coup in Afghanistan

continued

Table 1
Crises Selected for Intensive Coding
Continued

<u>Identification No.</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Events</u>
369	730911	Military coup ousts Allende in Chile
370	730925	Peron represses progressive forces in Argentina
371	731003-731114	October Middle East war
372	740110	New U.S. strategic targeting doctrine
373	740119	Soviet Union, People's Republic of China expel one another's diplomats
374	740210-740674	Iraq accuses Iran of aggression
375	740226	Military coup overthrows Ethiopian emperor
376	740311-750322	Kurdish revolt in Iraq
377	7403 -751227	Soviet helicopter downed in People's Republic of China
378	740424-751127	Revolution in Portugal
379	740716	Turkish troops invade Cyprus
380	750114	Soviet Union rejects trade agreement with United States
381	750213	Turkey closes U.S. bases
382	750408-751112	Yugoslavia boycotts 1975 Communist Party conference
383	750512-750514	U.S. Mayaguez operation
384	750519	U.S. Secretary of Defense warns North Korea
385	750617	Soviet Union warns Japan
386	750715	Angolan civil war

TABLE 2
Selected Comparisons of Crisis Descriptors:
386 Crises of Concern to the Soviet
Union and 101 Case Intensive Sample^a
(percentage)

<u>Region</u>	<u>396 Cases (1946-1975)</u>	<u>101 Cases (1946-1975)</u>
North America	1.3	1.0
Central, South America	16.3	7.9
Western Europe, Mediterranean, Atlantic	12.5	15.8
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union	11.4	14.9
Middle East, Northern Africa	21.3	22.8
Southern Asia, Indian Ocean, Sub-Saharan Africa	13.1	11.9
Pacific, Eastern Asia	23.6	23.8
Other, Multiple Regions, World (at the United Nations)	0.8	2.0
<u>Geopolitical Area</u>		
Soviet Homeland	6.2	4.0
Germany/Berlin (East or West)	5.7	10.9
Primary Buffer Zone (Warsaw Pact States)	3.6	4.0
People's Republic of China	10.6	12.9
Border States	3.1	7.9
Middle East	21.0	25.7
Other	48.4	33.7

^a Because of rounding, percentages do not total to exactly 100 percent.

Table 2
Selected Comparisons of Crisis Descriptors
Continued

	<u>396 Cases (1946-1975)</u>	<u>101 Cases (1946-1975)</u>
<u>Crisis Characteristics</u>		
Dangerous Domestic Trends/Events	7.5	8.9
Riot, Other Civil Disorder	8.5	2.0
Uprising, Revolt, Insurgency	11.9	5.9
War of National Liberation	4.4	1.0
Coup d'Etat	11.9	9.9
Structural Change (Shift in Alignment, Formation of Alliance), Dangerous Inter- national Trend/Events	10.4	14.9
Border Incident/Territorial Dispute	11.7	7.9
Foreign Intervention, Conflict Short of War	28.5	36.6
War	4.9	12.9
Other	0.3	0.0
<u>Scope</u>		
Domestic ^a	32.6	12.9
International	67.4	87.1
<u>Strategic Confrontation</u>		
None	82.9	71.3
Potential	15.5	23.8
Actual	1.6	5.0

^a Within a nation other than the Soviet Union.

continued

Table 2
Selected Comparisons of Crisis Descriptors
Continued

	<u>386 Cases (1946-1975)</u>	<u>101 Cases (1946-1975)</u>
<u>Threat to CP, CP/Movement, or CP Regime</u>		
No Threat	56.0	42.6
Well-Being, Activities Threatened	31.6	40.6
Survival Threatened	12.4	16.8
<u>Level of Violence</u>		
Nonviolent Events	36.3	41.6
Violent Events	63.7	58.4
<u>Soviet In-Theater Military Crisis Management Capabilities</u>		
Uncodable	0.8	1.0
Substantial	23.8	34.7
Moderate	8.8	22.8
Minor/Negligible	66.6	41.6
<u>Soviet Objectives With Respect to In-Theater Supported Actors</u>		
Incodable, N/A	15.0	10.9
Preserve Status Quo Ante	32.9	42.6
Restore Status Quo Ante	17.9	19.8
Change Status Quo Ante	32.1	26.7
Indifference (Both Ante)	1.6	0.0

continued

Table 2
Selected Comparisons of Crisis Descriptors
Continued

	<u>386 Cases (1946-1975)</u>	<u>101 Cases (1946-1975)</u>
<u>Soviet Objectives with Respect to In-Theater Opposed Actors</u>		
Uncodable	4.1	5.9
Oppose Effort to Preserve Status Quo Ante	29.8	15.8
Oppose Efforts to Restore Status Quo Ante	2.6	4.0
Oppose Efforts to Change Status Quo Ante	53.6	69.3
Indifferent	9.1	4.0
<u>Crisis Outcome for Soviet Union</u>		
Uncodable	0.8	0.0
Favorable	22.3	28.7
Mixed	35.8	42.6
Unfavorable	26.4	23.8
Indifferent	14.8	5.0
<u>Crisis Outcome for Soviet Allies</u>		
Uncodable	56.4	41.6
Favorable	10.6	14.9
Mixed	17.9	24.8
Unfavorable	15.0	18.8
Indifferent	0.3	0.0

- A significantly larger percentage of wars and higher percentages of structural changes, foreign interventions, and conflicts short of war.
 - Fewer domestic crises.
 - More strategic confrontations (though the number of actual, as opposed to potential, confrontations is still quite small).
 - Relatively more threats to Communist parties and regimes.
 - Proportionately more cases in which the Soviets had moderate to high in-theater military crisis management capabilities.
- Apparent Soviet Objectives and Outcomes: The intensive cases include:
 - For in-theater supported nations, a more conservative mix of Soviet goals.
 - For in-theater opposed nations, more attempts to resist the efforts of others to change the status quo ante.
 - Slight increases in the percentages of favorable and mixed outcomes for the USSR and significantly less indifference on the part of the Soviets.
 - Slight increases in the percentages of favorable and mixed outcomes for Soviet allies and a slightly larger increase in the percentage of unfavorable outcomes as well.

Coding

Data coding is always an inferential process. At the minimum it is necessary to define (on the basis of analytical judgment) the set of data sources that will be used and to locate relevant evidence using a set of formal and/or informal procedures. Coding always involves much more than immediately meets the eye, even when relatively "easy"³ subjects such as U.S. crisis behavior are being examined.

³ "Ease" is defined here in relative terms only. As anyone who has attempted to collect data on U.S. crisis operations can attest, the process is by no means easy compared to (say) the collection of data on

The Soviet Union is notoriously reticent concerning its crisis activities. This fact complicates the task of providing an account of Soviet behavior consistent with Soviet approaches to crises (for example, the emphasis upon political-military rather than simply military behavior discussed in Chapter 2). As a result, coding of Soviet actions, objectives, and problems data required more use of inference than was the case in CACI's previous codings of U.S. crisis behavior (CACI, 1978a). Many of the types of information that are often available in Western media concerning U.S. crisis operations (for example, "leaks" indicating that the U.S. is sending aid to one side during a crisis) are seldom available for comparable Soviet actions. To the extent that such data do exist, most commonly in Western sources, source bias and selective coverage raise further difficulties.

CACI's technical response to these coding problems took several forms.

- Variable definitions were adjusted when necessary.
- Strong reliance was placed on the expertise of Richard P. Clayberg, a career specialist in Soviet studies.
- Extensive checks were made for inconsistencies and miscodings.

Necessary adjustments were made in variable definitions much as the focus in the identification of "crises" was shifted from a U.S.-style emphasis on military events to a Soviet-style stress on political-military incidents. These adjustments are discussed in the reviews of the actions, objectives, and problems data. One of the more significant examples, which can serve as an illustration, has to do with arms transfers. It is often possible to use open source materials to determine that the

domestic U.S. political processes. It is, however, fair to say that the collection of U.S. crisis data from open sources is significantly easier than is the collection of comparable data concerning the crisis behavior of the Soviet Union.

Soviet Union had an arms transfer relationship in a given period of time. Given this information, it is possible (to use a felicitous Marxist concept) to identify "conjunctions" between crisis events and these arms transfer relationships. It is, however, far more difficult to establish strong causal linkages between the two than in similar Western cases. As a result, with one exception, the arms transfer variables presented in the review of crisis actions focus on these conjunctions.³

Second, very strong reliance was placed during the intensive coding phase of the project on the expertise of Richard P. Clayberg, a career specialist in Soviet studies. While CACI's usual form of "confrontational" coding reviews were employed, in which each score was examined and justified, particular emphasis was given to his background and experience in this area, particularly in the coding of objectives, but in the scoring of problems and actions as well.⁴

Finally, extensive checks were made across both cases and variables, to identify potential inconsistencies and miscodings.

This approach to coding had two consequences:

- The scores of the intensive data base variables are (with the exception of some of the action variables) based to a greater extent on inference than was true for most of the crisis descriptor variables. This is the case for both Soviet and U.S. crisis data files.

³ Similarly, Western sources dealing with Western arms aid are likely to provide more details about the specific types of relationship involved, for example, use of materials from U.S. depots or the employment of on-site U.S. technical advisors. In the Soviet case less information is available. It is possible, however, to make some fairly good inferences in a number of cases (for example, by knowing something about the complexity of the systems transferred and the characteristics of the recipient state, the likelihood of technical training can be inferred).

⁴ For example, one arms transfer variable was coded on the basis of Mr. Clayberg's educated judgment.

- For some variables, more "instances" are identified for the Soviets than was true for the U.S. This is a consequence of attempting to tailor the coding system to the Soviet experience and the use of open sources.

As a result, the analyses in the following chapters focus on similarities in patterns of relationships among variables across the two nations. It is more significant to know that Soviet and U.S. crisis actions have similar structures (for example, independent military aid factors) than to know that one action variable occurred 17 percent of the time for the U.S. and 22 percent for the Soviets. As a consequence, primary emphasis rests on the discovery of overall patterns and structures throughout this and the following chapters.

Part of the process of checking data involved comparative evaluations by the coders of the overall quality of the variables scored. While "present" codes were not assigned unless there were grounds to believe that the values were warranted, all inferences were not, in the assessment of the research staff, of equal quality.

For the Soviet actions variables, the indicators with the highest level of coding confidence were of an avowedly public nature, especially those that were a matter of record (for example, diplomatic and U.N.-related actions). Somewhat lower on the scale were unilateral actions of a general nature (for example, the USSR acts alone or makes fairly direct use of military forces to support the achievement of political goals) and cases where the Soviets clearly opted to take no military action at all. Further down the reliability chain were more detailed military activities falling under the general rubric of security assistance and unilateral military actions (actions affecting force readiness or location) along with assorted political moves (for example, reaffirm commitment). Actions with the lowest confidence ratings were those that were either naturally secretive in nature (for example, military intelligence collection, which proved to be uncollectable) or were less well described in

the open literature (provision of military supplies, maintenance support, and other logistical security assistance).

The Soviet objectives coded with the highest degree of confidence dealt with prestige and with blocking opponents. At a slightly lower level of confidence were Soviet objectives of a defensive nature (for example, deny access to opponents, preserve the Eastern European buffer system). Generally speaking, Soviet objectives of an offensive nature were seen as being somewhat less reliable than those in the former category. The objectives with the lowest levels of coder assurance were related to goals of a less clear or contingent nature (for example, discover intentions or actions, prepare for alternative missions) or were not designed to fit analysis of the Soviet system (for example, assure continued economic access). This latter circumstance is, of course, an expectable byproduct of trying to use some of the same objectives for both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Overall, there was less variation in coder confidence for the problems variables than was true for actions and objectives. Part of this was due to the larger percentage of problems of a general sorting nature (for example, by timing of crisis development) and due to the elimination, from the outset, of a number of the U.S. problem variables that appeared to be clearly uncodable for the Soviets. Setting these aside, the problem variables with the highest level of coder assurance related to other actors -- both general and Marxist-Leninist. Next followed problems concerned with Soviet perceptions and geopolitical considerations. The hardest to code problems for the Soviets included the most sensitive Soviet perceptions (threats to the Soviet homeland and sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties) and certain types of logistical capabilities (for example, availability of sea and airlift).

Some of the specific solutions adopted to coding problems in each of the three variable domains (actions, objectives, problems) are detailed in the introductions to the analyses of these three factors below.

CRISIS ACTIONS

Indicators and Frequencies

Table 3 presents the 64 variables used to code Soviet crisis actions. The first 49 were taken from CACI's previous research (1978a) on U.S. crisis behavior; the remaining 15 were created to capture peculiarly Soviet aspects of the Soviet crisis management experience. Each variable was coded for its presence or absence in each case. The variable descriptors are followed by a number indexing the number of "present" codes for the indicator. Since there are 101 cases in the intensive sample, these frequencies can be read as approximate percentages.

For the most part the titles of the variables are self-explanatory. In a few cases, however, some additional explanations and qualifications are in order:

- In the treatment of Soviet alerts, maneuvers, and exercises, primary reliance had to be placed on Western media. As a result, there is some likely source bias and, in addition (as is brought out in Appendix A) it is difficult to fix causal relations between exercises and crisis.
- Base rights were defined in more general terms than was the case in the U.S. projects. A good case can be made that the Soviets have never had "bases" in the Third World, the focal area for many of the crises. As a result, likely shifts in status of forces agreements and facilities access were used instead.
- As noted in the previous section, military aid indicators reflect a conjunction of Soviet military aid contacts and crisis involvement on the part of a recipient. One exception is the final military aid variable included in the set of distinctively Soviet indicators. This measure was coded judgmentally (by Richard P. Clayberg) to provide a better linkage between aid contacts and crises (see the review of the factor analysis results below).

TABLE 3
Soviet Crisis Action Variables

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Commit Land Forces to Combat	5
Commit Air Forces to Combat	16
Commit Support Services (Land)	10
Commit Support Services (Sea)	4
Commit Support Services (Air)	9
Reposition Land Forces	21
Reposition Sea Forces	24
Reposition Air Forces	23
Redeploy Nuclear Forces as a Deterrent	1
Threaten Nonnuclear Forces as a Deterrent	14
Redeploy Nonnuclear Forces as a Deterrent	23
Change Alert Status of Nonnuclear Forces	33
Show of Military Force	29
Military Blockade or Quarantine	7
Isolated Military Contact	13
Military Forces Used in Search and Rescue Operation	3
Military Maneuvers or Training Exercises	22
Improve, Maintain Force Readiness	40
Covert Military Operation	13
Military Intervention Between Combatants	2
Airlift Personnel and/or Supplies and Equipment	37
Provide Military Advisory Assistance	41
Provide Military Training for Combat Troops	25
Provide Other Military Training	37
Drawdown Military Equipment From Soviet Depots	59
Provide Supplies From Soviet Depots	57
Provide Supplies From Nonmilitary Sources	40
Provide Military Maintenance Assistance	36

continued

Table 3
Soviet Action Variables
Continued

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Provide Other Military Logistics Assistance	33
Provide Other Military Assistance	19
Make Political/Economic Commitment Implying New Military Mission	6
Undertake a New Military Mission	27
Accept a New Military Cost	33
Modify an Existing Defense Treaty	7
Modify an Existing Base Rights Treaty	8
Modify an Existing Status of Forces Agreement	10
Seek Assistance in Decision-Making	10
Take No Military Action	48
Employ Diplomacy	89
Mediate a Dispute	8
Threaten to, or Actually, Withdraw Support	12
Advocate/Support Peacekeeping Efforts	16
Improve Scientific/Technical Capabilities	2
Reaffirm Existing Political/Military Commitment	51
Lodge Protest(s)	69
Soviet Union Acts Alone	34
Soviet Union Acts With One Other Nation	17
Soviet Union Acts With Two or More Other Nations	43
United Nations Involved	37
<u>Peculiarly Soviet Actions</u>	
Military Intervention in a Marxist-Leninist State	3
Cooperative Intervention in a Third World State	8
Joint Operation With Forces From Another Marxist- Leninist State	7
U.N.-Associated Actions: Resort to Veto	13

continued

Table 3
Soviet Action Variables
Continued

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
U.N.-Associated Actions: Resolutions and/or Amendments	21
U.N.-Associated Actions: Speeches and/or Letters	42
Support Existing Regime	60
Support Antiregime Insurgent Movement	16
Support Antiregime Communist Party or Communist Party/ Movement	38
Provide Political/Propaganda Support	81
Provide Economic Assistance	35
Provide Crisis-Related Military Aid	48
Fairly Direct Use of Military Forces to Support Political Goals	37
Use of Warsaw Pact, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to Support Political Goals	45
Use of International Organizations Other Than United Nations, Warsaw Pact, or Council for Mutual Economic Assistance	23

- United Nations activities were coded from the U.N. Year-book.
- Isolated military contacts include harassment incidents, attacks on individual aircraft and naval vessels (including U.S. bombing of Soviet merchant ships during the Vietnam War), and minor border clashes.

Focusing on the 36 indicators that occur in at least 20 percent of the crises, Table 4 groups these variables into five analytical categories to describe the modal types of Soviet crisis actions.

Relationships Among Crisis Actions

Table 5 complements the a priori clustering of the most common actions in Table 4 by showing the empirical groups produced by means of a principal components factor analysis.⁶ Eight substantial factors emerge in this analysis, including dimensions which closely match some of the a priori groups, such as military aid. Collectively these factors account for 69 percent of the variance in the set of relatively more common Soviet crisis actions:

- Factor 1 -- Military assistance. Significantly, all of the military aid variables load on this dimension, including those measures that deal with "conjunctions" of Soviet assistance and crises as well as the more refined index of direct linkages between the assistance and the crises. Other variables defining this dimension are indicators of Soviet willingness to undertake new military missions and new military costs, both of which can be involved in military aid programs.

⁶ Principal components factor analysis was selected as the factoring model for two reasons: first, the relatively weak a priori theoretical priors available (for example, our limited expectations as to likely theoretical relationships among the indices) make the major alternative (some member of the common factor analysis model school) less attractive; second, principal components analysis was used in previous CACI analyses of U.S. crisis behavior (1978a). Its use here enhances comparability. In this and subsequent presentations of factor analyses, only dimensions with eigenvalues of 1.0 or greater are presented.

TABLE 4
Predominant Types of Soviet Crisis Actions^a

Actions of Conventional Forces

Reposition Land Forces	Changes Alert Status of Nonnuclear Forces
Reposition Sea Forces	Show of Military Force
Reposition Air Forces	Military Maneuvers or Training Exercises
Redeploy Nonnuclear Forces as a Deterrent	Improve, Maintain Force Readiness

Military Assistance

Airlift personnel, Supplies and Equipment	Provide Military Maintenance Assistance
Provide Military Advisory Assistance	Provide Other Military Logistics Assistance
Provide Military Training for Combat Troops	Provide Other Military Assistance
Drawdown Military Equipment from Soviet Depots	Provide Crisis-Related Military Aid ^b

New Missions and Costs

Undertake a New Military Mission	Accept a New Military Cost
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The Employment of Military Forces in Crisis Management

Fairly Direct Use of Military Forces to Support Political Goals	Take No Military Action
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^a This table includes all variables with frequencies greater than or equal to 20 in Table 3. Indicators are grouped in terms of analytical similarity, not statistical properties.

^b This is a judgmental variable, unlike the other military aid indices which index conjunctions of aid and crises.

Table 4
Predominant Types of Soviet Crisis Actions
Continued

Style of Political-Military Management Diplomacy

Employ Diplomacy	Provide Political/Propaganda Support
Reaffirm Existing Political-Military Commitment	Use of Warsaw Pact, CMEA, to Support Political Goals
Lodge Protest(s)	Use of International Organizations other than Warsaw Pact, CMEA, UN
USSR Acts Alone	
USSR Acts with Two or More Other Nations	
United Nations Involved	
UN Associated Actions: Resolutions and/or Amendments	
UN Associated Actions: Speeches and/or Letters	
Support Existing Regime	
Support Antiregime CP or CP/Movement	

TABLE 5
Soviet Actions Variables, Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

Soviet Actions ^a	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
Dreadnought military equipment from Soviet depots	0.84	0.19	0.15	0.23	-0.02	0.22	-0.01	0.04
Provide supplies from Soviet depots	0.84	0.23	0.18	0.04	0.03	0.19	-0.02	0.01
Provide military advisory assistance	0.82	0.08	0.10	0.29	0.11	0.07	0.03	0.11
Provide other military training	0.79	-0.09	-0.03	0.16	0.04	0.11	0.05	0.12
Provide crisis-related military aid	0.75	0.17	0.27	-0.02	0.08	0.17	0.06	-0.09
Provide supplies from nonmilitary sources	0.73	0.07	-0.06	-0.20	0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.11
Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment	0.71	0.17	0.12	-0.23	0.13	-0.05	-0.02	0.02
Provide military maintenance assistance	0.66	0.16	0.14	0.40	0.11	0.28	-0.00	-0.23
Provide other military logistics assistance	0.66	0.24	0.18	0.32	0.22	0.10	-0.02	-0.24
Provide economic assistance	0.61	-0.12	-0.15	-0.12	-0.14	0.26	-0.28	0.37
Provide military training for combat troops	0.59	0.14	0.33	0.36	0.17	-0.28	-0.01	0.05
Undertake a new military mission	0.47	0.45	0.49	-0.14	-0.12	-0.15	-0.11	-0.12
Accept a new military cost	0.46	0.57	0.36	-0.14	-0.15	-0.19	-0.04	-0.13
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces	0.01	0.81	0.09	0.19	0.14	0.21	0.12	-0.06
Reposition land forces	0.12	0.79	-0.09	-0.22	-0.05	0.03	0.09	-0.09
Improve, maintain force readiness	0.00	0.77	0.28	0.25	0.14	0.02	0.04	-0.06
Redeploy nonnuclear forces as a deterrent	0.08	0.76	0.09	0.14	-0.16	0.16	0.04	0.19
Reposition air forces	0.12	0.76	-0.04	0.05	0.11	0.07	0.16	-0.09
Military maneuvers or training exercises	0.03	0.75	0.06	-0.21	0.16	-0.19	-0.00	0.06
Show of military force	0.19	0.72	0.15	0.16	0.05	-0.07	0.03	0.31
Fairly direct use of military forces to support political goals	0.20	0.67	0.36	0.12	-0.17	-0.14	-0.11	0.16
Take no military action	-0.16	-0.51	-0.28	-0.03	-0.22	-0.07	-0.09	0.00
U.N.-associated actions: speeches and/or letters	0.15	0.12	0.82	-0.03	0.11	0.06	0.18	0.04
U.N. involved	0.14	0.22	0.76	0.02	0.22	0.08	0.19	-0.06
U.N.-associated actions: resolutions and/or amendments	0.09	0.16	0.69	0.23	0.06	0.23	-0.03	0.06

Continued

Table 5
Soviet Actions Variables
Continued

Soviet Actions ^a	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8
Support anti-regime CP or CP/movement	-0.07	-0.06	-0.00	-0.77	0.20	-0.11	-0.03	0.04
Reposition sea forces	0.28	0.34	0.28	0.43	0.11	-0.22	0.05	0.29
USSR acts with two or more nations	0.13	0.01	0.30	-0.10	0.80	0.14	0.13	0.02
USSR acts alone	-0.12	-0.09	-0.22	-0.10	-0.74	-0.13	0.37	-0.12
Use of international organizations other than U.N., WP, CMEA	0.10	0.17	-0.12	-0.01	0.68	-0.36	0.28	0.08
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment	0.33	0.23	0.10	0.10	0.12	0.58	0.20	-0.01
Provide political/propaganda support	0.26	0.00	0.39	-0.30	0.08	0.42	0.01	0.21
Employ diplomacy	0.14	0.10	0.15	-0.06	0.02	0.05	0.79	0.13
Lodge protest(s)	-0.35	0.25	0.17	0.15	0.06	0.08	0.60	0.00
Use of WP, CMEA to support political goals	0.05	0.10	0.04	-0.03	0.14	0.14	0.13	0.80
Percentage of variance	29.2	12.6	6.9	5.5	4.5	4.3	3.3	3.2

^a General and peculiarly Soviet combined.

- Factor 2 -- Conventional forces operations. It includes the repositioning of land and air units, but not of naval forces. More general types of conventional force activities which load on this dimension include redeployments, changes in alert status, show of force operations, maneuvers, and shifts in readiness status. Like the first factor, this dimension is defined in part by Soviet willingness to undertake new missions and incur new costs. The positive loading of the "direct use of military forces to achieve political goals" variable on this dimension is intuitively reasonable, as is the inverse loading of the "take no military action" index.
- Factor 3 -- United Nations activity is the first of several political-military diplomatic activity factors. The fact that variables dealing with Soviet U.N. behavior coload is not surprising. What is significant is that this set of indices define a relatively unique dimension. Only one non-U.N. associated index, "undertake a new military mission" loads above .40. The emergence of a U.N. factor is consistent with the importance attached in the Soviet crisis management literature to the role of the United Nations Organization in crises (Zhurkin, 1972).
- Factor 4 -- Conventional forces operations, generally in the Third World is defined by three variables: the repositioning of naval forces, military assistance in the form of maintenance, and an inverse loading for support for anti-regime Communist parties and movements. It is not surprising that naval forces should load on a separate dimension than Soviet land and air units (which loaded primarily on the second factor). In its crises involving the homeland and/or key contiguous regions, naval forces are less relevant to the Soviet Union for crisis management (their role as a strategic deterrent excepted). In addition, as noted in Chapter 2, the Soviet Navy did not "put to sea" until fairly late in the period surveyed (the mid-1960s) and the preponderance of its crisis operations have taken place in the Third World.
- Factor 5 -- Collective Diplomacy. "The USSR acts with two or more nations" and "Use of other international organizations," load positively on this factor. The "USSR acts alone" variable loads negatively.

⁷ This is the only one of the actions variables displayed in Table 5 whose communality (h^2) is below .50. Given the character of the index, this is a reasonable finding.

- Factor 6 -- Public support is defined by the reaffirmation of commitments and political/propaganda support.
- Factor 7 -- Public opposition is defined by the "lodge protests" variable (the loading "employ diplomacy" index is too general to define a direction for this factor).
- Factor 8 -- The use of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. This a distinctive form of Soviet political-military diplomacy most commonly employed in European crises.

It is noteworthy that this last factor is the only dimension defined solely by the characteristically Soviet variables. With the exception of factor seven (defined solely by variables taken from CACI's previous research on U.S. crises) all other dimensions are defined both by variables developed specifically to index the Soviet crisis experience and by indicators which have been used to assess the crises actions of both superpowers.

Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Crisis Actions Factors

The use of formal techniques such as those presented in Rummel (1970) to compare the crisis actions factors generated in this study and in CACI's previous analysis (1978a) of U.S. crisis actions is inhibited by a number of factors, including the different sets of variables employed in the analyses, some differences in variable definitions, and the different samples of cases employed. At the same time, however, it is possible to make some general observations comparing the overall configurations of the Soviet data (Table 5) and the U.S. dimensions (Table 6).

There are striking similarities in the first two factors in each set. The first U.S. factor largely corresponds to the second Soviet dimension. Common variables between the two factors include the repositioning of air and land forces and the redeployment of nonnuclear units. Differences

TABLE 6
Factor Structure in U.S. Actions in 101 Crises, 1956-1976^a

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Factor</u>			
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Reposition air forces	.80	.27	-.27	-.09
Reposition sea forces	.64	-.05	-.06	-.04
Redeploy nonnuclear forces	.55	-.10	.01	.11
Redeploy nuclear forces	.54	.04	-.04	.23
Change nuclear alert status	.51	-.11	.08	.20
Reposition land forces	.51	.03	-.15	-.06
Provide training for combat troops	.02	.70	-.06	.11
Provide military advisory assistance	.11	.65	-.07	-.13
Provide supplies from U.S. depots	.21	.62	.00	.09
Provide other military logistic support	.16	.58	-.05	-.07
Provide military maintenance assistance	-.08	.40	.06	-.05
Commit sea forces to combat	-.00	-.04	.74	.17
Commit air forces to combat	-.05	-.05	.69	.13
Commit land forces to combat	-.03	.15	.51	-.22
Provide supplies from nonmilitary sources	.05	.17	-.02	.41
Commit land support	-.12	.21	.39	-.41
Advocate or support peacekeeping forces	.36	-.03	.21	.38
Commit sea support	-.16	-.05	.01	-.35
Employ diplomacy	.07	.16	-.28	.35
Improve scientific-technical capability	-.09	-.05	-.03	-.31
Commit air support	-.18	.31	.13	-.30
Threaten nuclear forces	.25	.06	-.00	-.02
Threaten nonnuclear forces	-.02	.22	.13	.02
Change nonnuclear alert status	.37	-.12	.39	.04
Provide other military training	.05	.38	-.11	.21
Draw down equipment from U.S. depots	.09	.13	-.07	-.26
Provide other military assistance	.08	.30	.01	.05
Threaten to or do withdraw support	-.15	-.04	-.04	-.27
Reaffirm existing political-military commitment	.32	.23	.07	.03
Lodge protest	-.06	.04	.09	.23
Other U.S. actions	-.22	-.04	-.06	.12
Mediate a dispute	.18	-.06	-.07	.13
Percent variance explained	37	28	21	14

^a Varimax solution, orthogonal rotation.

include the absence of the nuclear alert variable from the Soviet factor (this indicator was hard to code for the Soviets from open source materials) and the nonloading of the sea forces indicator on the Soviet factor. There are also strong similarities between the first Soviet factor and second U.S. dimension. Both share the five military assistance variables that define the U.S. dimension. The third U.S. factor includes variables that occurred less than 20 times in the Soviet data hence they were not included in the Soviet factor analysis. The final U.S. logistics dimension collapses, in the Soviet case, into the first factor. In sum, the similarities between the two sets of dimensional analyses are striking.

CRISIS OBJECTIVES

Indicators and Frequencies

Table 7 presents the 59 Soviet objectives variables and the number of times each objective was coded as "present" in the 101 case sample. Coding was done from a Soviet vantage point using both Soviet and Western materials. These dichotomous variables were coded as outlined in the first section of this chapter. As was the case in the analysis of crisis actions, this section emphasizes the overall patterns taken by the objectives, particularly the objectives that occurred in at least 20 cases.

Most of the variable definitions are self-explanatory. A few items, however, require additional comments:

- Prestige variables were coded fairly liberally, reflecting the research staff's assessment of the high importance placed by the Soviets on this factor (the selection of the sample is also biased towards the inclusion of cases involving symbolic/prestige issues).
- Similarly, the "contain opponents" index was frequently used, hopefully reflecting a Marxist-Leninist (and, in some ways, distinctively Soviet) emphasis on the need to avoid isolation and to contain imperialism.

TABLE 7
Soviet Objectives Variables

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Deter Imminent Attack	13
Improve or Rectify Deterrence Posture	20
Put Down Rebellion	6
Restore a Regime	5
Regain Access to Economic Resources	3
Restore Peace	22
Restore Territorial Integrity	28
Restore Military Balance of Power	6
Restore Readiness	1
Preserve Readiness	20
Preserve Peace	20
Confirm or Reestablish Prestige	84
Preserve Territory and/or Facilities	37
Preserve Regime From External Threat	66
Preserve Regime From Internal Threat	22
Preserve, Restore, or Improve Alliance	39
Protect Legal and Political Rights	43
Induce Maintenance of Current Policy	17
Dissuade From a New Policy	38
Protect a Military Asset	15
Support a New Government	10
Induce National Reorientation	20
Induce Adoption of a New Policy	42
Bring About the Fall of a Regime	24
Support Insurgency	26
Deny Political Access	66
Deny Military Access	69
Assure Continued Economic Access	22
Preserve or Regain Control of the Sea	2

continued

Table 7
Soviet Objectives Variables
Continued

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Preserve or Regain Control of the Air	4
Protect Human Life	7
Provide Sanctuary or Asylum	5
Support Critical Negotiations	7
Discover Intentions or Actions	49
Prepare for Alternative Missions	33
Support Efforts by the United Nations	18
Contain Opponent(s)	86
Prevent Spread of War	21
Preserve Line of Communications	25
Regain Technical Advantage	1
Restore Prestige	42
Preserve Balance of Power	8
Prevent Spread of Capitalist Influence	55
Prevent Nuclear Proliferation	2
Insure Self-Sufficiency	9
Avoid Direct Involvement	55
Preserve Secrecy	60
<u>Peculiarly Soviet Objectives</u>	
Preserve Elite Power/Political System Within Soviet Union	4
Preserve Buffer System (Eastern Europe and Mongolia)	27
Preserve, Restore Unity of (and Soviet Preeminence Within) International Communist Movement	21
Prevent Remergence of Germany as a Major Power	10
Contain PRC Expansionism (Ideological, Political, Economic, Territorial)	23
Avoid Isolation	24

continued

Table 7
Soviet Objectives Variables
Continued

<u>Indicators Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Maximize Soviet and Soviet Leadership's Prestige	83
Support Shift in Correlation of Global Forces Against Capitalism in Favor of Communism	77
Neutralize/Eliminate Western Influence in Third World	57
Achieve Recognition, Equal Status With United States as Global Superpower	37
Prevent U.N. Secretariat, and so forth, From Taking Independent Action	14
Alter Balance of Power Favorable to Soviet Union, Allies, Clients	62

- Peace is defined negatively as the absence of war.
- Military assets include Soviet access to facilities abroad (including overflight and transit rights as a form of access); noninstitutionalized (nontreaty) forms of access were included.
- The sanctuary/asylum codes include the instances in which the Soviets received refugees from the People's Republic of China (for example, the major Sinkiang migrations in the early 1960s).

Focusing on the 37 objectives that occurred in at least 20 cases, Table 8 provides some a priori analytical grouping of these goals. The most striking point in the table is the relative preponderance of the more conservative objectives (position preservation and containment).

Relationships Among Crisis Objectives

Table 9 complements the a priori grouping of objectives variables with the results of a principal components factor analysis of these goals. In comparison with the crisis actions variables, the factor solution is much more complex. Twelve significant dimensions account for 67 percent of the variance in goals.

There are striking similarities between Tables 8 and 9, particularly in the clustering of the preservation goals:

- Factor 1 -- Defense Goals includes the preservation of territorial alliances, the Eastern European buffer system (the largest loading variable), and the international Marxist-Leninist movement. The negative loading for the "preserve secrecy" variable suggests that these are generally openly advocated objectives.
- Factor 2 -- Peace is defined by the goals of restoring peace, preventing the spread of war, and restoring territorial integrity.
- Factor 3 -- Defense Against Capitalism and Isolation. Defining variables include prevention of the spread of imperialist influence, denial of political access,

TABLE 8
Predominant Types of Soviet Crisis Objectives^a

Preservation Goals

Preserve readiness	Preserve peace
Preserve regime from external threat	Preserve regime from internal threat
Protect a military asset	Protect legal and political rights
Assure continued economic access	Prevent spread of war
Preserve lines of communication	Preserve buffer system
Preserve unity of International Communist movement	Avoid isolation
	Confirm prestige

Deterrence Goals

Improve or rectify deterrence posture	Dissuade from a new policy
Deny political access	Deny military access
Contain opponents	Prevent spread of capitalist influence
Contain PRC expansion	

Restoration Goals

Restore peace	Restore territorial integrity
Restore prestige	

Active Goals

Dissuade from a new policy	Induce national reorientation
Induce adoption of new policy	Bring about fall of a regime

^a Based on Table 7 which includes all variables occurring in 20 or more cases. Groupings are analytical, not statistical.

Table 8
 Predominant Types of Soviet Crisis Objectives
 Continued

Support insurgency	Discover intentions or actions
Prepare for alternative missions	Maximize Soviet prestige
Support shift in correlation of forces against capitalism	Neutralize Western influence in Third World
Achieve recognition of equal status with U.S.	Alter balance of power favorable to USSR, allies

Minimization of Public Involvement Goals

Avoid direct involvement	Preserve secrecy
--------------------------	------------------

TABLE 9
Soviet Objectives Variables Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

Soviet Objectives	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11	Factor 12
Preserve buffer system (E. Europe and Mongolia)	0.80	-0.16	0.11	-0.02	-0.14	0.06	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.00	0.10	0.04
Neutralize/eliminate Western influence in Third World	-0.67	0.20	0.17	0.13	-0.06	-0.08	-0.19	0.28	0.10	0.16	-0.19	-0.10
Preserve territory and/or facilities	0.62	0.29	0.03	-0.08	0.05	-0.04	-0.06	0.35	-0.06	0.06	0.15	-0.01
Preserve, restore, or improve alliance	0.51	0.11	0.12	0.02	0.16	0.24	0.03	-0.03	0.22	-0.32	-0.02	0.09
Preserve, restore unity of International Communist Movement	0.42	-0.04	-0.05	0.25	0.14	0.20	0.27	-0.41	0.19	-0.17	0.03	-0.03
Preserve secrecy	-0.40	-0.10	0.21	0.35	0.34	0.20	0.26	-0.00	-0.01	-0.14	0.06	0.23
Restore peace	-0.09	0.89	-0.01	0.05	-0.01	0.05	0.08	0.11	0.05	-0.15	-0.01	0.01
Restore territorial integrity	0.14	0.85	-0.10	-0.00	-0.05	-0.11	0.00	0.12	0.04	0.00	-0.00	0.09
Prevent spread of war	-0.09	0.79	0.02	-0.06	0.08	0.09	0.00	-0.07	0.09	0.16	0.04	0.01
Preserve regime from internal threat	-0.05	-0.04	0.82	-0.05	-0.12	0.03	-0.00	-0.03	-0.07	-0.04	0.04	0.03
Prevent spread of capitalist influence	0.04	-0.22	0.57	0.36	0.11	-0.14	-0.09	0.16	0.18	0.24	-0.13	-0.02
Deny political access	0.20	-0.00	0.56	0.15	0.03	-0.02	-0.08	0.49	0.12	0.00	-0.10	-0.11
Assure continued economic access	0.15	0.11	0.41	0.14	0.34	-0.15	-0.09	-0.28	0.04	0.16	0.06	-0.27
Bring about the fall of a regime	0.03	0.06	0.07	0.82	0.03	0.00	-0.07	-0.11	-0.00	-0.04	-0.02	0.08
Support insurgency	-0.22	-0.01	0.02	0.65	0.10	-0.07	-0.02	0.32	0.03	0.05	-0.09	0.00
Preserve regime from external threat	-0.01	0.21	0.38	-0.40	0.08	0.14	-0.45	0.09	0.26	0.03	-0.10	0.13
Confirm or reestablish prestige	0.12	-0.05	-0.08	-0.06	0.80	0.11	0.08	0.10	-0.04	-0.04	0.08	0.05
Maximize Soviet and Soviet leadership's prestige	-0.16	0.06	0.00	0.16	0.79	-0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.11	-0.14	-0.05	-0.04
Discover intentions or actions	0.04	-0.14	-0.00	0.07	-0.05	0.77	-0.06	0.20	0.13	-0.14	0.01	-0.06
Preserve peace	0.08	0.15	-0.02	-0.11	0.17	0.73	0.04	-0.08	-0.15	0.04	-0.01	-0.03
Improve or rectify deterrence posture	0.27	0.03	-0.03	-0.10	-0.05	0.49	0.09	-0.09	0.25	0.11	0.40	0.31

Continued

Table 9
Soviet Objectives Variables
Continued

Soviet Objectives	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11	Factor 12
Induce adoption of a new policy	0.05	0.11	-0.09	-0.06	-0.00	0.03	0.77	-0.00	0.07	0.04	-0.00	-0.11
Deny military access	0.03	0.18	0.00	0.07	0.15	0.12	0.08	0.70	0.10	0.16	-0.04	0.16
Preserve line of communications	0.13	0.17	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.79	0.00	0.16	0.02
Achieve recognition, equal status as superpower	-0.25	0.00	0.16	-0.10	0.20	0.09	0.03	0.19	0.61	0.05	-0.20	0.26
Avoid isolation	0.11	-0.08	0.09	0.33	-0.00	0.07	-0.10	0.32	0.40	-0.37	0.22	-0.30
Contain PRC expansionism	-0.01	0.11	-0.08	0.17	0.13	0.09	-0.16	-0.08	-0.01	-0.65	-0.18	-0.09
Avoid direct involvement	-0.20	0.22	0.00	0.21	-0.17	0.12	-0.09	0.16	-0.14	0.55	-0.05	-0.24
Support shift in correlation of global forces against capitalism in favor of Communism	-0.20	0.03	0.25	0.18	0.13	-0.09	-0.22	0.30	0.18	0.50	-0.01	0.33
Disuade from a new policy	0.13	-0.13	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06	-0.08	-0.04	-0.00	0.03	0.02	0.75	-0.21
Preserve readiness	0.26	0.10	-0.01	0.11	0.00	0.26	0.04	-0.21	0.00	0.19	0.54	0.30
Restore prestige	0.12	0.12	-0.06	-0.20	0.21	0.01	0.37	-0.09	0.13	-0.16	0.49	-0.26
Prepare for alternative missions	-0.03	0.22	0.16	0.24	0.09	0.25	-0.04	0.09	-0.01	-0.38	0.44	0.27
Protect legal and political rights	-0.00	0.18	0.06	-0.21	0.23	-0.04	0.39	0.16	-0.02	0.18	0.42	0.20
Alter balance of power favorable to USSR, allies, clients	0.11	0.09	-0.04	0.08	-0.00	-0.07	-0.16	0.09	0.11	0.01	-0.06	0.75
Percentage of variance	11.6	9.9	8.2	6.9	5.0	4.7	4.5	3.8	3.6	3.4	3.0	2.8

preservation of the regime from internal threats, and assurance of economic access.

- Factor 4 -- Antiregime Activity involves support for insurgency/inducing regime collapse. The preservation of regimes from external threats has a reasonable negative loading.
- Factor 5 -- Prestige. The two defining variables deal with Soviet status.
- Factor 6 -- Selected Forms of Deterrence includes the goals of preserving peace, improving deterrence, and discovering others' intentions.
- Factor 7 -- Influencing Other Nations' Policies, on the other hand, has to do with the goal of "inducing adoption of new policies" and has a negative loading for "preserving regimes from external threat."
- Factor 8 -- Denial of Political and Military Access operates even at the partial expense of other Marxist-Leninist nations and movements.
- Factor 9 -- Preservation of Soviet Access involves lines of communication, the avoidance of isolation, and confirmation of Soviet status, particularly in the Third World.
- Factor 10 -- Indirect Attempts to Influence the Correlation of Forces. This is the most difficult of the dimensions to interpret. Positive loading variables for this factor include "avoid direct involvement" and support for shifts in the correlation of forces. Containment of China loads negatively.
- Factor 11 -- Status Quo Goals and Prestige includes improving deterrence and readiness, protecting legal rights, and restoring prestige. Attempts to dissuade others load positively on this factor.
- Factor 12 -- Attempts to Alter the Correlation of Forces in the Soviet Union's Favor.

Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Crisis Objectives Factors

Table 10 presents the factor structure of U.S. crisis goals identified in CACI (1978a). There is far less consonance between U.S. and Soviet

TABLE 10
Factor Structure of U.S. Objectives in 101 Crises, 1956-1976^a

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Factor</u>			
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Prevent spread of Communist influence	.69	.21	.07	.09
Preserve balance of power	.64	.22	-.08	.02
Contain opponents	.57	-.04	.18	.05
Restore military balance of power	.51	.11	.11	.28
Prevent spread of war	.46	-.16	.26	.54
Preserve regime from external threat	.46	-.14	.21	.16
Preserve, restore, or improve alliance	.43	-.04	.04	.21
Deter imminent attack	.40	.09	-.14	.35
Protect a military asset	-.19	.68	-.16	.24
Preserve lines of communication	.10	.60	-.12	-.11
Protect legal and political rights	.01	.52	-.06	.14
Improve or rectify deterrence posture	.26	.45	-.03	.23
Preserve readiness	.25	.45	-.25	-.35
Confirm or reestablish prestige	-.06	.41	-.14	-.09
Put down a rebellion	-.07	.03	.80	.05
Restore territorial integrity	.16	.14	.58	.01
Preserve regime from internal threat	.10	-.15	.48	.00
Restore peace	.30	-.12	.47	.37
Preserve or regain control of sea	-.06	.11	-.12	.50
Restore readiness	.06	.08	.05	.46
Preserve or regain control of air	.05	.11	.03	.41
Restore a regime	-.02	-.09	.21	-.04
Regain access to economic resources	-.03	-.13	-.07	-.08
Preserve peace	.25	.22	-.19	-.18
Preserve territory or facilities	.29	.24	.01	.29
Induce maintenance of current policy	.21	.05	-.14	.11
Dissuade from a new policy	.22	.06	-.21	-.26
Assure continued economic access	-.00	.09	.09	-.30
Prevent nuclear proliferation	-.07	-.22	-.06	.01
Insure self-sufficiency	.03	.00	.04	.08
Percent variance explained	39	30	18	13

^a Variance structure, orthogonal rotation. Variables with small cell sizes were dropped to minimize distortion.

crisis goals than was the case for the crisis actions of the two superpowers. Primary differences derive from the greater subdivision of Soviet objectives across three times as many dimensions. For example, the first U.S. factor contains variables that load on the first three Soviet dimensions. What is, for the U.S., a fairly global containment of Communism dimension is, in the Soviet case, three dimensions having to do with various subtypes of defensive goals.

Perhaps the closest match across the two factor analyses is between the second U.S. factor (accounting for 30 percent of the variance) and the ninth and eleventh Soviet dimensions. Variables that load on the U.S. "preservation of military capability" and "protection of interests" factors also load on the Soviet "preservation of access" and "status quo goals" dimensions. Even here, however, the fit is weaker than was seen for the actions variables. Correspondences between superpower crisis behaviors appear to be far stronger than the fits between their goal structures.

CHAPTER 6. CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS

This chapter provides some of the criteria used to define Soviet crisis problems variables, shows the factor structure of these data, and compares these dimensions with a similar study of U.S. crisis problems.

DEFINITIONS AND CODING INTERPRETATIONS

During the 101 events included in the intensive crisis sample, the Soviet Union encountered a wide variety of crisis management problems that affected its actions and influenced the extent to which it was able to achieve objectives. Forty-three problems variables were coded for the crises. Thirty-one of these indicators were taken from CACI's previous research on U.S. crisis management problems (CACI, 1976) while the remaining twelve indicators were added to capture peculiarly Soviet problems (for example, the difficulties caused by other Communist parties).

Crisis management problems were coded in the same fashion as the actions and objectives presented in the preceding chapter. Both Soviet and Western source materials were used as bases for inference and the assignment of present/absent scores. The criteria used to assign values were affected by the character of some of the problems taken from the earlier U.S. project and the inherent limitations of open source materials.¹ As a result, some significant interpretations affected the coding of variables:

- Assessments of CACI researchers with expertise in the analysis of operational experience and sea and airlift

¹ In addition, many of the U.S. problem variables were simply uncodable for the Soviets and were excluded from the outset of the project.

capabilities were pooled to construct reference tables that were applied to all 101 cases. Historical cases of Soviet crisis involvement, plus the deployment patterns of Soviet armed forces units were used to establish the marker dates in these tables. Tables 1 and 2 present, as examples, the codes employed for Soviet military operational experience and support capabilities in major crises.

- "Constraints on military action" included the actions of other powers that inhibited the commitment of Soviet forces.
- The "proposed action produces foreign policy conflict" code was used only if the conflict was between the USSR and another state (internal conflicts within the Soviet leadership were not systematically codable from open sources).
- Emotional issues were indexed by a number of factors, including the participation of the actors that tend to produce the most emotional responses in Soviet writings: China and the Federal Republic of Germany.
- Where actions were coded as "inadequate" (as in "action inadequate to prevent crisis") it was required that the Soviet Union be in principle capable of taking actions that would have been adequate). The "forces inadequate to solve crisis" factor was coded as present only if Soviet forces were already committed with the apparent goal of solving the crisis.

INDICATORS AND FREQUENCIES

Table 3 presents the 43 problem variables. Of the 31 variables taken from the U.S. project, 21 have a frequency of 20 or greater. Of the 12 indicators of peculiarly Soviet problems, 8 occur 20 or more times in the 101 cases. These relatively high frequencies are due, in part, to the preselection of variables. Many of the U.S. indicators of crisis problems were excluded from the outset because of the severe difficulties in data collection that they would have posed.² The

² The frequencies are also due, in part, to the fact that no artificial limits were placed on the number of present codes assigned to any crisis. Instead, each event was assigned "1" codes for each attribute that appeared to be applicable.

TABLE 1
Soviet Military Operational Experience
by Region
Large-Scale Crisis Involvement^a

<u>Region</u>	<u>Code as 1 (a problem)</u>	<u>Code as 0 (not a problem)</u>
East Europe, Periphery of USSR		1946-1975
Middle East	1946-1966	1967-1975
North Africa	1946-1975	
Central, South Africa	1946-1975	
East Asia	1946-1975	
South, Southeast Asia	1946-1975	
Latin America	1946-1975	

^a Deals solely with large-scale crisis involvement. Different criteria were employed for lower levels of Soviet crisis involvement

TABLE 2
Soviet Sea, Airlift Capabilities by Regions
Large-Scale Crisis Involvement
Support Capabilities^a

<u>Region</u>	<u>Code as 1 (a problem)</u>	<u>Code as 0 (not a problem)</u>
East Europe, Periphery of USSR		1946-1975
Middle East, North Africa	1946-1968	1969-1975
Central, South Africa	1946-1975	
East Asia	1946-1975	
South, Southeast Asia	1946-1975	
Latin America	1946-1975	

^a Deals solely with large-scale crisis involvement. Different criteria were employed for lower levels of Soviet crisis involvement.

TABLE 3
Soviet Problem Variables
Derived From U.S. Crisis Management Project

<u>Problem Variables</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
System/Procedural Constraints on Actions	
Constraints on Military Action	41
Consideration of Soviet Domestic Impact	17
Consideration of International Relations	84
Proposed Action Produces Foreign Policy Conflict	55
Resources Inadequate for Decision-Making/Action	
Inability to Reinforce Local Units in Time	9
Inability to Provide Additional Logistical Support	9
Emotional/Ideological Issues Involved in Decision-Making	
Crisis Actions Affected by Ideological Issues	60
Crisis Actions Affected by Emotional Issues	45
Interpersonal Factors in Decision-Making	
Multilingual Problems	7
Delay in Contacting Proper Individuals	4
Constraints on Operations	
Action in Friendly Country (Area)	58
Action in Hostile Country (Area)	61
Failures in Taking Appropriate/Timely Action	
Action Inadequate to Prevent Crisis	45
Action Inadequate to Solve Crisis	34
Force Inadequate to Solve Crisis	16
Fail to Execute Action in Time	2
Inadequate Logistic Support to Accomplish Objectives	8
FORSTAT Problems	
Availability of Lift (Sea/Air)	22
Problems in the Operating Environment	
Geography, Terrain, Climate	32

Table 3
Soviet Problem Variables
Continued

<u>Problem Variables</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Distance to Crisis Area	46
Unique Logistics/Communications Requirements	32
General Problems in Crisis Handling	
Crisis Develops Despite Adequate Actions	22
Overreaction to Crisis	5
Late Soviet Political-Military Involvement	33
Soviet Political-Military Involvement at Outset	55
General Problems in Crisis Timing	
Situation Develops Over Time Before Crisis Level Is Reached	47
Situation Develops Over Time but Crisis is Sudden	49
Sudden Crisis With Prolonged Action/Solution	41
Prolonged Crisis With Intermittent Peaks	65
Multicrises	65
Perceptual/Psychology	
Threat to Homeland Perceived	29
Threat to Other Key Regions (for example, Eastern Europe) Perceived	35
Fear of Germany	13
Fear of Encirclement by Western States	25
Sensitivity to Criticism From Other Communist Parties and Party States	51
Relations With Marxist-Leninist States	
Interests of Other Marxist-Leninist States Involved in Crisis	70
Marxist-Leninist State Included in Set of Soviet Opponents in Crisis	28
Joint Operations With Other Marxist-Leninist States	7
Relations With Local Communist Parties and Progressive Movements	
Local Communist Parties and Movements Threatened	39
Local Communist Parties and Movements Fail to Follow Soviet Advice (Chile, Indonesia, and So Forth) and Suffer as a Result	8

Table 3
Soviet Problem Variables
Continued

<u>Problem Variables</u>	<u>Number of "Present" Codes</u>
Local Communist Parties and Movements Oppose the Soviet Union	15
Transportation/Logistical Issues	
Soviets Have Little Military Operational Experience in Crisis Theater	21

specifically Soviet factors were introduced on the basis of their presumed relevance.

Using the clusters presented in Table 3, Table 4 highlights the most frequently occurring groups of crisis management problems. The wide variety of problem categories is most striking. Only two of the categories of problems presented in Table 3 (interpersonal factors in decision-making and resource inadequacies) do not appear in Table 4.

TABLE 4
Crisis Problem Groups^a

System/Procedural Constraints on Actions
Emotional/Ideological Issues Involved in Decision-Making
Constraints on Operations
Failures in Taking Appropriate/Timely Action
FORSTAT Problems
Problems in the Operating Environment
General Problems in Crisis Handling
General Problems in Crisis Timing
Perceptual/Psychological
Relations with Marxist-Leninist States
Relations with Local Communist Parties and Progressive Movements
Transportation/Logistical Issues

^a Groupings are taken from Table 3.

Relationships Among Crisis Management Problems

Table 5 presents the results of a principal components factor analysis (Varimax rotation) of the problems variables which were present in 20 or more of the 101 cases in the intensive sample. The eleven factors extracted, all of which have eigenvalues greater than 1.00, account for 72 percent of the variance in the problems. In terms of the diversity

TABLE 5
Soviet Problem Variables Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix

Soviet Problem	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	0.90	0.01	-0.04	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.07	-0.04	0.11	-0.18
Situation develops over time before crisis level is reached	-0.90	0.03	0.07	0.06	0.03	-0.00	0.07	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00	0.16
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/solution	0.78	0.15	-0.08	-0.15	0.01	0.09	-0.00	0.04	0.04	-0.09	0.14
Availability of lift (sea/air)	0.09	0.72	0.07	0.00	0.05	0.09	0.02	0.14	-0.00	0.24	-0.07
Distance to crisis area	-0.05	0.70	0.18	-0.01	-0.34	-0.14	-0.03	-0.00	0.05	-0.07	-0.02
Geography, terrain, climate	0.09	0.70	-0.02	0.21	-0.27	0.14	0.01	-0.16	0.04	0.16	0.19
Unique logistics/communications requirements	0.00	0.51	0.06	-0.15	0.05	-0.17	0.35	0.02	0.22	-0.02	-0.34
Constraints on military action	0.17	0.50	-0.16	0.11	0.24	0.12	-0.30	0.37	-0.05	-0.18	0.18
Sensitivity to criticism from other CP's and CP states	-0.15	-0.06	0.81	0.00	-0.17	-0.06	-0.11	0.02	0.07	-0.13	0.09
Interests of other M-L states involved in crisis	-0.13	0.25	0.77	0.07	0.06	0.03	-0.07	0.06	0.07	-0.16	-0.16
M-L states included in set of Soviet opponents in crisis	-0.02	0.06	0.61	0.25	0.13	0.05	0.14	-0.19	-0.09	0.43	-0.09
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	0.25	0.07	0.49	-0.12	0.23	-0.00	0.03	0.01	0.27	0.26	0.20
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	-0.18	-0.14	0.42	0.21	0.17	-0.07	0.38	0.22	0.25	0.21	0.02

Continued

Table 5
Factor Matrix
Continued

Soviet Problems	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11
Late Soviet political-military involvement	0.09	-0.01	0.02	-0.09	0.04	0.03	-0.03	-0.00	0.00	0.08	0.11
Soviet political-military involvement at outset	-0.09	0.09	0.16	0.85	0.06	0.00	0.04	0.19	0.13	-0.02	-0.07
Fear of encirclement by Western states	0.10	-0.05	-0.05	-0.08	0.81	0.03	-0.00	0.18	0.01	-0.11	-0.02
Threat to homeland perceived	-0.03	-0.28	0.07	0.22	0.63	0.07	-0.09	-0.03	-0.10	-0.02	0.35
Actions in hostile country (area)	-0.30	-0.05	0.15	-0.01	0.55	-0.29	0.12	-0.11	0.02	0.03	-0.24
Crisis develops despite adequate actions	0.07	0.04	0.02	-0.07	-0.07	-0.87	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.04	-0.00
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	0.03	0.05	-0.25	0.07	0.28	0.50	0.12	0.53	0.09	0.18	-0.13
Threat to other key regions (e.g., E. Europe) perceived	0.15	0.26	0.08	0.14	0.32	0.40	0.07	0.38	0.01	-0.33	0.15
Multi-crises	-0.01	0.04	-0.08	0.04	-0.00	0.04	0.79	0.01	-0.02	-0.14	0.06
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	0.03	0.01	0.15	0.33	0.31	-0.11	0.22	0.61	0.05	0.01	0.05
Consideration of international relations	0.03	0.03	0.14	-0.27	0.01	0.19	-0.36	0.58	0.26	0.18	-0.15
Action in friendly country	0.25	0.19	-0.08	0.22	-0.29	-0.13	-0.01	0.56	-0.23	0.00	0.14
Action inadequate to solve crisis	0.02	0.01	0.13	0.14	-0.07	0.08	0.07	0.11	0.84	-0.03	0.04

Continued

Table 5
Factor Matrix
Continued

Soviet Problem	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4	Factor 5	Factor 6	Factor 7	Factor 8	Factor 9	Factor 10	Factor 11
Local CP's and movements threatened	-0.00	0.29	0.03	-0.08	0.11	-0.15	-0.28	-0.34	0.53	0.20	-0.00
Soviets have little military operational experience in crisis area	-0.03	0.18	-0.08	-0.14	-0.15	0.07	-0.21	0.12	0.05	0.72	0.04
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	-0.22	0.02	-0.00	-0.26	0.02	-0.03	0.10	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.77
Percent of Variance	12.3	11.0	10.9	7.5	5.9	5.1	4.3	4.2	3.8	3.6	3.5

of the factor solution, the crisis management problems resemble the objectives variables examined in the preceding chapter more than the crisis actions indicators. Each of the variables included in the analysis had a communality above .50.

Only the first three factors individually account for more than 10 percent of the variance in the set of problems. The factors, in order of diminishing variance are:

1. Crisis timing problems -- variables dealing with the suddenness of crises.
2. Constraints on operations -- indexed by the availability of sea and airlift; features of geography, terrain, and climate; distance; unique logistics and communications requirements; and the effects of other powers' actions that restrict Soviet freedom of action.
3. Crisis sensitivity -- including ideological and emotional problems, Soviet sensitivity to criticism from other Marxist-Leninist states, the need to consider the interests of other Communist actors during the crisis, and the presence of Marxist-Leninist opponents (such as China). Significantly, sensitivity variables from both the U.S. crisis project as well as from the set of indices constructed specifically for the Soviets load on this dimension.
4. Timing of Soviet crisis involvement.
5. Geopolitical concerns -- including threats to the Soviet homeland, Soviet concern with encirclement by the West, and the location of crisis events in hostile areas.
6. Diplomatic issues -- including foreign policy conflicts with other states, threats to other key regions perceived during crises, and the development of crises in spite of Soviet actions.
7. Multiple simultaneous crises.
8. Geopolitical and diplomatic problems -- including considerations of international relations during crises, foreign policy conflicts between the USSR and other states, the location of crisis events in friendly areas, and the inadequacy of crisis actions.

9. Endangered Communist parties and movements -- particularly when Soviet actions are not sufficient to solve the crisis.
10. Opposition by other Communist actors and limited Soviet in-theater operational experiences.
11. Prolonged crises with intermittent peaks -- not a surprising factor to emerge, given the "structural" outlook of Soviet crisis literature with its emphasis on longer-duration events.

Looking at the two sets of variables, those taken from CACI's previous research on U.S. crises and those created specifically for the Soviet research (Table 3), it can be seen that six factors are defined solely by variables from the first set, one by the new Soviet indicators, and four by both sets. Almost half of the factors reflect distinctively Soviet types of crisis problems.

COMPARISON OF SOVIET AND U.S. CRISIS PROBLEMS FACTORS

Table 6 presents the results of a principal components factor analysis of U.S. crisis management problems in 101 postwar American crisis operations, (CACI, 1978f). The first U.S. dimension (intelligence and international considerations) has a number of defining variables which were not collectable for the Soviets, such as "interagency coordination required" and "need for special intelligence." As a result, it has no clear counterpart in the set of Soviet factors (Table 5). The same is true for the second U.S. factor (readiness) which is defined by a number of variables which could not be reliably coded for the Soviets from open sources. The third U.S. factor (crisis timing and development) does have some counterparts in the set of variables coded for the Soviets (for example, "unique logistics requirements" which loads on the second Soviet factor) but the fit between the two sets is generally poor. Fits are poor for the fifth U.S. dimension (political-military constraints), and the sixth U.S. dimension (domestic pressures) as well.

TABLE 6
Factor Matrix for 101 Crisis Problem Variables (1946-76)^a

Crisis Problem Variables	Factor 1: Intelligence and International Problems	Factor 2: Readiness	Factor 3: Timing and Development	Factor 4: Timing of U.S. Military Involvement	Factor 5: Political- Military Constraints	Factor 6: Domestic Pressures and Considerations	Factor 7: Environmental Constraints	Factor 8: Surprise
Delayed Decision on Action	19	23	11	02	-06	36	11	21
Interagency Coordination Required	50	12	10	-02	-27	33	14	13
International Agency Coordination Needed	29	01	40	-02	-26	-03	-06	21
President Involved as Decision-Maker	30	20	21	-28	12	30	01	02
Constraints on Military Action	20	-00	11	-06	56	16	03	06
Consideration of U.S. Domestic Impact	00	04	23	-10	-09	70	09	-02
Consideration of Inter- national Relations	45	09	14	-09	03	16	-03	08
Domestic Policy Conflict Produced	-04	01	-04	-04	23	69	-03	02
Foreign Policy Conflict Produced	62	15	19	00	-02	15	-09	11
Legality of Action is Issue	12	-01	-10	-19	35	22	17	-04
Inadequate Intelligence Input	57	-26	-21	03	14	-04	03	11
Delay in Securing Adequate Facts	54	04	-20	-14	-00	-06	23	-12
Failure to See Import of Information	32	05	-18	09	04	26	34	29
Actions Affected by Ideo- logical Issues	48	-12	33	03	16	07	04	08
Actions Affected by Eco- nomical Issues	18	-07	-12	34	04	66	06	13

^a Orthogonal varimax rotation; unitless were used as initial communality estimates; N=101 crises (entire period, 1946-76); 38 problem variables were omitted to avoid distortion due to large numbers of empty cells; problem variables included occur in at least 20 percent of all crises in sample; preceding decimal point omitted; loadings greater than or equal to .40 are underlined.

Continued

Table 6
Factor Matrix
Continued

Crisis Problem Variables	Factor 1: Intelligence and International Problems	Factor 2: Readiness	Factor 3: Timing and Crisis Development	Factor 4: Timing of U.S. Military Involvement	Factor 5: Political- Military Constraints	Factor 6: Domestic Pressures and Considerations	Factor 8: Environmental Constraints	Factor 8: Surprise	^{h 2}
Press and Public Reactions are Issues	41	07	-10	19	09	44	-04	-12	44
Sudden Call-up/Dispatch of Troops	26	39	09	-37	05	00	-00	-03	38
Action in Friendly Nation	02	05	22	09	-32	18	28	04	28
Action in Hostile Nation	04	07	-21	08	73	02	11	-07	60
Action Inadequate to Prevent Crisis	-01	19	-08	15	36	03	24	08	26
Inadequate Local Logistic Support	14	22	12	-05	08	07	56	-08	41
Readiness of Forces	09	69	06	15	07	-03	22	12	57
Availability of Forces	-00	81	03	02	-10	09	16	05	71
Choice of Units	-02	73	06	-33	02	05	-04	-01	64
Availability of Equipment	07	38	07	20	05	20	21	-05	29
Geography/Terrain/Climate	-14	29	-02	06	32	-06	61	-11	60
Distance to Crisis Area	05	42	00	09	31	-04	56	-19	63
Unique Logistics/Communications	29	14	44	11	-15	-12	09	-21	40
Need for Special Intelligence	48	33	09	-12	03	-04	-19	-24	46
Security/Sensitivity an Issue	07	46	01	14	05	-03	-00	-29	32

Continued

Table 6
Factor Matrix
Continued

Crisis Problem Variables	Factor 1: Intelligence and International Problems	Factor 2: Readiness	Factor 3: Timing and Development	Factor 4: Timing of U.S. Military Involvement	Factor 5: Political- Military Constraints	Factor 6: Domestic Pressures and Considerations	Factor 8: Environmental Constraints	Factor 8: Surprise	λ^2
No Contingency Plans	-07	-09	-26	-16	-22	04	57	17	51
Inadequate Contingency Plans	03	22	20	18	46	-00	-33	07	44
Crisis Develops Despite Actions	06	00	46	10	-09	-11	-30	03	33
Late U.S. Military Involvement	03	-08	14	-87	-05	02	11	06	80
Early U.S. Military Involvement	09	09	-02	90	08	-00	01	-05	85
Situation Develops Before Crisis Reached	04	11	58	-03	-03	05	-07	09	36
Situation Develops; Crisis Sudden	28	05	-10	-07	-23	-04	-26	63	61
Crisis Occurs; No Warning	04	09	-40	-08	-19	-24	-06	-70	77
Sudden Crisis; Prolonged Solution	21	25	-19	-12	-40	06	02	11	34
Prolonged Crisis	-03	-00	51	-13	01	25	07	-04	35
Multiple Crises	-04	21	10	09	00	03	-26	04	13
Cumulative Percent of Total Variance Explained	6.9	14.5	19.6	25.2	30.7	36.5	42.0	45.7	
Eigenvalues	4.51	3.35	2.49	2.20	1.89	1.80	1.31	1.15	

On the other hand, there are some U.S. factors that have Soviet counterparts. The fourth U.S. factor (timing of U.S. involvement) is defined by late U.S. involvement; the counterpart variable for the Soviets is one of the two defining indicators for the fourth Soviet factor (timing of Soviet crisis involvement). The seventh U.S. factor (environmental constraints) has a counterpart in the second Soviet factor (constraints on operations). Common variables across the two include geography, terrain, climate, and distance problems. Finally, the last U.S. factor bears a resemblance to the first Soviet factor, as both focus on surprise and suddenness.

Overall, the most significant point to emerge from these comparisons is the difference between the structures of the crisis management problems encountered by the two superpowers. In part due to the different mixes of variables employed for each and in part due to the patterns taken by the indicators for each country, quite distinctive profiles of problems emerge. In the Soviet case, the factor structure shows a distinctively Soviet pattern of crises management problems.

CHAPTER 7. COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF CRISIS ACTIONS, OBJECTIVES, AND PROBLEMS

This chapter presents comparative analyses of the crisis actions, objectives, and problems data presented in the preceding two chapters. The first section examines temporal sequences in the frequencies of these three factors. The second section investigates their correlations with one another and with the crisis characteristics data presented in Chapter 4.

RELATIVE FREQUENCIES

Over the three periods used to stratify the selection of the intensive sample cases there are both major continuities and significant differences in the relative frequencies of actions, objectives, and problems indicators. Because the sample was deliberate, and not random, these differences and similarities cannot be exclusively ascribed to either temporal trends or to the factors used to classify cases in the sampling.¹ They are, nevertheless, of considerable interest.

Table 1 shows the most frequent action variables in each of the phases.

Two kinds of behaviors were common in all three phases:

- General diplomatic activities (the employment of diplomacy, lodging of protests, reaffirmation of commitments, supporting of existing regimes, and the use of Soviet-dominated international organizations).

¹ During Phase I (1946-1965) emphasis was given to the selection of major Cold War crises, plus a few incidents involving the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist states. In Phase II (1966-1970) stress was placed on events taking place in the Middle East and crises involving the United States, China, and the People's Republic of China. During Phase III (1971-1975) all cases were selected.

TABLE 1
High Frequency Soviet Actions by Phase
(percent)

<u>Soviet Actions</u>	<u>Phase I 1946-1965</u>	<u>Phase II 1966-1970</u>	<u>Phase III 1971-1975</u>
Employ diplomacy	94.1	88.6	81.3
Provide political/propaganda support	82.4	71.4	87.5
Drawdown military equipment from Soviet depots	61.8	60.0	53.1
Lodge protest(s)	79.4	80.0	43.8
Support existing regime	55.9	57.1	65.6
Provide supplies from Soviet depots	61.8	69.0	46.9
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment	67.6	40.0	43.8
Provide crisis-related military aid	58.8	42.9	40.6
Use of WP, CMEA to support political goals	44.1	45.7	43.8
U.N.-associated actions: speeches, letters	61.8	31.4	31.3
Fairly direct use of military forces to support political goals	58.8	31.4	18.8
Accept a new military cost	55.9	28.6	12.5
Change alert status of non-nuclear forces	52.9	37.1	6.3
Undertake a new military mission	50.0	17.1	12.5
Reposition land forces	47.1	8.6	6.3
Show of military force	47.1	28.6	9.4

continued

Table 1
High Frequency Soviet Actions by Phase
Continued

<u>Soviet Actions</u>	<u>Phase I 1946-1965</u>	<u>Phase II 1966-1970</u>	<u>Phase III 1971-1975</u>
Provide military maintenance assistance	47.1	31.4	28.1
Provide other military logistics assistance	47.1	28.6	21.9
Military maneuvers or training exercises	41.2	17.1	6.3
Airlift personnel and/or supplies and equipment	41.2	31.4	37.5
Support anti-regime CP or CP/movement	41.2	22.9	50.0
Improve, maintain force readiness	67.6	40.0	9.4
United Nations involved	55.9	40.0	12.5
USSR acts with two or more other nations	50.0	45.7	31.3
Provide military advisory assistance	44.1	40.0	37.5
Provide supplies from non-military sources	41.2	40.0	37.5
Take no military action	32.4	42.9	68.8
Provide economic assistance	26.5	28.6	50.0
Provide other military training	38.2	28.6	43.8
USSR acts alone	29.4	31.4	40.6

- Security assistance (the provision of military aid, equipment, and supplies).

A number of actions were common during one or two phases. The use of military force to support political goals was relatively most common during the Cold War incidents of Phase I. During both Phase I and Phase II, multilateral political-military diplomatic activity was common, often in the context of the United Nations. Phase III, on the other hand, was characterized by a relative reduction in the use of military forces as policy instruments, increases in military training and economic aid, and an increased tendency for the Soviet Union to act alone.

Similar patterns of continuity and discord can be detected in Table 2, which shows the most frequently occurring Soviet objectives.

Continuities in Soviet goals over the three, quite disparate, phases include:

- Concern with Soviet prestige.
- The perceived need to block opponents and preserve a sphere of control.
- A general interest in favorable alteration of the status quo.
- A preference for indirect involvement.

During the Cold War crises of Phase I, particular emphasis was placed on the preservation of the buffer system. During Phase II relatively greater emphasis was placed on the protection of Soviet legal and political rights. In Phase III, particular stress was placed on the goals of limiting Western influence, particularly in the Third World, support for insurgencies, and the achievement of recognition as a superpower of equal status with the United States, while renewed emphasis was placed on the maintenance of the Soviet alliance system.

TABLE 2
High Frequency Soviet Objectives by Phase
(percent)

<u>Soviet Objectives</u>	<u>Phase I 1946-1965</u>	<u>Phase II 1966-1970</u>	<u>Phase III 1971-1975</u>
Contain opponents	85.3	74.3	96.9
Maximize Soviet and Soviet leadership's prestige	85.3	77.1	84.4
Confirm or reestablish prestige	85.3	91.4	71.9
Support shift in correlation of global forces against capitalism in favor of communism	79.4	65.7	84.4
Deny military access	76.5	62.9	65.6
Preserve regime from external threat	67.6	60.0	68.8
Deny political access	73.5	45.7	78.1
Alter balance of power favorable to USSR, allies, clients	67.6	62.9	53.1
Preserve secrecy	44.1	62.9	71.9
Avoid direct involvement	47.1	54.3	62.5
Preserve territory and/or facilities	52.9	31.4	25.0
Discover intentions or actions	52.9	34.3	59.4
Prevent spread of capitalist influence	50.0	28.6	87.5
Restore territorial integrity	44.1	22.9	15.6
Preserve, restore, improve alliance	44.1	28.6	43.8
Preserve buffer system (East Europe and Mongolia)	41.2	22.9	15.6
Restore prestige	52.9	40.0	31.3
Dissuade from a new policy	41.2	48.6	21.9
Protect legal and political rights	38.2	51.4	37.5
Induce adoption of a new policy	26.5	57.1	40.6
Neutralize/eliminate Western influence in Third World	38.2	54.3	78.1
Achieve recognition, equal status with United States as superpower	38.2	14.3	59.4
Support insurgency	14.7	22.9	40.6

Table 3 presents the most frequent Soviet crisis management problems variables.

A number of problems were common to all three phases:

- The activities and interests of other actors.
- Crisis dimensions and timing.
- Regional factors (friendly/hostile locales)
- Soviet perceptions, attitudes, ideological concerns).

On the other hand, a number of problems steadily decreased over the three phases:

- Factors pertaining to Soviet interests in key geopolitical regions and Soviet fear of encirclement.
- Inadequacies in Soviet actions, involvement, timing.
- The frequency of sudden crises.
- Constraints on Soviet military action.

Finally, some types of problems increased over the three phases:

- Long, chronic, overlapping crises.
- Crises in areas hostile to the USSR.
- Problems involving Soviet sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties and regimes.
- Special logistical problems.

Dealing with the patterns presented in all three tables, it is striking how the trends noted match the assessments of many more qualitatively oriented students of Soviet foreign and political-military policy since

TABLE 3
High Frequency Soviet Problems by Phase
(percent)

<u>Soviet Problems</u>	<u>Phase I 1946-1965</u>	<u>Phase II 1966-1970</u>	<u>Phase III 1971-1975</u>
Consideration of international relations	100.0	80.0	68.8
Interests of other M-L states involved	70.6	60.0	78.1
Prolonged crisis with intermittent peaks	61.8	60.0	71.9
Multi-crises	58.8	62.9	71.9
Action in hostile country (area)	52.9	54.3	75.0
Action in friendly country (area)	64.7	54.3	53.1
Crisis actions affected by ideological issues	76.5	40.0	62.5
Soviet political/military involvement at outset	52.9	51.4	59.4
Crisis actions affected by emotional issues	41.2	45.7	46.9
Action inadequate to prevent crisis	58.8	37.1	37.5
Threat to other key regions perceived (e.g. East Europe)	50.0	34.3	18.8
Action inadequate to solve crisis	44.1	28.6	28.1
Late Soviet political/military involvement	41.2	31.4	25.0
Fear of encirclement by Western states	41.2	20.0	12.5
Local CP's and movements threatened	41.2	22.9	53.1
Soviets have little experience in crisis theater	41.2	11.4	9.4

Continued

Table 3
High Frequency Soviet Problems by Phase
Continued

<u>Soviet Problems</u>	<u>Phase I 1946-1965</u>	<u>Phase II 1966-1970</u>	<u>Phase III 1971-1975</u>
Proposed action produces foreign policy conflict	82.4	62.9	15.6
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	70.6	51.4	21.9
Sudden crisis with prolonged action/ solution	55.9	42.9	21.9
Constraints on military action	50.0	45.7	25.0
Sensitivity to criticism from other CP's, CP states	29.4	51.4	71.9
Situation develops overtime before crisis level reached	29.4	42.9	68.8
Unique logistics/communications requirements	26.5	22.9	46.9

World War II.² The picture presented is one of steady growth -- in power, horizons, understanding, and experience. As the Soviet Union overcame its Stalin-era fears of foreign encroachment and turned its attention outwards, the self-confidence of its leadership grew and the mix of policy tools employed was adjusted to meet the new circumstances and opportunities. At the same time, however, its lines of communications became more extended and its leaders found themselves increasingly involved in chronic crises not of their own making that are the cross of the genuine superpower.

EXAMINING RELATIONSHIPS AMONG SETS OF CRISIS ATTRIBUTES

Soviet Crisis Attributes

Four sets of crisis attributes have been coded in this project and examined in previous chapters:

- The basic characteristics of the 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union, 1946-1975.
- The actions taken by the Soviets in a sample of 101 incidents. (the intensive sample).
- The apparent objectives pursued by the Soviets in the intensive sample cases.
- The crisis management problems encountered by the Soviets in the intensive sample cases.

As illustrated in Table 4, there are six possible comparisons of these four sets of attributes. Each of these relationships is examined in this section.

² Scholars holding this general view of postwar Soviet foreign policy include Dr. George E. Hudson (Wittenberg College) and Dr. Vladimir Petrov (George Washington University). (This conclusion is based on interviews with both researchers).

TABLE 4
Possible Bivariate Comparisons
of Crisis Attributes

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Actions</u>	<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Problems</u>
<u>Crisis Characteristics</u>			
<u>Actions</u>	x		
<u>Objectives</u>		x	
<u>Problems</u>			x

Analytical Approach

Since each set of attributes contains a substantial number of variables, comparison of bivariate relationships between individual indicators would produce a bewildering amount of detail. To avoid this complexity while still providing an overview of the inter-domain relationships, canonical correlation will be employed.

Canonical correlation (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971) is a statistical technique designed for the examination of relationships between sets of variables. It resembles multiple regression in that it shows the linear fit between two domains, while differing in that it allows for multiple criterion variables. It resembles the principal component model of factor analysis (Rummel, 1970) in that it searches for the canonical variates (factors) that best summarize the variation in each set of variables of interest and then searches for between-set covariation among these variates. Canonical correlation differs from principal components factor analysis, however, in that it produces factors/variates by using the criterion of accounting for the maximum amount of variance between two sets of variables. In a principal components factor analysis there is a unique solution for a given set of variables. In canonical correlation, on the other hand, the canonical variates selected for one of the two sets of variables in the analysis vary depending on the composition of the other set of indicators and between set covariations.

In canonical correlation, the first pair of canonical variates (one from each of the two sets of variables being examined) is selected to have the highest intercorrelation possible. The second pair of variates is then selected to account for the maximum amount of the residual variance not accounted for by the first pair, and so forth, until there is no significant common variation across the two sets remaining to be "explained".

The results of a canonical correlation analysis include:

- A correlation coefficient r_c that can be interpreted in the same manner as Pearson's r .
- An eigenvalue, (here presented as r_c^2) which can be interpreted as the square of Pearson's r , indexing the variance accounted for across a pair of canonical variates.
- The number of statistically significant canonical variates.
- The loadings of each of the variables within each set on each canonical variate.

In the analysis, primary attention will be paid to variables that load above .4 on each canonical variate factor (a similar criterion was employed in the preceding interpretations of the principal components factor analyses). With one exception, which is significant at the .06 level, all canonical correlation results reported are statistically significant at the customary .05 level.

Because of its strong resemblance to principal components factor analysis, canonical correlation has some of the same analytical interpretations. In the analyses to follow it will be employed as a data reduction technique that will show the overall relationships among domains of variables (for example, crisis characteristics and actions). Like principal components factor analysis, it is not an ideal choice where analysts have strong theoretical priors. However, such priors do not exist for the data to be examined and, as a result, little analytical loss is entailed.

Each of the four domains of crisis attributes will be indexed by a selected set of variables. The crisis characteristics selected are those in a dimensional (more/less) form, such as geopolitical proximity to the Soviet homeland. For the three intensive sample data bases

(actions, objectives, and problems), marker variables for each of the factors presented in the preceding two chapters will be employed, because such high-loading marker variables are simpler to interpret than factor scores. The variable sets are presented in Table 5. The sequence of the analysis will follow the rows of Table 4 beginning with the relationships between crisis characteristics and the three intensive sample data bases and then moving to comparisons between intensive sample data sets. As was true in the presentation of frequencies in the previous section, these results must be examined with some caution, since sampling was systematic and not random.

Crisis Characteristics and Actions

Two statistically significant variates emerge in the first cross-set comparison (Table 6). In the first pair, the characteristics variate is defined by a negative loading for initiation date and geopolitical locale and a positive loading for Soviet in-theater crisis management capabilities. The actions variate is defined by the provision of crisis-related military aid and changes in the alert status of nonnuclear forces. Substantively, the relationship between these two variates means that (at least for the sample) the crisis actions of providing military aid and altering the alert status of conventional forces were more likely during the earlier and middle years of the postwar period,³ in peripheral regions (the Third World), and as Soviet crisis management capabilities increased. All of these are reasonable relationships.

The second set of variates has a similarly reasonable interpretation. Crises that occur in geopolitically sensitive regions tend to be associated with three Soviet actions:

- Increases in the alert status of conventional forces,

³ The composition of the samples, with disproportionate percentages of major crises occurring in the first two phases, is likely to be one of the factors behind this relationship.

TABLE 5
Indicators for Comparisons

Crisis Characteristics

Initiation date of crises
Threats to Communist parties, movements present
Level of violence
Geo-political locale
Soviet activity level
Strategic confrontation
Duration of crises
Soviet objectives^a: in-theater supported actors
Soviet objectives^a: in-theater opposed actors
Soviet in-theater crises management capabilities

Actions^b

Provide crisis related military aid
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces
U.N. involved
Support antiregime Communist party or movement
USSR acts with two or more nations
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment
Employ diplomacy
Use of Warsaw Pact, CMEA to support political goals

^a The two "objectives" variables included in the characteristics data are summary overall assessments of Soviet goals. As such, they are pitched at a much higher level of generality than the goals coded for the intensive sample.

^b The variables shown under actions, objectives, and problems are, with one exception, the highest loading variables for the factors identified in the previous two chapters. The exception is the "provide crisis-related military aid" indicator. As noted in the discussion of crisis actions, this index has the cleanest substantive interpretation of the variables making up the first actions factor. Because of this, and since it has a high (though not the highest) loading on the dimension as well, it has been employed as the marker variable for the factor.

Continued

Table 5
Indicators for Comparisons
Continued

Objectives

Preserve buffer system
Restore peace
Preserve regime from internal threat
Bring about the fall of regime
Confirm/reestablish prestige
Discover interests or ambitions
Induce adoption of a new policy
Deny military access
Preserve lines of communication
Contain PRC
Dissuade from a new policy
Alter balance of power in USSR's, allies' favor

Problems

Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden
Availability of sea and airlift
Sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties and
party states
Late Soviet political/military involvement
Fear of encirclement by Western states
Crises develops despite adequate actions
Multicrises
Action inadequate to prevent crises
Action inadequate to solve crises
Soviets have little military operational experience in
crises theater
Prolonged crises with intermittant peaks

TABLE 6
Characteristics by Actions

<u>Canonical Variate</u>	<u>r_c²</u>	<u>r_c</u>	<u>Significance</u>
1	.48	.69	.000
2	.44	.66	.005

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Variate 1</u>	<u>Variate 2</u>
Initiation date of crisis	<u>-.58</u>	.02
Threats to Communist parties, movements present	.19	.02
Levels of violence	.29	-.35
Geopolitical locale	<u>-.53</u>	<u>.43</u>
Soviet activity level	.35	.34
Strategic confrontation	.22	.10
Duration of crises	.19	-.21
Soviet objectives: in-theater supported actors	-.36	.09
Soviet objectives: in-theater opposed actors	-.32	-.21
Soviet in-theater crises management capabilities	<u>.43</u>	.17

<u>Actions</u>	<u>Variate 1</u>	<u>Variate 2</u>
Provide crises related military aid	<u>.40</u>	-.39
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces	<u>.57</u>	<u>.60</u>
U.N. involved	.34	<u>-.44</u>
Support antiregime Communist party or movement	.26	-.10
USSR acts with two or more nations	-.04	-.18
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment	.16	.07
Employ diplomacy	-.08	<u>.65</u>
Use of Warsaw Pact, CMEA to support	-.06	-.03

- Increases in diplomatic activity, but
- Lessened involvement on the part of the United Nations.

It appears that U.N. involvement is more likely in less sensitive crises, such as those in the Third World.

Crisis Characteristics and Objectives

Two significant relationships emerge in Table 7, accounting for 61 and 40 percent of the variance between the paired variates. The first pair consists of one predominant objective -- preservation of the buffer system surrounding the USSR -- and three characteristics -- initiation date (negative loading), threats to Communist parties and regimes, and the crisis management capabilities of the Soviet Union. Substantively, the results mean that the goal of preserving the buffer system was less common in later years, following the more intense phase of the Cold War, and that this goal tended to occur when Communist parties or regimes (for example, those in Eastern Europe) were threatened, and where the Soviets had more substantial military capabilities, as was certainly the case in the buffer regions.

The second variate's interpretation is that in crises in geopolitically sensitive areas and in which the Soviets had the general aim of changing the status quo in favor of supported nations (including the USSR itself), Soviet objectives of inducing the adoption of new policies by other nations and containing the PRC tended to occur and the goal of restoring peace tended not to occur. A good example would be Soviet skirmishes with China on their common border.

Crisis Characteristics and Problems

Three significant pairs of variates emerge in the comparison of crisis settings and management problems, accounting for 58, 52, and 39 percent

TABLE 7
Characteristics by Objectives

<u>Canonical Variate</u>	<u>r_c^2</u>	<u>r_c</u>	<u>Significance</u>
1	.61	.78	.000
2	.40	.63	.038

<u>Objectives</u>	<u>Variate 1</u>	<u>Variate 2</u>
Preserve buffer system	<u>.86</u>	.28
Restore peace	.08	<u>-.47</u>
Preserve regime from internal threat	.07	-.06
Bring about the fall of regime	.18	-.22
Confirm/reestablish prestige	.24	-.27
Discover interests or ambitions	-.06	.21
Induce adoption of a new policy	-.09	<u>.43</u>
Deny military access	.09	-.30
Preserve lines of communication	.03	-.03
Contain PRC	-.15	<u>.49</u>
Dissuade from a new policy	.16	-.10
Alter balance of power in USSR's, allies' favor	.14	-.05

<u>Characteristics</u>	<u>Variate 1</u>	<u>Variate 2</u>
Initiation date of crises	<u>-.48</u>	.35
Threats to Communist parties, movements present	<u>.41</u>	-.04
Level of violence	-.14	-.13
Geopolitical locale	-.31	<u>.46</u>
Soviet activity level	.19	-.33
Strategic confrontation	.11	-.13
Duration of crises	.06	-.16
Soviet objectives: in-theater supported actors	-.22	<u>.45</u>
Soviet objectives: in-theater opposed actors	-.22	.19
Soviet in-theater crises management capabilities	<u>.67</u>	.30

of the variance between the sets of variates/factors (Table 8). In the first pair, a characteristics variate defined by a strong negative loading for the initiation date of the crises is associated with a decline in sensitivity to criticism from other Communist movements and a Soviet fear of encirclement. Substantively, this variate does nothing more than identify temporal trends in the sample for two crisis management problems.

The second variate is of more substantive interest. The defining characteristics are initiation date, threat to Communist parties, and Soviet crisis management capabilities (all negative loadings). The associated problems defining the other paired variate are the existence of sudden crises following the development of a crisis situation over time and a negative loading for actions inadequate to prevent the crisis. Once again some temporal-dependent characteristics have been associated with problems. Cases in which the crisis situation developed over time but the crises were sudden were more common in the earlier years in the sample, where there were no threats to Communist parties and regimes, and where the Soviets had very limited crisis management capabilities.

Finally, the third set of variates associates the absence of threats to Communist parties and regimes and of overall Soviet aims of preserving the status quo with the absence of sensitivity to criticism from other Marxist-Leninist movements and the absence of the problems caused when the Soviets have limited in-theater operational experience. Where the Soviets faced threats to Communist parties and regimes and had overall aims designed to alter or restore the status quo ante, they tended to be sensitive to criticism from other Communist movements and to face problems caused by limited experience in crisis operating theaters.

Crisis Actions and Objectives

Only one significant relationship between canonical variates emerges when objectives and actions are interrelated (Table 9). The crisis

TABLE 8
Characteristics by Problems

Canonical Variate	r_c^2	r_c	Significance
1	.58	.76	.000
2	.52	.72	.000
3	.39	.62	.002

Problems	Variate 1	Variate 2	Variate 3
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	.07	<u>.45</u>	-.08
Availability of sea and airlift	-.09	-.07	-.32
Sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties and party states	<u>-.47</u>	-.31	<u>-.58</u>
Late Soviet political/military involvement	.10	.23	.30
Fear of encirclement by Western states	<u>.51</u>	-.25	-.28
Crises develops despite adequate actions	.16	-.23	.03
Multicrises	-.08	.11	.13
Action inadequate to prevent crises	.39	<u>-.52</u>	.15
Action inadequate to solve crises	.25	.15	.00
Soviets have little military operational experience in crises theater	.32	.36	<u>-.65</u>
Prolonged crises with intermittent peaks	.07	.19	.18

Characteristics	Variate 1	Variate 2	Variate 3
Initiation date of crises	<u>-.80</u>	<u>-.54</u>	-.29
Threats to Communist parties, movements present	-.14	<u>-.45</u>	<u>-.55</u>
Level of violence	-.34	.33	-.02
Geopolitical locale	-.22	-.04	.19
Soviet activity level	.22	-.33	-.21
Strategic confrontation	-.01	-.19	-.21
Duration of crises	.27	.06	-.20
Soviet objectives: in-theater supported actors	-.10	.16	-.59
Soviet objectives: in-theater opposed actors	-.11	.23	<u>-.51</u>
Soviet in-theater crises management capabilities	.27	<u>-.40</u>	.26

TABLE 9
Actions by Objectives

<u>Canonical Variate</u>	<u>r_c^2</u>	<u>r_c</u>	<u>Significance</u>
1	.52	.75	.001
<u>Objectives</u>		<u>Variate 1</u>	
Preserve buffer system		.10	
Restore peace		<u>-.53</u>	
Preserve regime from internal threat		-.17	
Bring about the fall of regime		<u>-.50</u>	
Confirm/reestablish prestige		-.05	
Discover interests or ambitions		.18	
Induce adoption of a new policy		.14	
Deny military access		<u>-.50</u>	
Preserve lines of communication		-.01	
Contain PRC		.16	
Dissuade from a new policy		-.23	
Alter balance of power in USSR's, allies' favor		.00	
<u>Actions</u>		<u>Variate 1</u>	
Provide crises related military aid		<u>-.55</u>	
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces		-.12	
U.N. involved		-.34	
Support antiregime Communist party or movement		-.38	
USSR acts with two or more nations		-.28	
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment		.17	
Employ diplomacy		.05	
Use of Warsaw Pact, CMEA to support political goals		-.23	

action of providing military assistance (the first and largest of the crisis actions factors) tends to be associated with three goals: restoring peace, bringing about the fall of a regime, and denial of military access.

Crisis Actions and Problems

Only one significant variate pair emerges in Table 10. The two have 42 percent of their variance in common and associate a number of actions and problems. In those cases in which:

- The Soviet Union acted in concert with two or more other powers, and
- The Soviet Union did not change the alert status of conventional forces or employ the United Nations as a forum for diplomacy,

The Soviets tended to have one problem:

- Actions inadequate to solve crisis,

And to avoid two others:

- Fear of encirclement by Western states,
- Actions inadequate to prevent crisis.

One interesting implication of the loadings and covariation is that in those cases where the Soviets emerged in collective diplomacy, outside of the United Nations, their actions tended to be adequate to prevent some of the crises but inadequate to solve others once they occurred.⁴

TABLE 10
Actions by Problems

<u>Canonical Variate</u>	<u>r_c^2</u>	<u>r_c</u>	<u>Significance</u>
1	.42	.65	.020
<u>Problems</u>		<u>Variate 1</u>	
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden		.18	
Availability of sea and airlift		-.02	
Sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties and party states		.00	
Late Soviet political/military involvement		.20	
Fear of encirclement by Western states		-.49	
Crises develops despite adequate actions		-.32	
Multicrises		-.20	
Action inadequate to prevent crises		-.49	
Action inadequate to solve crises		.43	
Soviets have little military opera- tional experience in crises theater		-.03	
Prolonged crises with intermittant peaks		-.06	
<u>Actions</u>		<u>Variate 1</u>	
Provide crises related military aid		.31	
Change alert status of nonnuclear forces		-.73	
U.N. involved		-.40	
Support antiregime Communist party or movement		-.10	
USSR acts with two or more nations		.56	
Reaffirm existing political/military commitment		-.23	
Employ diplomacy		-.05	
Use of Warsaw Pact, CMEA to support political goals		-.14	

Crisis Objectives and Problems

The relationships presented in Table 11 were the most difficult to uncover of the six sets of cross-domain comparisons made in this section. Only one pattern emerged, and even it was below than .05 level employed in earlier comparisons. It is, however, a moderately strong pattern with the variates sharing 42 percent of their variance and is reported here for that reason.

The syndrome presented in Table 11 bears directly on the efficacy of Soviet crisis activities. The Soviets were likely to avoid the problems commonly associated with actions that are inadequate to solve crises when they had the goal of preserving a regime from internal threats and did not have the goals of containing the PRC and/or dissuading another regime from undertaking a new policy.

SUMMARY

The canonical correlation analyses reveal that the four domains of variables coded in the project: crisis characteristics, actions objectives, and problems, do not trace out completely idiosyncratic patterns. Instead, each exhibits patterns that are interrelated with patterns in the other data sets at moderate to strong levels of correlation. At the same time, the domains are relatively independent, with no more than three statistically significant canonical variates appearing in any

⁴ A point that needs to be taken into account in the interpretation of this pattern is that in some cases the Soviets might have viewed the occurrence of an apparently "manageable" crisis as desirable. In such cases no actions would have been taken to prevent the crisis and emphasis would have instead been placed on obtaining a favorable resolution/solution, even though these efforts might not have been successful.

TABLE 11
Objectives by Problems

Canonical Variate	r_c^2	r_c	Significance
1	.42	.65	.063
Objectives	Variate 1		
Preserve buffer system	.38		
Restore peace	.22		
Preserve regime from internal threat	.41		
Bring about the fall of regime	.16		
Confirm/reestablish prestige	.22		
Discover interests or ambitions	.14		
Induce adoption of a new policy	-.16		
Deny military access	-.03		
Preserve lines of communication	-.15		
Contain PRC	-.67		
Dissuade from a new policy	-.41		
Alter balance of power in USSR's, allies' favor	-.03		
Problems	Variate 1		
Situation develops over time but crisis is sudden	.19		
Availability of sea and airlift	.06		
Sensitivity to criticism from other Communist parties and party states	-.28		
Late Soviet political/military involvement	.36		
Fear of encirclement by Western states	.37		
Crises develops despite adequate actions	.17		
Multicrises	.11		
Action inadequate to prevent crises	.38		
Action inadequate to solve crises	-.52		
Soviets have little military operational experience in crises theater	.00		
Prolonged crises with intermittant peaks	.04		

comparison. This relative independence is significant because each of the domains has been coded in the same general fashion -- on the basis of inferences that were derived from observable patterns of behavior. The levels of correlation and independence found lend support to the proposition that the four domains capture related, but different, aspects of the Soviet crisis experience.

Of the sets, the crisis characteristics had more patterns in common with the three intensive coding variable sets than was true for the comparisons between the intensive domains. The most salient characteristics included time trends, which, because of the sampling criteria, were partially confounded with the character of the cold war and major power crises oversampled in the first and second phases; the geopolitical location of the incidents; the existence of threats to Communist parties and regimes; and the military crisis management capabilities of the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 8. SOVIET CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION

Most analyses of crises focus on single incidents or involve a comparison of a handful of major cases. While such studies can be extremely useful, this type of analytical emphasis automatically excludes some major aspects of crisis behavior, such as emerging patterns and trends and the interconnections that crisis operations and concerns have with other facets of East-West competition. These can only be analyzed by reviewing a large number of cases in conjunction with these other factors.¹ Analyses of U.S. crisis behavior have shown that these operations exhibit clear patterns in the period since World War II and have varied in accordance with changes in other central aspects of interbloc relations such as Soviet-U.S. strategic parity (Mahoney, 1978).

This chapter deals with the context within which Soviet crisis concerns have occurred since 1946. The first section reviews previous research dealing with the context in which U.S. crisis operations have occurred since World War II. It then uses these findings to suggest factors (for example, superpower strategic parity) that might have influenced and/or been influenced by Soviet crisis concerns and sets the stage for comparisons of the Soviet and U.S. crisis management experiences. The second section uses these and other factors to analyze how Soviet crisis concerns have fit into larger frameworks or structures of relations during the postwar period (for example, the structures of East-West relations and Soviet-Chinese competition).

¹ The crisis literature has recently been reviewed for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) by Parker (1976). One of the major reasons why CACI (1976) developed a definition of "crisis" that focused on extraordinary military management activities instead of the traditional "great crisis" emphasis focus was to allow for the analysis of trends in crises over time.

REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON U.S. CRISES IN CONTEXT

Mahoney (1978) examined 215 separate U.S. political-military crisis operations conducted over the period 1946-1975.² These data were elicited from a major ARPA-sponsored study (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) conducted at the Brookings Institution. The 215 operations were instances in which the U.S. Armed Forces

- Engaged in some physical action(s),
- At the direction of the U.S. National Command Authorities,
- In order to influence events abroad, either by taking direct action (short of war) or by establishing a presence targeted at specific nations and events.

The Korean and Vietnamese wars were excluded from the data base.

These 215 operations differ from one another along many dimensions. At the same time, however, each shares the common characteristic of being a case in which the U.S. Armed Forces were used for political-military ends. As a consequence, it is reasonable to presume that each operation was based on the same type of organizational processes within the U.S. National Command Authorities: the identification of a crisis "problem" or "opportunity," the selection of the armed forces as one of the appropriate policy instruments to use in dealing with the situation, and the implementation of a crisis operation. As a result, the relative frequency of crisis operations over time provides a partial perspective on

² Since the purposes of this section are to identify factors that might have influenced and/or been influenced by Soviet crisis concerns and to set the stage for a comparison of Soviet and U.S. crisis behavior, the results from the analyses of only one of the three major U.S. crisis data bases are presented here. Appendix B provides a brief comparison of these three data files produced by CACI, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), and Brookings.

the incidence of U.S. political-military operations and of the propensity of U.S. leaders to use the armed forces as policy instruments.

It is not a simple matter to relate these operations to the context of the postwar international environment. Not enough theoretical work has been carried out in the fields of defense analysis and international relations to allow for the development of strong model specifications of the type required for many types of formal causal inference. Instead of searching for the "causes" or causal consequences of U.S. crisis operations (which is beyond the state-of-the-art), the most that can be done in this area is to identify significant modalities -- trends and patterns in crisis operations and other factors of significance (such as Soviet-U.S. strategic parity).

A literature review (Mahoney, 1977b) suggests that four factors are of particular relevance for an understanding of the context within which U.S. crisis operations have taken place:

- The state of the strategic balance between the superpowers.
- Soviet-U.S. interactions.
- The amount of conflict occurring throughout the world.
- U.S. involvement in limited wars since 1946.

The frequency of U.S. crisis operations will be elicited from Blechman and Kaplan's (1976) study.³

The Soviet-U.S. strategic balance can be indexed by a four-value-ordinal variable based on an interpretation of Goldmann's (1974) analysis of the postwar strategic competition (Table 1). In this scheme a low number ()

³ This U.S. crisis data base has been selected for presentation here because it presents the strongest effects. The relationships between these four factors and the frequency of U.S. operations are reviewed in greater detail in Appendix C. The analyses of U.S. crises reported here are taken from Mahoney (1977b).

TABLE 1
Goldmann East-West Tension Levels

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Period</u>	<u>Level of "Objective" Tension in the Strategic Balance (1= low tension)</u>
I	1946-1947	(3)
II	1948-1956	(2)
III	1957-1965	(4)
IV	1966-1975	(1)

indexes a low level of "objective" tension in the balance. In Goldmann's assessment the most balanced (and least tense) period has been the phase of mutual second strike capabilities (parity) since the mid-1960's. The next most stable/least tension phase was 1948-1956, when only the United States possessed the capacity to attack the other superpower's homeland with a major strategic strike. This is followed by the period in which neither superpower had significant nuclear forces. Finally, the period with the most "objective" tension was 1957-1965, when both superpowers had counter-homeland nuclear capabilities, but where the United States had a significant lead over the Soviet Union. Parity (achieved sometime during the mid-1960's) ended this imbalance. (Subsequently this variable will be cited as the strategic balance.) (See Table 2, Row 1.)

The behavioral dimension of Soviet-U.S. relations can be indexed by an event data measure of Soviet conflict behaviors directed toward the United States over the period 1948-1973. This measure is taken from the Azar-Sloan (1975) event data file and deals primarily with verbal behaviors. (See Table 2, Row 2.)

Most U.S. political-military operations involve actual (or perceived potential) conflict in the Third World. This facet of the international

TABLE 2

Correlations: Frequency of U.S. Crisis Operations^a

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Correlation</u>
Strategic Balance	.74
Soviet Conflict Behaviors Toward the United States	.38
Frequency of Conflict Throughout the World	.49
U.S. Involvement in Limited Wars	-.34

^a N = 30 for all pairs except those involving Soviet-U.S. conflict behaviors because no observations are available for the years 1946-1947 and 1974-1975 on that index. The use of significance tests with data that are not a sample from a population is controversial. The 0.05 level (one-tailed) for all coefficients except those involving Soviet-U.S. behaviors is 0.30; for these cases the level is 0.32. All statistics are computed using the pair-wise deletion option of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) program package.

environment will be measured by a frequency index based on a data file developed by Edward E. Azar. The file contains major domestic and international conflicts: coups and other irregular regime transfers, border incidents and wars, and major domestic disturbances.

U.S. involvement in limited wars will be reflected by a dichotomous variable. For the Korean war, this variable takes on positive values for the years 1950-1953. For the Vietnam/Indochina war, the positive values begin in 1965 with the introduction of large numbers of U.S. military personnel into Vietnam. The end of the limited war commitment in the Southeast Asian theater is set in 1970. While one can argue for other termination dates (for example, 1972 and 1975), a 1970 endpoint is consistent with the Blechman-Kaplan data base. From early 1965 through the end of 1970 there are no U.S. political-military operations in the file

that involve the core states of Southeast Asia. In 1971 such operations begin to appear. While U.S. involvement in the theater certainly continued after 1970, it is consistent with the data base being employed to index a shift in the character of this involvement in 1970. The correlations between the frequency of U.S. crisis operations and the other four factors are given in Table 2.

U.S. crisis operations fall into a pattern that is shared, to varying degrees, by the other elements. Moreover, these are reasonable relationships. The signs of the correlations in Table 2 are intuitively interpretable. U.S. crises operations were more likely when

- The strategic balance was in phases that were more conducive to tension,
- The level of conflict in Soviet behaviors increased,
- The amount of conflict throughout the world increased, and
- The United States was not involved in a limited war.

The final step in relating the operations to their structural context involves determining the fit between the operations and the other four factors, taken as a set, using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. Because of the weak specifications involved in this analysis, attention will be confined to the R^2 value⁴ and the fit between actual and estimated values, as presented on the following page and in Figure 1.

⁴ Computed using the SPSS pair-wise deletion option due to the four missing values for Soviet-U.S. behaviors. For the residual analysis the equation was reestimated omitting these variables to estimate values for the first and last pairs of years. The two equations had nearly identical summary statistics, not a surprising finding in light of the presence of multicollinearity and the relative dominance of other factors in the correlation matrix.




Figure 1. Actual and Estimated Number of Operations

$$R = .84$$

$$R^2 = .70$$

$$F = 12.6$$

Standard deviation of residuals = 2.7

Durbin-Watson statistic = 1.94

Two points stand out in this analysis. First, it is apparent that there is a good fit between the pattern taken by U.S. crisis operations since 1946 and the set of contextual factors. The operations share better than two-thirds of their variance in common with the other elements; the standard deviation of the residuals is not a bad estimate; and the estimated curve reproduces, in essence, the most prominent features of the crisis operations frequency curve, notably the "peaking" in the late 1950's and early 1960's followed by a sharp decline in 1966. Postwar U.S. crisis operations take on patterns that are quite similar to those taken by other significant facets of East-West relations and international affairs.

Second, this analysis shows four classes of factors that might also be relevant for explaining Soviet crisis concerns:

- The state of the strategic balance.
- Soviet-U.S. interactions.
- The level of conflict throughout the world.
- U.S. involvement in limited wars.

SOVIET CRISIS CONCERNS IN CONTEXT

Factors Bearing on Soviet Crisis Concerns

The review of U.S. crisis analyses and the Soviet studies literature suggests a number of factors that might have influenced, and been influenced by, Soviet crisis concerns. As was true in the review of the U.S. studies in the previous sections, any analysis of the similarities of patterns taken by these factors and the set of crises of concern to the Soviet

Union is subject to two caveats. The first is that the relative frequency of these events over time is only one limited aspect of Soviet crisis concerns. The second is that because of the limited amount of research performed to date in this area no attempts to uncover "causal" patterns can be supported. The most that can be done is to search for similarities in patterns as indications of the broader contexts into which Soviet crisis concerns might have fallen in the postwar period.⁵

The analyses in this section will follow the format used in the previous section: an initial presentation of potentially relevant factors, followed by a correlation analysis to observe bivariate pattern similarities, and a final multivariate comparison of patterns. Two general classes of factors will be related to the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns. The first set pertains to the Soviet Union itself and includes indicators of the formal Soviet policy process, Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States, West Germany, and China, and Soviet perceptions of the strategic balance.

Chapter 4 shows that the frequency of Soviet crisis concerns varies in accordance with the cycles traced by the Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Dichotomous indicators indexing the

⁵ This lack of strong theoretical priors is taken into account in the regression analyses performed in this section. The relationships between the factors and Soviet crisis concerns are likely, in most cases, to be ones in which influence moves in both directions. However, in the absence of strong a priori specifications of equations, the use of more powerful forms of regression that can capture such interactive effects is impractical because the coefficients of such equations cannot be interpreted in the absence of these priors. Similarly, there is no good solution to the problem of correlations between predictor factors (multicollinearity) except the use of the priors, which are not available. As a consequence, the regression analysis will focus on the pattern-matching components of ordinary least squares regression (the simplest, most robust, and best understood model of regression) -- R^2 and residuals. This methodological response to the problem of incomplete specifications is detailed at greater length in Mahoney (1977b).

years encompassed by these Congresses will be used to capture this aspect of the Soviet policy process:

- 1946-1952 (from the end of World War II to the first postwar Congress)
- 1953-1955 19th Congress
- 1956-1958 20th Congress
- 1959-1961 21st Congress
- 1962-1965 22nd Congress
- 1966-1970 23rd Congress
- 1971-1975 24th Congress⁶

Three major Soviet crisis antagonists identified in Chapter 3 are the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the People's Republic of China. Soviet conflict toward these nations (primarily verbal actions) are indexed using the Azar-Sloan (1975) event data base, which was used in the previous section to measure Soviet conflict toward the United States.

In his analysis of contemporary international conflicts, Zhurkin (1975)⁷ identifies four stages in the evolution of "imperialism's" policies. The first stage, from the end of the 1940's through the mid-1950's, coincided with the beginning of the Cold War and what he sees as preparations by Western states for an attack on the Soviet Union and other Marxist-Leninist countries. The second stage (the latter half of the 1950's) saw a rapid strengthening of Soviet military power, which made threats of war an ineffective strategy for the imperialists. During the 1960's imperialism tried a new tack, shifting the center of gravity of its struggle against

⁶ To avoid a sense of false precision (the implication that shifts in Soviet policy occur precisely at the date of the Congresses), the dates of the Congresses have been used to delineate complete years.

⁷ Zhurkin is Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada and the most prominent Soviet specialist on U.S. crisis behavior.

the world Socialist system to the Third World and conducting operations in the Middle East and Southeast Asia behind the strategic shield provided by U.S. forces. The 1970's saw a new phase, with the further strengthening of Soviet power as the most important change responsible for this shift.

As is common in Soviet analyses of international relations, Zhurkin does not focus solely on the strategic balance and/or other purely military factors in delineating these stages. The Soviet conception of the "correlation of forces" encompasses more than is entailed by Western concepts of the balance of power or strategic balance (for example, Tomashevsky, 1974). However, we can use these stages, which have been formulated by a very senior Soviet analyst, to provide an approximation of a "strategic" balance measure that is somewhat analogous to the indicator of the nuclear balance used in analyzing U.S. crisis behavior in the previous section. Four dichotomous indicators will be used for this purpose to index the years cited above.⁸

In an unpublished analysis, Kjell Goldmann of the University of Stockholm has analyzed major power relations from 1950 through 1975. Using official government statements, Goldmann has computed mean tension levels for the major power dyads, for example, mean tension in U.S. statements concerning the Soviet Union. To index this perceptual/psychological dimension of Soviet behavior over the period, Goldmann's scores for Soviet tension concerning the United States will be employed.⁹ The final Soviet factor to be considered will be changes in national leadership, with dichotomous indicators representing the Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev-Kosygin eras.

⁸ The use of dichotomous or "dummy" variables to index periods in this fashion is explained in Cohen (1968).

⁹ These data, provided by Professor Goldmann in a seminar presentation conducted at CACI on 5 April 1978, deal with the entire range of Soviet-U.S. relations. A similar data set dealing only with European affairs is presented in detail in Goldmann (1974).

The second class of factors consists of items that are not Soviet behaviors, perceptions, or aspects of the Soviet policy process. Many of these factors were presented in the earlier analysis of U.S. crisis behavior and need not be discussed extensively. Their inclusion here facilitates comparison of the Soviet and U.S. crisis experiences. The items to be considered are the frequency of conflict throughout the world, the frequency of U.S. crisis management operations, conflict behaviors directed by the United States, West Germany, and the People's Republic of China toward the Soviet Union, articulated U.S. perceptions relating to U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, Western perceptions of the strategic balance, and U.S. involvement in limited wars (Korea and Vietnam).

The frequency of domestic and interstate conflicts was indexed using the Azar measure discussed previously. The frequency of U.S. crisis operations was measured using two major ARPA-sponsored projects conducted by the Brookings Institution (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) and CACI (1978a). The Azar-Sloan event data file was used to assess conflict behaviors directed toward the Soviet Union. The unpublished Goldmann perceptions data base discussed previously was used to measure U.S. perceptions of tension in relations with the Soviet Union. The strategic balance measure used in analyzing U.S. crisis behavior will be employed to assess the nuclear relationship as perceived in the West. A dichotomous indicator will be used to index U.S. involvement in limited wars.

Table 3 presents the correlations of these Soviet and non-Soviet factors with the yearly frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. Two important conclusions may be drawn from it. First, a large number of factors (predominantly Soviet) have appreciable correlations with the pattern taken by Soviet crisis concerns over the 30-year period. Rather than being idiosyncratic events, Soviet concerns with critical international events during the postwar period varied over time in ways that were similar to the patterns taken by 11 other factors.

TABLE 3

Correlation of Factors With Soviet Crisis Concerns

<u>Soviet Factors</u>	<u>Correlation With Frequency of Soviet Crisis Concerns, 1946-1975^a</u>
CPSU Congress Periods:	
Prior to 19th	-.22
19th	-.04
20th	-.04
21st	-.12
22nd	<u>.39</u>
23rd	<u>.47</u>
24th	<u>-.48</u>
Soviet Conflict Behavior Toward:	
United States	<u>.50</u>
West Germany	.22
People's Republic of China	<u>.37</u>
Goldmann, Soviet Expressions of Tension Toward the United States	<u>-.42</u>
Zhurkin, Phases in Strategic Balance:	
1946-1955	-.16
1956-1960	-.11
1961-1969	<u>.65</u>
1970-1975	<u>-.45</u>
Leaders:	
Stalin	-.22
Khrushchev	.18
Brezhnev-Kosygin	.02

^a Underlined correlations are .30 and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 3
Correlation of Factors With
Soviet Crisis Concerns
Continued

<u>Non-Soviet Factors</u>	<u>Correlation With Frequency of of Soviet Crisis Concerns, 1946-1975</u>
Frequency of Conflicts Throughout World	<u>.54</u>
U.S. Crisis Operations:	
CACI	.25
Brookings	<u>.35</u>
Conflict Behaviors of Major Nations Toward the Soviet Union:	
United States	-.38 ^b
West Germany	.04
People's Republic of China	<u>.41</u>
Goldmann, U.S. Expressions of Tensions Toward the Soviet Union	.13
Strategic Balance (Western Views)	.15
U.S. Involvement in Limited Wars	.19

^b The sign of this correlation is anomalous, associating higher levels of U.S. conflict toward the Soviet Union with lower levels of crisis concern on the part of the Soviet Union. While this could be interpreted as a plausible relationship (with received hostility from the United States causing the Soviet Union to focus its concerns on a narrower range of topics), there is a strong possibility that the relationship is artifactual. A comparison of the time series for Soviet conflict toward the United States and U.S. conflict toward the Soviet Union suggests that the former presents a perspective that is more in harmony with traditional interpretations of postwar superpower relations. For example, the Soviet-to-U.S. series has a peak in conflict in 1962, the year of the Cuban missile crisis, which the U.S.-to-Soviet series lacks. Because of the anomalous sign, this variable will be excluded from subsequent analyses. Apart from this case, all signs of the significant correlations are intuitively interpretable, for example, those of the Goldmann tensions variable, which is scored with low values reflecting high levels of tension.

The second noteworthy point is that, of the four factors shown to be correlates of U.S. crisis operations in the first section of the chapter (the frequency of conflict throughout the world, Soviet conflict toward the United States, Western perceptions of the strategic balance, and U.S. involvement in limited wars), only the first two are also appreciably correlated with the pattern of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. U.S. crisis operations and Soviet concerns with international events have different correlates in the postwar period.

Eight of the 11 correlates of Soviet crisis concerns are Soviet factors. The first three pertain to the Soviet policy process and are indicators for the periods following the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses. The next two variables are Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States and the People's Republic of China (interestingly, neither Soviet conflict toward West Germany nor German conflict toward the Soviet Union shows an association above the 0.30 threshold). The remaining Soviet factors have to do with Soviet expressions of tension concerning Soviet-U.S. relations and Soviet perceptions of recent phases in the correlation of forces between East and West.

Of the non-Soviet factors, only three have relationships above the 0.30 threshold: Azar's index of the frequency of domestic and interstate conflict throughout the world, the Brookings Institution index of the frequency of U.S. crisis operations during the postwar period, and Chinese conflict behavior toward the Soviet Union.⁹

Of the set of 11 factors that have appreciable correlations with the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns, two subsets are closely related: the indicators for the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses and Zhurkin's phases

⁹ The difference in correlation between the Brookings and CACI U.S. crises lists is apparently due to different patterns of coverage in the first postwar decade. The correlation between the Brookings and CACI lists is 0.56 for 1955-1975, but only 0.32 for the entire 30-year span. Appendix B compares these data bases in greater detail.

in the strategic/correlation of forces balance. Both subsets consist of dichotomous indicators that demarcate subperiods. In some cases these subperiods are almost identical, for example, Zhurkin's last phase in the correlation of forces (1970-1975) and the span covered by the 24th Congress of the CPSU (1971-1975). A comparison of the multiple correlations of the two subsets with the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union shows that the two subsets account for approximately the same amounts of variance (45-55 percent), with the Party Congress indicators being somewhat superior.¹⁰

In the interests of parsimony, and in order to reduce the degrees of freedom problems posed by a set of 11 predictors and only 30 "cases" (years), the Zhurkin indicators were removed from the analysis. The Party Congress indicators were used to index both formal phases in the Soviet policy process and the recent changes in the perceived correlation of forces that are concomitants of these phases.

Removing the Zhurkin correlation of forces/strategic variables, nine factors remain:

- Indicators for the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th Party Congresses.
- Soviet expressions of tension concerning the United States.
- Frequency of conflict throughout the world.
- Frequency of U.S. crisis operations.

¹⁰ Together the three Party Congress indicators and the two strategic phases variables account for 59 percent of the variance in the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. The Party Congress indicators by themselves account for 55 percent of this variance and the two strategic/correlation of forces variables 45 percent. The two strategic variables add only 4 percent to the variance accounted for by the Party Congress measures, while the latter add 14 percent to the variance accounted for by the former.

- Conflict behaviors directed by the People's Republic of China toward the Soviet Union.
- Soviet conflict toward the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The results of regressing the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union against these nine factors are shown below.¹¹ Figure 2

$$R = .85 \quad R^2 = .73 \quad F = 4.29$$

Standard deviation of residuals = 4.2

Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.37

compares the actual frequency of the Soviet crises with the frequency that would be estimated on the basis of these nine factors. The multiple regression results show that there is a good fit between the pattern taken by the crises of concern to the Soviet Union over the 30-year period and the aggregate pattern of the other factors. The equation shows that almost three-quarters of the variance in the crises was in common with variation in the other factors. The Durbin-Watson statistic indicates a modest degree of negative autocorrelation.¹²

¹¹ Regression results are computed using the pair-wise deletion option of SPSS.

¹² As noted previously, due to multicollinearity (correlations between the nine predictor factors) and because of the weak theoretical "priors," it is not possible to produce reliable structural parameter estimates and/or to apportion "influence" among the predictors. Analyses of subsets of the predictors indicate that it is possible to account for as much as 70 percent of the variance (with even less autocorrelation) in Soviet concerns with as few as four predictors (for example, the indices of the periods after the 23rd and 24th Party Congresses, Soviet conflict toward the United States, and Chinese conflict toward the Soviet Union). However, given the limits of what can be done (due to weak specifications and multicollinearity), it is not possible to state that these predictors (or any other subset) are the only "important" influences among the set of nine factors.




FIGURE 2. FREQUENCY OF CRISES OF CONCERN IN THE SOVIET UNION

The fit between the pattern of the crises noted in Soviet sources and the aggregate pattern estimated on the basis of the other factors is confirmed in Figure 2. The estimated and actual frequencies of crises of concern are very close in the early Cold War years (1946-1954). The estimates then miss a peak in Soviet concerns in the mid-1950's and return on track in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The estimated curve catches the general rise in the frequency of events of concern to the Soviet Union during the periods following the 22nd and 23rd Party Congresses (1962-1970), but falls short of capturing the peaks, especially in 1967, the year with the highest number of events of concern. The fit between the actual and estimated curves then becomes quite close for the most recent years (1971-1975).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has examined the international and domestic contexts within which U.S. crisis operations were conducted and Soviet crisis concerns formed over the period 1946-1975. The first section reviewed research on U.S. crisis operations. It was shown that these operations varied in accordance with the level of conflict throughout the world, U.S. involvement in limited wars, Soviet behaviors toward the United States, and phases in the strategic balance (as perceived in the West). This review provided support for the attempt to conduct a multiple-case contextual analysis of Soviet crisis concerns and identified predictors to be used in the comparison of Soviet and U.S. crisis management experiences.

The second section focused on Soviet crisis concerns as revealed by a review of Soviet sources. It showed that the frequency of crises of concern to the Soviet Union varied according to a number of factors: the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th CPSU Congresses (and recent phases in Soviet perceptions of the correlation of global forces, which were highly correlated with these Congress periods), Soviet behaviors toward the United States and the People's Republic of China, Chinese behaviors toward the Soviet Union, Soviet expressions of tension regarding Soviet-U.S. relations,

the frequency of U.S. crisis operations, and the level of conflict throughout the world.

Three major conclusions concerning Soviet crisis concerns can be drawn from these analyses. First, U.S. crisis operations and Soviet crisis concerns have different correlates. This is evidenced by the fact that only two of the four major correlates of U.S. crisis operations were also appreciably correlated with the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns (the indices of the level of conflict throughout the world and Soviet conflict, primarily verbal behavior, toward the United States).

Second, the fact that the pattern of Soviet crisis concerns varies in accordance with the aggregate pattern estimated on the basis of nine other Soviet and non-Soviet factors lends support to the Soviet data base. In any data-generation effort there is always a danger that an apparently plausible research strategy will produce anomalous and/or idiosyncratic data that have no appreciable relationships with variables measuring other factors of concern. The regression results presented in the second half of the chapter show that this is clearly not the case for the Soviet crisis concerns data, whose frequency varied in accordance with such factors as the formal stages in the Soviet policy process, the correlation of forces (as presented in a Soviet source), Soviet expressions of tension regarding Soviet-U.S. relations, the level of conflict throughout the world, U.S. crisis operations, and the behaviors sent and received by the Soviet Union.

Third, and more speculatively, the analysis of the context within which Soviet crisis concerns have occurred since World War II provides some suggestive evidence concerning the factors that might have influenced (and been influenced by) these concerns and events. While causal arguments cannot be supported, the results do pinpoint types of factors (such as those reviewed in the previous paragraph) as being potentially more important for an understanding of the reasons why Soviet crisis concerns have taken certain patterns and flag other factors (such as Soviet interactions with West Germany) as being less likely influences.

APPENDIX A. RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

This appendix deals with the reliability and validity of the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union and the codings of the crisis descriptors obtained for these incidents. The first section deals with general reliability and validity issues. The second section compares the Soviet crisis concerns list with other crisis lists.

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY

Data are reliable to the extent that two independent coders would produce the same results (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). In the identification of the cases from Soviet sources and the coding of basic crisis descriptors from both Soviet and Western sources, reliability was maintained by means of a form of "confrontational" or "consensus" coding. The two principal coders in this phase of the project (one a Ph.D. with experience in analyzing Soviet crisis behavior, the other an M.A. in Soviet studies with a career background as a Soviet specialist in the U.S. Army) identified and coded cases independently. During conferences these two coders justified their decisions and reconciled differences. This approach to reliability was adopted because the coding process required a "mini-case study" to be made for each case. The independent duplication of these mini-case studies to produce a sufficient number of cases for more formal intercoder reliability checks was prohibitive.

Validity relates to whether measures accurately index what they are intended to measure (Caporaso and Roos, 1973). In the identification of crises, validity was maintained in two ways. First, Soviet sources were used to identify the crises of concern to the Soviet Union.¹ These open-source Soviet materials are a form of communication from the Soviet Union,

¹ As elaborated in Chapter 2, due to source coverage problems, Western sources were also used to code incidents in 1974 and 1975.

and communication is an essential part of crisis management. National leaders (in the Soviet Union and elsewhere) need to inform other nations (and their own publics) about what issues and events concern them so that they can engage in effective bargaining and other forms of diplomacy. While there is no reason to believe that the Soviets tell everything that concerns them, it is reasonable to believe that most of their "sins" in communicating are ones of omission rather than commission and that they communicate their concerns without necessarily providing a full amount of their self-perceived interests and behaviors.

A second factor contributing to validity was the use of multiple categories of Soviet sources:

- Soviet statements in the United Nations.
- The Soviet crisis management literature.
- Soviet "State of the World" messages at Party Congresses.
- Soviet texts dealing with international events.
- Krushchev's memoirs.
- Soviet chronologies.

Use of multiple sources helps to counteract whatever biases might characterize any particular category of information.

COMPARISON OF CRISIS LISTS

Introduction

One of the most effective ways in which to validate a crisis list is to compare it with a similar list (for example, Mahoney's (1977a) comparison of the Brookings and Center for Naval Analyses U.S. crisis lists). In a strict sense, no such validation comparisons can be made for the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union. No other project has produced a comparable list using criteria similar to those employed here. As a

consequence, formal validation analyses involving either a one-to-one comparison of lists or comparisons of aggregate patterns cannot be performed.

It is possible, however, to gain some insight into the list of crises of concern to the Soviet Union (and into the Soviet views it embodies) by comparing it to some partially comparable data bases. These analyses delineate the specific patterns of perceptions and concerns found in the list and show how these patterns differ from the pictures traced by other data bases bearing on the subject.

In the interest of parsimony (and to provide for more rigorous comparisons) differences between lists receive much more emphasis than similarities. In the comparisons little concern is given to the ways in which different projects have categorized the same set of crisis events (for example, the issue of whether the Cyprus crisis of 1964 is one, two, or three events) (Mahoney, 1977a). Tabular presentations are adapted from the original source materials.

The data bases that will be compared with the Soviet list are

- The International Incidents project of the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) (Mahoney, 1977a),
- Other CNA lists produced by Brad Dismukes (1977) and Anne Kelly (1977),
- Blechman and Kaplan's preliminary analysis (1976) of the employment of the Soviet armed forces for political purposes, and
- Major lists of U.S. crises produced by the Brookings Institution, the Center for Naval Analyses, and CACI.²

² The purpose of this section is not to provide a detailed comparison of the Soviet and U.S. crisis lists produced by CACI. Instead, the goal is to use elements from the U.S. crisis list (and other sources) to delineate the types of events covered in the Soviet crisis concerns data base.

- A recent Soviet source bearing on the subject (Kremenyuk, 1977), which became available only after most of the data collection phase of the project had been completed.

In dealing with each of these sources, attention is confined to cases concerning Soviet crisis operations and/or Soviet-U.S. crisis interactions.

Comparison With CNA'S International Incidents List

The International Incidents project of the Center for Naval Analyses (Mahoney, 1977a) produced a list of 99 Navy and Marine Corps crisis operations over the period 1955-1975. Table 1 presents the major³ U.S.-Soviet crises contained in the Incidents data base; all are included in the CACI Soviet crisis concerns list.

TABLE 1

Major Soviet-U.S. Crises, International Incidents Project List

<u>Principal Target</u>	<u>Response</u>
Soviet Union	Post-Suez 11-12/1956 Berlin 5-9/1959 Berlin 8/1961-5/1962 Cuban Missile Crisis 10-11/1962 Middle East War 5-6/1967 Eilat 10/1967 Jordan 9-10/1970 Indo-Pak War 12/1971-1/1972 Middle East War 10-11/1973

Table 2 presents the major crises involving other Communist nations found in the Incidents data base.

³ These are "major" Navy crisis responses in the sense that they are the cases in which the Navy's most significant projection force -- aircraft carriers -- was involved in operations involving the Soviet Union.

TABLE 2
Other Crises Involving Communist States,
International Incidents Data Base^a

<u>Principal Target</u>	<u>Response</u>
PRC	Tachen Islands 2/1955 PRC-ROC 7-9/1957 Quemoy 6-12/1958 PRC-ROC 7/1959 Sino-Indian War 10-11/1962 PRC-ROC 9/1963
DPRK	Pueblo 1-3/1969 EC-121 4/1969
DRV	Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964
RGNUC	Mayaguez 5/1975

^a As was the case in Table 1, only Navy responses involving carriers are included in this list.

The pattern of coverage between the two lists is mixed. Of six incidents involving the People's Republic of China over the period, the Soviet list includes three: Taiwan Straits, Quemoy, and the Sino-Indian border war. Three Sino-U.S. crises of lesser significance are not included in the Soviet list. One of the two crises involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is included (Pueblo); one (EC-121) is not. The Gulf of Tonkin incident involving the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Mayaguez crisis between the United States and Cambodia are present in both lists.

Comparison With Dismukes CNA List

Dismukes (1977) presents a listing of major employments of the Soviet Navy for political purposes since the Soviet fleet "went to sea" in 1967. While not all of these cases are "crises" in any sense of the

term, they do involve the Soviet armed forces and hence provide a useful comparison base, which is presented in Table 3.

Several significant patterns emerge when Table 3 is compared with the list of crises of concern to the Soviet Union. First, the CACI list contains correspondent events for all major Soviet naval crisis operations: the June 1967 war, the movement of Soviet naval combatants into Egyptian ports in late summer 1967, the October 1967 Eilat incident, the Jordan crisis of 1970, the Portuguese raid on Guinea in 1970, the Bangladesh war of 1971, the Vietnam war, and the October 1973 war.

Second, the cases on the Dismukes list that do not have corresponding events on the Soviet crisis list fall into four categories:

- Mine clearing operations (Bangladesh and Suez).
- Exercises carried out in conjunction with other (political) events (Exercise Sever in 1968 and the maneuvers conducted at the time of the Cod War in 1973).
- Cases in which Soviet naval port visits and/or the positioning of Soviet naval units occurred at the same time as significant events in Third World countries: the 1969 Ghanaian fishing boats case, the Somali port visits of 1969, 1970, and 1972, the Sierra Leone case of 1971.
- The sealift of Moroccan troops in 1973, well prior to the October war.

The first category includes events that are not "crises" in any common usage of the term.

The second category contains two major fleet exercises. As is the case with all exercise activity, it is difficult to prove that these cases were focused on the political events that occurred at the same time (and/or to prove that they were not so focused).

TABLE 3
Employment of the Soviet Navy for Political Purposes, 1967-1974

<u>Date</u>	<u>Episode</u>
May 12-June 19, 1967	Surge deployment of 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and submarines to Mediterranean during the June War.
July 10-September 2, 1967	Soviet combatants led by a cruiser into Port Said and Alexandria.
October 27, 1967, to present	Combatants returned to Port Said and Alexandria following Israeli shelling of Port Suez in reprisal for sinking of <u>Eilat</u> .
July 1968	Exercise Sever in the Norwegian Sea.
February/March 1969	Small naval squadron off Accra during Soviet-Ghanaian negotiations on release of 2 Soviet trawlers, detained since October 1968. Squadron comprised 2 DCGs, 1 SS, 1 AD. Presence of Soviet ships did not become public knowledge but almost certainly was known to Ghanaian officials.
December 1969	Soviet ships performed a series of port visits and steamed steadily off Somalia following assassination of the president and a bloodless military coup.
April/May 1970	Port visits of longer than customary duration and simultaneous calls in Somali ports during a period when Somalia reportedly felt itself (erroneously) threatened by an Ethiopian military move and by internal rebellion.
September/October 1970	Increased deployments into Mediterranean during Jordanian crisis.
December 11, 1970, to present	Almost continuous patrol by Soviet combatants along West African coast and in Conakry following Portuguese attacks (November 22, 1970) on Guinea. Significant presence by LST/LSM since January 1972.
May 18-23, 1971	Kashin visit to Freetown, Sierra Leone, during a period of domestic instability.
December 1971	Deployment of 2 anti-CVA task groups to the Bay of Bengal to counter presence of <u>Enterprise</u> task force.
January 24-February 6, 1972	Kynda and Kreeta CLGs present in Mogadiscio during period of coup rumors and coinciding with a visit of UN Security Council in Mogadiscio.
April 1972-June 1974	Major harbor-clearing and mineclearing operation in Bangladesh.
May-June 1972	Deployment of surface squadron and submarines to South China Sea in reaction to U.S. <u>Linebacker</u> operations.
March/April 1973	Sealift of Moroccan troops to Syria.
Spring 1973	Large-scale naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea at the peak of the U.K.-Iceland Cod War.
October-November 1972	Major augmentation of Soviet Mediterranean Fleet in connection with the October Mideast War; threatening behavior in the peaks of the crisis.
July-November 1974	Mineclearing operations in the Straits of Cuba.

The status of the cases in the third category is also somewhat ambiguous. Their nonoccurrence on the Soviet crisis concerns list may be due to a number of factors:

- Soviet sensitivities concerning their lower-level political-military operations in the Third World.
- Soviet perceptions that these were not "major" political-military crises/operations.
- Soviet perceptions that at least some of these events were not intended by them to be responses to specific problem events in the Third World.

Because of its timing in March/April 1973, well before the October war, the last event (the Moroccan sealoft) is a somewhat marginal case. It is possible, however, that the absence of a correspondent entry on the Soviet list is due to the source coverage problems in the 1970's.

Comparison With Kelly CNA List

The final Center for Naval Analyses list of interest was produced by Anne Kelly (1977). Kelly's data base deals with politically oriented Soviet naval operations. As might be expected, there is substantial overlap between it and the Dismukes list examined in the previous section. As a result, attention is paid only to the eight cases on it which were not discussed in the previous section. These cases are presented in Table 4.

Of the cases listed, three have fairly close referents on the Soviet list:

- Yemen (though the Soviet list's entry includes a broader span of events).
- The Bab el Mandeb (part of the final phase of the 1973 October crisis).
- Soviet submarine visits to Cuba in 1972 and 1974 (the list has an earlier entry (in 1970) for this prolonged set of incidents).

TABLE 4

Selected Examples of Politically Oriented Soviet Naval Operations

<u>Year</u>	<u>Operation</u>	<u>Target</u>
1972, 1974	Deployment of sub tender and ballistic missile submarines in Cuban territorial waters	United States/ Cuba
1973	Visit of Admiral Gorshkov and naval contingent to Iraq	Iraq/Kuwait
1973	Sealift of South Yemen troops	Oman, South Yemen
1973	Naval patrol in Bab el Mandeb during Arab-Israeli war and aftermath	Israel/Egypt
1974	Naval hydrographic ship masking as a civilian research ship visits Tunisia	Tunisia
1974	At-sea seizure, off Guinea, of fleeing rebels held and charged by Guinea in the assassination of leader Amilar Cabral	Guinea/PAIGC
1974	Continuing patrol off West Africa following independence of Guinea Bissau	Uncertain (at least Guinea)
1974	Intelligence collection ships on patrol in Straits of Hormuz	Iran/West

The remaining events resemble those seen previously in that they involve "conjunctions" of naval activities and on-shore events and are not major crises in the conventional sense of the term.

Comparison With Brookings List

In their ARPA-sponsored study of the employment of the U.S. armed forces for political purposes, Blechman and Kaplan (1976) included one chapter that surveyed the employment of the Soviet armed forces for political ends. Table 5 presents some of the cases cited in that chapter. The table excludes events that were not "crises" in any common usage of the term (for example, port visits not associated with crisis events ashore) and events having correlates on the Soviet crisis concerns list.

A number of the 46 events listed in Table 5 have already been examined in previous comparisons (for example, the post-1967 operations involving the Soviet Navy) and need not be reviewed in detail again. For the remaining events, the most striking feature is the relatively large number of incidents involving Germany (21 cases). These are generally traffic events involving transit to Berlin, apart from the major Berlin crises. Soviet attention, as reflected in the CACI Soviet crisis concerns list, focuses on the major Berlin crises to the exclusion of these incidents.

Comparison With Major U.S. Crisis Lists

ARPA has sponsored two major studies dealing with U.S. crisis operations by Brookings (Blechman and Kaplan, 1976) and CACI (1977b). Together with CNA's International Incidents project (Mahoney, 1977a) these studies provide the most comprehensive data bases available concerning U.S. crisis management operations in the postwar period. The comparisons in this section use an unpublished working paper produced at CACI that integrates these three lists.

TABLE 5
Selected Political Uses of Soviet Armed Forces, 1946-1975

<u>Beginning Date</u>	<u>Target Nations</u>	<u>Action</u>
January 1946	China	Occupation of Manchuria
1947	Austria	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
January 1947	Germany	Intimidation of non-Communist political organizations
January 1948	Germany	Interdict transit to Berlin
February 1948	Germany	Overflights
1950-1953	Germany	Sporadically harass traffic to Berlin
January 1951	Germany	Occupy two enclaves in Berlin
March 1951	Albania	Provide air defense assistance
August 1951	Czechoslovakia	Provide air defense assistance
August 1951	Germany	Maneuvers in area
June 1952	Austria	Harass U.S. occupation forces aircraft
September 1954	Germany	Harass air traffic
November 1956	Germany	Harass traffic
August 1957	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
January 1958	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
September 1960	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
September 1962	Germany	Harassed traffic to Berlin
April 1963	Germany	Harass air traffic to Berlin
May 1963	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
October 1963	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
August 1964	Congo	Airlift arms
April 1965	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
April 1968	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
August 1968	Romania, Yugoslavia	Mass troops
February 1969	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
February 1969	Ghana	Naval deployment
April 1969	Korea	Naval deployment (EC-121 incident)
October 1969	Germany	Harass air traffic
April 1970	Somalia	Port visit
October 1970	Germany	Maneuvers
December 1970	Guinea	Naval deployment
January 1971	Germany	Harass traffic to Berlin
January 1971	Sudan	Combat air missions
May 1971	Sierra Leone	Port visit
August 1971	Romania, Yugoslavia	Maneuvers
January 1972	Somalia	Port visit
April 1972	Bangladesh	Clear mines
May 1972	Vietnam	Naval deployment
1973	Yemen-Oman	Transport foreign troops
April 1973	Iraq, Kuwait	Port visit
April 1973	Morocco, Syria	Transport foreign troops
October 1973	Egypt, Syria	Airlift supplies, alert, naval deployment
1974	Guinea	Naval patrols
June 1974	Egypt	Clear mines
August 1974	Romania	Maneuvers
September 1975	Norway	Missile tests

Table 6 presents the Soviet-U.S. crises present in the integrated list, with the exception of those cases having correlates on the Soviet crisis concerns list.⁴ For convenience, Table 6 has five sections:

- Direct and indirect Soviet-U.S. confrontations.
- Ship incidents.
- Aircraft incidents.
- Border incidents.
- "Other" (miscellaneous) incidents.

Two points stand out in Table 6. The first is that the set of direct and indirect Soviet-U.S. confrontations consists, for the most part, of relatively minor events. The major Soviet-U.S. crises (for example, Turkey and Greece in the late 1940's; the 1948, 1958-1959, and 1961 Berlin crises; the Cuban missile crisis; the 1967 war; the Jordanian crisis of 1970; the Bangladesh war; and the October war of 1973) are found on both the integrated U.S. crises and Soviet crisis concerns lists and hence are not included in the table.

Kremenyuk's Analysis

During the course of the project, after most of the data collection and coding had been completed, CACI researchers obtained a copy of V.A. Kremenyuk's U.S. Policy in the Developing Countries: Problems of Conflict Situations, 1945-1976 (1977). This work is directly focused on subjects

⁴ Clearly the record of Soviet-U.S. crises provides the best base of precedents for U.S. crisis managers considering response options in crises involving the Soviet Union. Western perceptions of these events are fairly easy to obtain from these three projects. The existence of these projects and their data bases of Soviet-U.S. crises, as perceived in the West, is one of the major reasons why CACI's Soviet crisis project uses Soviet sources to obtain an alternative perspective on the Soviet crisis experience.

TABLE 6
Selected Soviet-U.S. Crises
(Brookings, CIA, and CACI Data Bases)

1. Direct and Indirect Superpower Involvement

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
5208 -	Security of Turkey
521021-521103	Allied authorities in Germany reject Soviet demands that anti-Soviet groups in West Berlin be disbanded.
620102-620405	Continued tensions over Berlin.
6312 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.
680830-	President Johnson warns the Soviet Union against further aggression in East Europe as rumors of invasion of Romania grow.
680917-680918	The United States, Britain, and France warn the Soviet Union that any effort to use military force against West Germany will bring "immediate" Allied response. ^a
710108-	Bomb explodes outside a Soviet cultural building in Washington, D.C.
7104 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.
720114-	U.S. Congressman expelled from Soviet Union.
7310 -7404	Indian Ocean. (Aftermath of October war)
7505 -	Improved relations with Soviet Union.

2. Ship Incidents

510207-	The United States demands that the Soviet Union return at once 672 vessels loaned during World War II.
590226-	U.S. Navy boards a Soviet trawler off Newfoundland while investigating damage to five transatlantic cables. Novorossiisk incident.
6205 -	Hostile Soviet naval activity in the Baltic.
650403-	The United States accuses the Soviet Union of dangerous harassment of U.S. naval operations on the high seas.
681209-681212	Two U.S. destroyers begin cruise in the Black Sea despite Soviet protest.
720416-	Soviet ships bombed in Haiphong Harbor.

3. Aircraft Incidents

500515-	Soviet Government charges in note to Iran that U.S. technicians are taking aerial photographs of Soviet-Iran frontier.
511124-	The United States charges that a U.S. Navy plane missing over northern Japanese waters had been shot down by Soviet fighter planes outside Soviet territory.

^a Present on draft list, but as a May-August Berlin crisis.

Table 6
Aircraft Incidents
Continued

<u>Date</u>	<u>Event</u>
521005-	Two Soviet jet fighters harass a U.S. ambulance plane en route to West Berlin.
521012-521017	Soviet Government charges that a U.S. B-29, reported missing off Japan, violated Soviet territory and disappeared seaward when fired on by Soviet fighters.
521104-	Fighter plane with Soviet markings intercepted over Hokkaido Island, Japan, by two U.S. planes and escorted back to Soviet territory.
530216-	Two U.S. jets fire on two Soviet fighters over Hokkaido, force their withdrawal.
530317-530325	Soviet aircraft attack U.S. Air Force RB-50 on weather reconnaissance mission 25 miles east of Siberia.
530520-	Another Soviet jet flown to Denmark by Polish pilot.
530727-530731	Soviet Union charges that four U.S. fighters shot down Soviet passenger plane over Communist China.
530729-530731	United States protests shooting down of U.S. RB-50 over Sea of Japan.
540201-	United States shoots down Soviet jet fighter off Korean coast.
541107-	U.S. reconnaissance plane shot down over Japan.
550424-550708	Soviet planes shoot down U.S. Navy patrol aircraft over international waters in the Bering Straits area.
560710-	Soviet Government charges that U.S. aircraft recently violated Soviet air space in flights as deep as 200 miles within Soviet borders.
560716-	U.S. Government charges the Soviet Union with holding at least 10 crew members from two downed U.S. military aircraft.
580418-	United States rejects Soviet allegation of provocative nuclear bomber flights over the Arctic.
580629-	U.S. transport forced down by Soviet jet fighters near Yerevan in Soviet Armenia.
581016-	The Soviet Union charges U.S. military aircraft are flying reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory in the Far East.
590615-	U.S. Navy patrol plane damaged by MIG's over the Sea of Japan.
600524-	Soviet Army agrees to release nine U.S. airmen and their plane forced down in East Germany.

Table 6
Aircraft Incidents
Continued

Date	Event
600711-610125	Soviet Union states a missing RB-47 was shot down over Soviet territorial waters in the Arctic.
640128-640131	Soviet fighters shoot down unarmed U.S. jet trainer over East Germany.
640310-640322	Soviet air defense forces shoot down U.S. jet reconnaissance bomber that accidentally crosses into East German airspace.
641105-	Soviet Union threatens the safety of international flights by Western airlines in the East German air corridors en route to and from Berlin.
680702-	U.S. commercial airliner forced to land on Soviet island in Kuriles.
4. Border Incidents	
490709-490725	Soviet authorities close all zonal crossings except one to truck traffic bound for Berlin from West Germany.
500126-500218	U.S., British, and French commandants protest continued restrictions by Soviet authorities on truck traffic in and out of Berlin.
520630-	U.S., British, and French high commissioners in Germany renew protests to Soviet authorities against interference with traffic on the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn by East German authorities.
521029-	Train carrying eight U.S. tanks to West Berlin is stopped at the border of the Soviet Zone by Soviet authorities.
600309-600402	Confrontations in West Germany and Berlin.
631011-631104	The United States protests strongly and repeatedly to the Soviet Union against the blocking of a U.S. military convoy by Soviet troops outside West Berlin.
5. Other Incidents	
510606-	United States demands that Soviet Government punish Soviet soldier who killed a U.S. corporal in Vienna.
510609-	U.S. Army forcibly removes 3-man Soviet repatriation mission from U.S. Zone to Soviet Zone in Austria.
640400-640410	The United States retaliates for travel ban on four of its embassy attaches in Moscow by restricting all Soviet military attaches in the United States to the Washington area.
701123-701221	Lithuanian seaman attempts to defect. Seeks asylum in the United States by boarding U.S. Coast Guard cutter. Coast Guard officers force him to return.
710125-710127	U.S. Embassy in Moscow protests against harassment of newsmen.

of concern to CACI's Soviet crisis management project. In the words of book's abstract:

In this book are examined the fundamental directions and major stages of U.S. policy towards serious conflicts in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the period following World War II, and also the peculiarities of this policy during the period of detente. The author points out how the active struggle on the part of the Soviet Union against interference in the internal affairs of the developing countries and for political resolution of international conflicts has promoted the gradual creation of a new world political climate. The book would be of interest for readers concerned with the problems of international relations (Kremenyuk, 1977: 1).

This work is clearly a major element in the emerging Soviet crisis management literature, along with the analysis of Zhurkin (1975), Zhurkin and Primakov (1972), and Kulish (1972). Like these earlier crisis management studies, the text has not been translated from Russian but is freely available for purchase by Westerners. (All translations presented in this section were made by Richard P. Clayberg of CACI.)

Kremenyuk is concerned with a wide variety of types of U.S. military-political involvement in conflicts involving developing nations, including

- Direct U.S. involvement in local wars against national liberation movements,
- Military operations involving U.S. armed forces against a national liberation movement in support of reactionary, pro-imperialist groupings in the developing nations,
- U.S. support of pro-imperialist groupings in armed conflict with limited uses of force ("show of force", transportation, military assistance, and so forth),
- U.S. support of reactionary groupings with the use of covert means of interference (arms deliveries, funding of secret operations, and so forth), and

- Diplomatic support by the United States of one side in a conflict (in the United Nations and in regional organizations, and assistance in political settlements in the interests of the U.S.-supported group, and so forth).

In addition, Kremenyuk presents lists of crises and conflicts involving Third World nations, focusing on the involvement of the United States and other Western powers in these incidents. These events fall within the scope of Soviet crisis concerns as defined in Chapter 2.

As noted previously, Kremenyuk's analysis was obtained at a late date in the project, and the bulk of data collection and coding had already been completed. At the same time, however, it came at a propitious time for purposes of validation, particularly because the recent date of publication (1977) made it likely that it would include a number of the more recent Soviet crisis concerns that other sources with earlier publication dates might have missed. As such, it can be used as a test of the quality of the Soviet crisis concerns data base presented in Chapter 3.

In his major discussions of both Third World conflict and Western involvement of these incidents, Kremenyuk lists 151 incidents. Of this set, 138 items have corresponding entries on the list of 386 crisis of concern to the Soviet Union presented in Chapter 3. The percentage of agreement between the two sources is 91 percent. Moreover, when the items presented in Kremenyuk but not found in the list of 386 crises of concern are examined (Table 7) some interesting patterns emerge.

The major conclusions that can be drawn from an examination of the set of 13 nonoverlapping cases are:

- There are no major world events or instances of major Soviet military operations in the set.
- There is a preponderance of Latin and Central American cases in the set (7/13). While the Soviets have not (apart from Cuba) focused their more overt forms of

TABLE 7

Cases Listed in Kremenjuk (1977) That Are Not Found in the
Set of 386 Crises of Concern to the Soviet Union

<u>Decade^a</u>	<u>Location or Participant(s)</u>
1940's	No Cases
1950's	Spanish Morocco, 1957-1958 Thailand, 1955-1959
1960's	Colombia, 1962 Guatemala, 1962 Thailand-Cambodia, 1961 Malaysia-Philippines, 1968 Thailand, late 1960's
1970's	Dominican Republic Panama Peru Venezuela Colombia Lebanon (1975-1976) ^b

^a In many cases Kremenjuk provides only very approximate dates for these crises. Where more specific dates are given, this information is presented in the second column.

^b Since the major crisis events occurred in 1976 and the list of 386 crises of concern ends in 1975, it could be argued that this incident should not be included in the set of nonoverlapping events. In order to err, if at all, on the conservative side, it is included here.

military crisis management behavior on these regions, it is apparent that events in these areas are of concern to them.

- There are more cases in the more recent period, as would be expected, given source coverage/publication date problems.

The most important conclusion, based on the 91 percent overlap between the two data sets, is that the list of 386 crises of concern to the Soviet Union during the post-war period fares well in the comparison. Since the 13 nonoverlapping cases would only increase the 386-case data base by 3 percent, their omission has little impact upon the analysis, apart from a slight underestimation of Soviet concerns with Latin American events.

CONCLUSIONS

Three points stand out in the comparisons of the Soviet crisis concerns list with the other major crisis data bases. The first is that the Soviet list includes most of the major postwar Soviet-U.S. crises identified in both Soviet and Western data bases. The most significant exception is the April 1969 EC-121 incident, and here the character of the Soviet operations suggests that they may not have regarded the event as a major crisis.⁵

Second, it is evident that the Soviets pay much less attention to ship, aircraft, and Berlin transit incidents than is the case in Western sources, as is shown most strikingly in the comparison of the Soviet crisis concerns list with the Brookings data base. A possible reason for this difference is that the Soviets may not consider such "military" incidents to be important unless they are clearly linked to more significant political events.

⁵ Moreover, the failure of the United States to take actions beyond a naval show of force in the 1968 Pueblo crisis might have suggested to the Soviet Union that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had little to fear from a U.S. response to the EC-121 shoot-down.

Finally, as was brought out most clearly in the comparisons with the Dismukes, Kelly, and Brookings lists, Soviet views differ considerably from those of Western observers when it comes to the treatment of some of the lesser incidents involving the Soviet Navy in the Third World. As noted previously, this could be due to any one of a number of factors: Soviet sensitivities concerning such operations, Soviet perceptions that these were not "major" crises or crisis operations, or (more speculatively) Soviet perceptions that at least some of the events in this category were not intended by them to be reactions to specific crisis events and/or significant crisis operations.

APPENDIX B. COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS PROJECTS

INTRODUCTION

Three major recent projects have attempted to identify and analyze the postwar military crisis operations of the United States (CACI, 1978a; Mahoney, 1978; Blechman and Kaplan, 1976). Each of the three employed a different definition for its subject matter.¹

- CACI researchers focused on instances in which the United States engaged in extraordinary military management activity.
- Brookings researchers focused on political uses of the armed forces.
- CNA's International Incidents project focused on Navy and Marine Corps operations carried out in conjunction with foreign events.

Because of these differences in scope, there is no reason to expect that the three would produce identical lists of incidents. At the same time, however, their foci clearly overlap (all, for example, include the major postwar East-West clashes) and hence have at least partial comparability. Because the theoretical implications of the differences in definition and scope are not well understood, any differences among the three can, at most, serve a heuristic purpose. At the same time, however, the identification of common patterns and (more significantly) common relationships will provide us with greater confidence in research that utilizes these data.

¹ The three definitions are presented and discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.

This section is designed to serve as an adjunct to analyses presented in Chapter 8. The analysis begins by comparing the three data sets and then proceeds to a comparison of their relationships with other factors.²

COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS DATA BASES

The Brookings and CACI data files cover the period 1946-1975. CNA's International Incidents project, by contrast, begins in 1955. This starting date was selected on the assumption that modern crisis diplomacy began in the mid-1950's, when the United States and the Soviet Union acquired the capacity to present credible nuclear threats to one another's homelands. The presupposition was that this mutual nuclear vulnerability set off the period since the mid-1950's from earlier eras of crisis diplomacy.

Reflecting this difference in temporal scope, Table 1 presents two sets of correlations, the spans 1946-1975 (for the Brookings and CACI files) and 1955-1975 (for all three data bases). Two CACI variables are presented, one for the complete data set (307 cases) and a second which excludes domestic (U.S.) operations, as well as a few other cases (for example, U.S. release of military bases in the West Indies in 1960 and the Independence of Micronesia in 1972) that have no counterparts in the other two data bases (274 cases).

The differences in correlations in the two periods are striking. The implication of these results is that the data files take on much more consistent profiles after 1955 than was true during the initial Cold War years of the late 1940's and early 1950's. This conclusion is supported by an examination of Figure 1, which plots the frequency of events in the CNA, Brookings, and "international crises" version of the CACI data bases.

² The second analysis can be viewed as a weak form of construct validity (Bohrnstedt, 1970).

TABLE 1
Correlations of U.S. Crisis Data Bases

	<u>Brookings</u>	<u>CNA^a</u>	<u>CACI (307)</u>	<u>CACI (274)</u>
<u>1946-1975</u>				
Brookings	1.0	-	.32	.35
CNA		-	-	-
CACI (307)		-	1.00	.89
CACI (274)		-		1.00
<u>1955-1975</u>				
Brookings	1.0	.89	.56	.71
CNA		1.00	.51	.65
CACI (307)			1.00	.86
CACI (274)				1.00

^a Since there are no pre-1955 values for the CNA indicator, cross-period comparisons of correlations cannot be made.

The differences between the pre- and post-1955 periods in Figure 1 are striking. With some exceptions (for example, the 1968 peak in the CACI series) the values in the later periods exhibit roughly consonant patterns. The contrary is true in the pre-1955 period.

Table 2 carries the analysis of the three data bases one step further by comparing the relationships that they have with other factors. The factors selected are those presented previously in Chapter 8:

- The (perceived) state of the strategic balance in the West (an "objective tension" variable based on Goldmann's (1974) research).
- Soviet conflict behaviors toward the United States (Azar and Sloan, 1975).
- The frequency of conflicts throughout the world (based on Azar's work).
- U.S. involvement in limited wars (Korea and Vietnam).

A number of points stand out:

- The results for 1946-1975 are not consistent across the data bases.
- In marked contrast, with the exception of the limited war variable for the 307-case CACI data base,³ there is much stronger consistency across crisis indicators in the 1955-1975 span.
- Moreover, the aggregate fit between the factors and the pattern taken by U.S. operations is consistently stronger for each data base in the post-1955 era.

On the basis of these analyses, two conclusions are warranted. The first is that all three data bases trace out roughly similar patterns in the post-1955 period and, perhaps more significantly, have similar

³ Domestic military operations conducted during the 1960's might account for this difference between the two versions of the CACI data base.

— BROOKINGS EVENTS
 CNA EVENTS
 - - - CACI 274 CASE EVENTS




FIGURE 1. COMPARISON OF U.S. CRISIS PROJECTS

TABLE 2

Correlations of Four Predictor Factors
With U.S. Crisis Data Bases^a

<u>Dependent Variables, 1946-1975</u>			<u>Factors</u>
<u>CNA</u>	<u>Brookings</u>	<u>CACI (307)</u>	
	.74	.27	Strategic balance
	.38	.19	Soviet conflict toward the United States
	.49	.31	The frequency of conflict globally
	-.34	.30	Limited wars
	.70	.32	R ²

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Dependent Variables, 1955-1975

<u>CNA</u>	<u>Brookings</u>	<u>CACI (307)</u>	<u>CACI (274)</u>	<u>Factors</u>
.72	.79	.42	.62	Strategic balance
.53	.43	.51	.49	Soviet conflict toward the United States
.56	.51	.41	.37	The frequency of conflict globally
.25	-.28	.06	-.15	Limited wars
.84	.86	.64	.69	R ²

^a Figures opposite factors are bivariate correlations.

^b The CNA values begin in 1955, making a two-span comparison impossible.

patterns of intercorrelations with other factors. Second, the salience of the 1955 "break" lends support for (though clearly does not provide conclusive evidence for) the CNA project's emphasis on the importance of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers as a factor denoting a new phase in U.S. crisis management.

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